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Researchers have always had great interest in traffic safety and the phenomenon 
of motor vehicle crashes (MVCs). Though scores of service members are severely injured 
or killed in off-duty MVCs each year, few studies have addressed the MVC phenomenon 
within the military population and none have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of 
the causal factors associated with MVCs involving military personnel. 
The main purpose of this dissertation was to gain a greater understanding of the 
causal factors associated with serious and fatal off-duty personal MVCs for military 
service members with the ultimate goal of preventing future losses. The HFACS-MVC 
framework was developed based on the established human error framework HFACS and 
used to classify causal factors from archival narratives from Class A and B off-duty 
MVCs in the USAF, USN, and USMC. This study identified the human factors trends 
associated with off-duty military MVCs and compared main trends for four variables of 
interest, specifically for military branch, vehicle type, paygrade, and age group. 
The main human factor trends associated with off-duty MVCs were skill based 
technique errors related to negotiating curves/turns and regaining road positions and 
procedural violations related to speeding and drunk driving. Significant differences were 
found between human factors trends associated with MVCs for both vehicle type and 
military branch. For vehicle type, the human factors trends for 4W MVCs were 
significantly different from those for 2W MVCs, especially at the preconditions level. 
However, for military branch, the human factors trends suggest differences in the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Around the world, motor vehicle crashes (MVCs) result in 1.2 million deaths and 
20 to 50 million injuries each year (WHO, 2009). In the United States alone, five to six 
million MVCs occur annually resulting in more than 30,000 deaths and over two million 
injuries (NHTSA, 2010a). In fact, MVCs consistently rank among the top ten leading 
causes of unintentional deaths in the United States and are particularly detrimental to 
young males (Evans, 2004; Subramanian, 2009). 
1.1 MVC CAUSAL FACTORS 
Causal factors for MVCs are commonly classified into one of three basic 
categories based on their source – driver, roadway environment, or vehicle. Driver factors 
include direct driver causes as well as driver conditions and states. Common driver 
factors include speeding, inattention, following too closely, alcohol impairment and 
inexperience (Treat, et al., 1979; Wierwille, et al., 2002). Common roadway environment 
factors are related to roadway design (e.g. grades, curves), weather, and lighting. 
Common vehicle factors are related to controls and displays (e.g. cruise control, ITS), 
visibility from the vehicle, and safety systems (e.g. safety belts, ABS). Of these three 
causal factor categories, driver factors are the leading cause of the large majority of 
MVCs (Sabey & Taylor, 1980; Treat, et al., 1979; Wierwille, et al., 2002). 
Finding driver factors messy and nebulous, engineers who study MVCs have 
typically eschewed driver factors for roadway environment and vehicle factors. Civil 
engineers who design structural systems generally focus on roadway environment factors. 
Mechanical engineers who design mechanical systems typically focus on vehicle factors. 
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However, human factors engineers who apply their expertise knowledge of human 
behavior to the design of products, processes, and systems focus on driver factors and 
their interactions with roadway environment and vehicle factors ("Human Factors," 
2011). Unfortunately, only a small fraction of existing MVC literature contains 
comprehensive human factors analyses of MVCs. 
1.2 MVCS IN THE MILITARY 
The MVC studies that do exist have typically looked at the general, largely 
civilian population. However, MVCs have detrimental effects on the military population 
as well. With the large majority of military personnel being young males, it's not 
surprising that hundreds of our service members are involved in serious and fatal MVCs 
around the world each year (GAO, 2005). Sadly, off-duty personal MVCs have gravely 
impacted the military for decades. 
The military is plagued by hundreds of accidental deaths to service members each 
year, of which approximately 40 to 55 percent are the result of MVCs (Ecola, Collins, & 
Eiseman, 2010). Losses suffered as a result of MVCs reduce combat readiness by 
undermining the ability of the military to successfully prepare and carry out missions 
(Markopoulos, 2009; Miles, 2008). The military is negatively affected by direct, medical, 
and lost productivity costs associated with severe MVCs. Direct costs include vehicle 
damage, property damage, and the costs associated with military training. Medical costs 
include amounts paid for hospital and rehabilitation services. Lost productivity costs 
include days in the hospital, lost work days, and workplace disruptions. 
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For over a decade, US military safety centers have collected and maintained both 
quantitative (personnel, roadway environment, vehicle, and event variables) and 
qualitative (narrative) information for all MVCs resulting in the hospitalization or death 
of a service member. Prior attempts at identifying human causal factors for these mishaps 
appear to be inadequate for a comprehensive analysis of MVC causal factors. At times 
causal factors were identified inconsistently or incorrectly. 
The military has implemented a number of recreation and off-duty safety 
programs targeting off-duty MVCs over the years. Traffic safety strategies commonly 
used throughout the military include training courses (e.g. Motorcycle Safety Foundation 
Basic/Experienced Rider Courses, Military Sportbike Rider Course), educational classes 
(e.g. AAA Driver Improvement Program, Alive at 25 Driver’s Awareness Course), and 
briefings (e.g. Safety Stand Downs). Off-duty MVC safety efforts often focus on 
preventing drinking and driving, drowsy driving, and distracted driving especially related 
to cell phone usage behind the wheel. 
To further their safety efforts, the United States Air Force (USAF), Navy (USN), 
and Marine Corps (USMC) collaborated with researchers in the Industrial Engineering 
department at Clemson University to carry out a comprehensive classification and 
assessment of MVC causal factors plaguing the military. The records for severe off-duty 
MVCs involving military personnel are maintained at service-specific military safety 
centers. This research accessed the records of severe off-duty MVCs for the USAF, USN, 
and USMC. Approximately 10 years of USN and USAF data and almost five years of 
USMC data were provided. The qualitative narrative descriptions provide a rare 
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opportunity to study severe off-duty MVCs in the military. Comprehensive classification 
and analysis of the causal factors involved in these MVCs exposes the hazards that pose 
the greatest threat to our service members on the road. These findings provide a sound 
foundation for the development of targeted, data-driven safety strategies. 
1.3 HFACS FRAMEWORK 
To ensure that the various causal factors associated with MVCs are 
comprehensively classified, an appropriate human error framework must be selected for 
use. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework 
(Figure 1) may be effectively applied to the MVC domain. Based on Reason’s (1990) 
model of human error, HFACS was developed by Drs. Wiegmann and Shappell (2000) as 
a proactive tool for capturing and classifying causal factors in real world settings. 
HFACS has since proven its utility and has been successfully modified for use in several 
industries including aviation (military, general aviation, air transport, and commercial), 
railroad, mining, construction, and health care just to name a few. The HFACS 
framework and its applications are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 Section 3 




Figure 1: Original HFACS Framework (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001) 
Though successfully modified and applied to a wide range of domains, the 
HFACS framework has not yet been developed for use in the road traffic safety domain. 
This need was addressed by the development of the HFACS-MVC framework in the 
present study. The HFACS-MVC framework was then applied by HFACS experts to 
classify the causal factors associated with severe off-duty MVCs in the military. 
1.4 OBJECTIVES 
The findings of this study should provide a basis for developing effective and 
actionable MVC safety strategies. The military has little control over roadway 
environment and vehicle factors, but may be able to positively affect its personnel (Ecola, 
et al., 2010). To accommodate this constraint, each of the four independent variables 
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selected for the present study was primarily related to the service member operating a 
motor vehicle and captured characteristics that change little over time and could be easily 
identified and classified prior to departure on the roads into categories that are distinctly 
different from one another. 
Each of the branches of the military has a unique subculture that attracts particular 
types of people and personalities. The skills and knowledge required to safely operate 
two wheeled (2W) vehicles far exceed those required for four wheeled (4W) vehicles. 
Officers and enlisted service members have different requirements for entry into the 
military and work different types of jobs with different roles, responsibilities, and 
expectations. Young males perform the riskiest road behaviors and are the demographic 
with the highest rate of involvement for fatal MVCs around the world. 
The main purpose of this dissertation was to gain a greater understanding of the 
causal factors associated with serious and fatal off-duty personal MVCs for military 
service members with the ultimate goal of preventing future losses of military service 
members to MVCs. The objectives of the present study were to identify the main causal 
factors involved in severe off-duty MVCs for military personnel and conduct 
comparisons of causal factor patterns for four independent variables: (1) military 
branches: USAF, USN, USMC, (2) vehicle types: 2W and 4W, (3) paygrades: enlisted 
and officer, and (4) age groups: 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, and >40 years old.  
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the present study, the human factors trends were identified for service members 
seriously or fatally injured in off-duty MVCs and compared across different military 
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branches, vehicle types, paygrades, and age groups. Identification of the human factors 
trends provide a basis for developing data-driven safety efforts targeted to the relevant 
issues experienced by service members on the roadways. Comparisons of the human 
factors trends amongst the groups of service members provide data-driven support for 
developing a one-size-fits-all approach or specific targeted (e.g. paygrade-based, age-
based) approaches for different groups. 
With the goal of preventing future military losses due to MVCs, the five main 
research questions addressed in the present study were: 
Q1: What are the main human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs involving 
military service members? 
Q2: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving service 
members from the USAF, USN, and USMC? 
Q3: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving 2W and 4W 
vehicles? 
Q4: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving enlisted and 
officer service members? 
Q5: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving service 
members in different age groups? 
1.6 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study provided a methodology for the systematic analysis of MVC causal 
factors. HFACS-MVC is a complete and comprehensive human error framework created 
for use with off-duty military MVCs. The creation and application of HFACS-MVC 
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contributed to the existing literature supporting the use of HFACS in non-traditional, 
non-aviation platforms. The HFACS-MVC framework made it possible to systematically 
and comprehensively identify and capture causal factors within the road traffic safety 
domain. 
The large majority of MVC research has focused on the general population with 
few specifically studying the MVC phenomenon in the military. For the present study, 
hundreds of severe off-duty mishaps involving service members serving in the USAF, 
USN, and USMC were classified using HFACS-MVC. This study has finally shed light 
on the specific types of human error affecting our service members on the roadways. 
An understanding of specific driving and riding behaviors is necessary for the 
effective prevention of future MVCs. To illustrate this point, consider a hypothetical non-
transportation situation in the medical field involving a doctor and two patients with the 
same illness. One patient tells the doctor that he feels sick while the other tells the doctor 
that she has a sore throat, swollen glands, and that her temperature has spiked in the past 
hour to 102 °F. How can the doctor help each patient? The doctor cannot accurately 
diagnose the first patient without additional information about his specific symptoms but 
has enough information to determine that the second patient has strep throat. While the 
second patient starts on antibiotics and feels better almost immediately, the first patient 
continues to suffer. Likewise, knowing that human error is a key component of MVCs 
does not help to prevent future crashes. But knowing that operator error in counter-
steering is a key factor does contribute to MVC prevention efforts. Safety strategies can 
be tailored to address the specific driving and riding errors of our service members. 
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With only a finite amount of resources and funding for safety strategies, there is 
great value in identifying programs that provide the largest return on investment. This 
study provided a new perspective for how to evaluate both current and prior military 
MVC safety efforts. The success of a strategy has typically been determined based on the 
number or rate of fatalities before and after implementation. The contributions from this 
study provided a basis for the evaluation of safety initiatives based on their effects on 
specific driver and rider behaviors. By connecting the dates of implementation for 
individual safety programs with MVC causal factor patterns, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the individual safety programs can be assessed. 
There has been recent consideration from the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
combine the individual safety centers into one entity that oversees safety for all services 
of the military. The present study supported these efforts by providing a universal human 
error framework for use throughout the military. Additionally, this study contributed a 
database filled with MVC causal factors for three of the four services of the military. The 
classification of MVC data with a universal set of HFACS-MVC causal factors provided 
the opportunity to compare the quality of MVC investigation and reporting practices 
between the military branches. Future efforts using on the causal factor database created 
in this study may be used to compare contributing causal factor trends between the 
branches to provide data-driven support for or against the unification of safety efforts for 
the entire military.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES (MVCS) 
Motor vehicle crashes (MVCs) have elicited a great deal of concern since the 
advent of automotive transportation. Unfortunately, MVCs continue to plague countries 
around the world. Though technological and legislative changes have achieved 
significant improvements in motor vehicle safety, MVCs still injure and kill thousands 
each year. No one is immune to the devastation that results from MVCs including those 
serving in the military for our country. 
Automotive transportation’s history began back in 1769 with the Cugnot Steam 
Tractor, the world’s first self-propelled vehicle (Bottorff, 2006) . By the early 1900s, 
companies in the US and Europe were commercially producing gasoline-powered 
automobiles and motorcycles. In 1910, there were already an estimated 130,000 cars and 
150,000 motorcycles and tricycles in the US (Shaw, 1910). Motor vehicle production 
picked up in the 1950s after a slow spell in the years between the Great Depression and 
World War II. The number of vehicles on the road increased and by 1960, there were 
over 61,600,000 passenger cars and 574,000 motorcycles were registered in the US (DoT, 
2011). These days, there are more than 137,000,000 passenger cars and 7,750,000 
motorcycles registered for use on American roads (DoT, 2011). 
With the advent of motorized vehicles came the danger of motor vehicle crashes. 
Reports of MVC injuries and fatalities were recorded almost immediately. The first 
automobile fatalities occurred in the late 19th century. Though the records may be a bit 
unclear, the first recorded MVC fatality occurred in Ireland in 1869 when Mary Ward 
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was thrown from a homemade steam carriage making a sharp turn (Fallon & O'Neill, 
2005). It appears that the first MVC fatality in the US occurred in Ohio a few decades 
later, in 1891 when James Lambert’s automobile collided with a hitching post ("World's 
First Automobile Accident," 2006). In 1900, Harry Miles became the first person killed 
in a motorcycle MVC when he was ejected from a pacing machine during a race in 
Massachusetts ("Accident at Bicycle Meet," 1900). 
Increased interest and demand of motor vehicles sparked concerns for the safety 
of all road users – drivers, passengers, motorcyclists, bicyclists, and pedestrians. Initial 
transportation safety efforts focused on making vehicles safer through design and 
technological modifications that increased crashworthiness. More recently, safety efforts 
have sought to modify driver and rider behaviors. 
2.1.1 MVC Terminology and Definitions 
There are a variety of terms that are used capture the basic elements of road traffic 
safety. A complete set of terminology and definitions used in the present study can be 
referenced in Appendix A. 
The term “motor vehicle” is used to capture a privately owned non-government, 
non-commercial vehicle that can be operated on public highways including motorcycles, 
passenger vehicles, and light trucks. For the purposes of the present study, the two types 
of motor vehicles are two-wheeled (2W) and four-wheeled (4W) vehicles. The term “2W 
vehicle” is used for a powered motor vehicle with two wheels including cruisers, sport, 
touring, standard, and dual-purpose motorcycles. The term “4W vehicle” is used for a 
powered motor vehicle with four wheels including cars and light trucks. 
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An event in which two vehicles collide could be termed an accident, collision, or 
crash. An accident, however, implies that the events leading up to a MVC occur by 
chance rather than as the result of a combination of causal factors and as such, many have 
eschewed this term for more objective terminology. Consequently, the term “motor 
vehicle crash (MVC)” is used to capture this event as an event where a motor vehicle in 
motion collides with obstacle(s) in the environment and results in injury and/or property 
damage. 
The US military has a unique set of safety terminology that is specific to adverse 
events involving service members. For example, a “mishap” is the term used by the 
military to define an adverse event or series of events that result in property damage, 
injury, or death. The DoD classifies mishaps according to the severity of their outcomes 
like injury, illness, or property damage (Table 1).  
Table 1: Mishap Descriptions by Class Severity 
Class Description 
A Damage: total cost ≥ $1 million or DoD aircraft destroyed 
Result: fatality or permanent total disability 
B Damage: $200,000 ≤ total cost < $1 million 
Result: permanent partial disability or 3+ personnel are hospitalized for 
inpatient care as a result of a single accident 
C Damage: $20,000 ≤ total cost < $200,000 
Result: nonfatal injury that causes loss of time from work beyond that 
day/shift or nonfatal occupational illness or disability that causes loss of 
time from work or disability  
There are four levels or classes of mishaps (A, B, C, and D), each with a lesser 
outcome severity than the last with Class D representing near-miss events. Class A 
mishaps are the most severe, resulting in permanent total disability or death. Each of the 
subsequent classes captures a lesser outcome severity. Class B mishaps result in 
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permanent partial disability or the hospitalization of three or more people as a result of a 
single accident. 
2.1.2 Operating a Motor Vehicle 
Motorists must possess certain knowledge and skill sets in order to operate a 
motor vehicle. To safely operate a 2W or 4W motor vehicle on the roadway, a motorist 
must be able to search, evaluate, and execute (MSF, 2005). The skills required to 
accomplish these tasks include vigilant scanning, good judgment, and smooth control. 
Additional factors uniquely affect 2W vehicles such as balance, visibility, and lack of 
protection producing additional hazards for riders that do not affect drivers. 
Motor vehicle operators must be able to vigilantly scan their environment. It is 
important for motorists to maintain awareness and sample their surroundings for the 
presence and position of other road users and obstacles. This skill is especially critical for 
motorcycle riders. The leading cause of fatalities for riders is the failure of another 
vehicle operator to detect, identify, and yield right of way to a 2W vehicle (SCDMV, 
2009). Unfortunately, riders of 2W vehicles often find it challenging to vigilantly scan 
their environments. With only two mirrors (right side, left side) as opposed to three (right 
side, left side, rearview), sampling the surroundings on a 2W vehicle is more challenging 
and requires more physical movement than in a 4W vehicle.  Rather than solely reference 
side mirrors, riders of 2W vehicles often compensate by performing head checks where 
they physically move their heads to sample the environment. As such, riders face an 




Motor vehicle operators must be able to evaluate the information from their 
surroundings and adjust their behaviors accordingly. Motorists must be able to adequately 
judge and determine safe distances and speeds while travelling on the road. Operators 
must be able to determine whether they are travelling too fast to safely negotiate a curve 
or on a slick road. Taking a curve or turn too fast can cause a vehicle to depart from its 
lane of travel into another. This is especially critical for operators of 2W vehicles who 
take a turn or curve too fast which forces them to either slide out, lay down the 
motorcycle, or drift out of the lane. Operators must also be able to determine their 
distances relative to other road users and obstacles. 
Motorists must be able to operate their vehicles in a smooth and controlled 
manner and maintain control while performing various operations. At times, motorists 
must react to avoid potential collision. However, sudden turns or lane changes can cause 
vehicle to skid, particularly with a slick or slippery road surface (NJMVC, 2011). Motor 
vehicle operators should be able to counter-steer (swerve) as necessary to avoid other 
road users and obstacles without losing control. Motor vehicle operators must be able to 
safely brake without losing control. Control skills are more integral for 2W vehicles than 
4W vehicles, especially given that recovery from loss of control is  extremely difficult 
with 2W vehicles and occur rarely (Elliott, Baughan, & Sexton, 2007).  
To slow and stop a motor vehicle safely, the operator should apply steady, gentle 
pressure as opposed to slamming on the brake(s) (NJMVC, 2011). Hard braking can 
result in a skid, especially on slippery road surfaces like snow or ice surface. Braking for 
2W vehicles is trickier than for 4W vehicles. Cars have one brake control which a driver 
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controls with the right foot. Motorcycles have two brake controls. A rider controls the 
front brakes with the right hand and controls the rear brake with the right foot. To 
decelerate safely, breaking force should ideally come 70% from the front brake and 30% 
from the rear brake (MSF, 2005). If the braking force is applied too abruptly, the 
respective wheel can lock up causing a skid. As such, decelerating is more difficult for 
riders of 2W vehicles than it is for drivers of 4W vehicles.  
While scanning, judgment, and control are important for both 2W and 4W motor 
vehicles, balance is basically a non-issue for drivers of 4W vehicles. Balance is critical 
for a safe riding experience and is sensitive to where riders should sit on the motorcycle 
and how they should hold their arms (CADMV, 2011). Riders have the additional 
challenge of checking their surroundings without it affecting their balance or direction of 
travel. 
2.1.3 Fatal MVCs in the US 
The topic of MVCs is relevant around the world and is extensively studied. 
International and national databases exist around the world to collect and track the 
characteristics of MVCs, especially fatal MVCs (Luoma & Sivak, 2007). In the US, fatal 
MVC records are maintained on both a federal system, NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System (FARS) and state-specific systems. The FARS database contains the 
characteristics for all MVCs occurring on public roadways around the US (all 50 States, 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico) that result in the death an involved person within 
30 days of the crash. In each state, FARS analysts gather source documents, such as 
Police Accident Reports and State Driver Licensing Files, and enter the data elements 
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into four forms (accident, vehicle, driver, and person). The accident form includes MVC 
demographics (e.g. date, location, weather, and number of vehicles involved). The 
vehicle form includes involved vehicle information (e.g. vehicle type, role in MVC, and 
impact points). The driver form includes driver qualifications (e.g. driving record and 
license status). The person form includes demographics for those involved in the MVC 
(e.g. age, role in MVC – driver, passenger, non-motorist, and severity of injuries) 
(NHTSA, 2005b). While FARS represents the entire population of fatal MVCs in the US, 
it lacks the ability to indicate when a road user is military. Therefore, MVCs that result in 
a military fatality are unable to be parsed from those involving civilians given the current 
FARS database. Furthermore, FARS does not contain personal information which 
prevents the collection of narrative summaries for the MVCs and restricts the level of 
detail for data collected about crash locations and involved individuals. 
2.1.4 MVC Individual Factors 
Historically, most studies have looked at the relationship between single elements 
(e.g. gender, age, intoxication, distraction, speeding, and crash demographics) and MVC 
involvement. Traditional analyses have identified the typical operator and crash 
characteristics. Common categories of demographics are operator (driver/rider), vehicle, 
crash, and environmental characteristics. Operator characteristics include age, gender, 
and race/ethnicity. Vehicle characteristics include the vehicle make, model, and year. 
Crash characteristics include time of day, location, number of vehicles involved, and 
configuration of involved vehicles. Environmental characteristics include atmospheric 
17 
 
and lighting conditions. Some of the operator, vehicle, crash, and environmental 
characteristics commonly researched are reviewed in the following section. 
Age and Gender 
Both within and outside the US, the demographic of drivers with the highest crash 
and fatality rates are young males. In fact, males are twice as likely as females to be 
killed in MVCs (Evans, 2004). The general relationship between driver age and 
involvement in fatal and nonfatal MVCs is presented in Figure 2. In general, drivers 
involved in fatal MVCs are younger than drivers involved in non-fatal MVCs. While 
people between the ages of 15 and 34 make up 27.5% of the American population, they 
represent 42.5% of the drivers killed in MVCs (NHTSA, 2008). Moreover, the highest 
fatality and injury rates per 100,000 people are experienced by people aged 21-24 and 16-




Figure 2: Driver Ages for Fatal and Non-Fatal MVCs in the US (NHTSA, 2008) 
Alcohol Impairment 
Drunk driving has received a substantial amount of attention as well. The 
probability of being involved in a MVC is at least two to ten times higher for a driver 
with a BAC of 0.08% than for an unimpaired driver (Compton, et al., 2002; Zador, 1991). 
Alcohol-impaired driving fatalities represented close to one-third of all US traffic 
fatalities in 2007 (NHTSA, 2008). Over one-third (35%) of drunk drivers (BAC of 0.08% 
or higher) involved in fatal MVCs in the US are between the ages of 21 and 25 (NHTSA, 
2008). At the 0.08 BAC level, one’s vision, balance, perception, reaction time, 
concentration, memory, judgment, reasoning, information processing, and speed control 
are all affected (NHTSA, 2005a). Observable cues that suggest that a vehicle is likely 
being operated by a drunk driver include problems maintaining lane position, speed and 
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Inattention and Distraction 
Driver inattention is involved in one-fourth to one-half of all MVCs in the United 
States (Stutts, Reinfurt, Staplin, & Rodgman, 2001). Behaviors such as texting, looking at 
external objects, and reaching for a moving object all serve to negatively impact a 
driver’s attention. The risk of MVC involvement is two to six times higher for inattentive 
drivers compared to alert drivers (Klauer, Dingus, Neale, Sudweeks, & Ramsey, 2006) 
Distraction, the primary form of inattention, occurs when the operator divests attention 
from the primary driving task in order to attend to an object or activity within or outside 
of the vehicle. Distraction comes from many sources – conversing with people in the car 
or on the phone, interacting with children in the backseat, or playing with the stereo to 
name a few. Young drivers, particularly those under the age of 20, are more likely than 
other age groups to be distracted when involved in a MVC. 
Speeding 
Speeding is a factor in approximately one-third of MVC fatalities (IIHS, 2010). 
Positive relationships exist between speed and both crash risk and injury severity; in 
high-income countries around the world, approximately 30% of fatal MVCs result from 
travelling at “excess or inappropriate” speeds (WHO, 2004). The relationship between 
speed and risk of MVCs is that the following three variables are exponentially increased 
when speed is increased – distance needed to stop, time needed to stop, and the energy at 
impact (IIHS, 2010). Even small increases in speed can increase the risk of a crash, of 
being injured, and of being killed. A mere increase in speed of 1 km/h (0.62 mph) may 




A large majority of motorcycle riders involved in MVCs lack formal riding 
education. A large-scale motorcycle study found that the overwhelming majority of riders 
involved in MVCs were self-taught or taught by friends or family and over half had fewer 
than five months of experience riding the mishap motorcycle (Hurt, Ouellet, & Thom, 
1981). While it is against the law to ride a motorcycle without an endorsement in the US, 
25% of the riders killed on 2W vehicles in 2009 did not have motorcycle endorsements 
(IIHS, 2011). While it is also against the law in the US to drive a 4W passenger vehicle 
without a driver’s license or permit, a smaller percentage (14%) of drivers in 4W fatal 
MVCs lacked licensure that same year (IIHS, 2011). 
Drowsiness and Fatigue 
Sleep, naps, and rest refresh the brain and its mental processing power. When 
fatigued, the brain’s mental processing power and speed decreases which affects its 
ability to process and react to new information. Symptoms of mental fatigue while 
driving or riding include slower reaction times, reduced vigilance and awareness, 
impaired memory, impaired decision-making, loss of situational awareness, and degraded 
performance. On the road, drowsiness affects everyone; however inexperienced operators 
are affected more than experienced operators. Inexperienced operators have not had 
enough experience to automatically respond in a skilled manner to unexpected situations 
on the road. 
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2.1.5 MVC Human Factors 
Though studying factors individually provides some insight into the causes of 
MVCs, it does not provide the whole picture. Traffic safety literature is replete with 
studies looking at the role of operator factors such as gender and age. Unfortunately, 
studying only traditional demographics restricts analyses to factors that cannot be 
controlled or modified. Ultimately the multifaceted causes of MVC are more complex 
than simple demographics can explain. A thorough understanding of MVCs requires an 
appreciation of the complexity of human error. Instead of looking at only one or two 
variables, a few researchers have sought to identify the variables involved in MVCs using 
a systems approach. These studies have greatly contributed to our understanding of MVC 
causal factors. Key studies that have comprehensively classified causal factors in MVCs 
include Indiana University’s Tri-Level study, Veridian’s Unsafe Driving Acts study, 
University of North Carolina’s Serious MVC study, the 100-Car Naturalistic Driving 
study, and the Hurt Motorcycle study.  
Tri-Level Study 
The Tri-Level Study performed by researchers at Indiana University was one of 
the first major human factors assessment of causal factors for MVCs (Treat, et al., 1979) 
in which the definite, probable, and possible factors resulting in MVCs were identified 
and categorized. The study found that 71% of the MVCs involved definite human causal 
factors but only 4% and 13% involved definite vehicular and environmental causal 
factors respectively. The main human causal factors were found to be recognition errors 
(41.4%) and decision errors (28.6%).  
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Unsafe Driving Act (UDA) Study 
The Veridian Unsafe Driving Act (UDA) Study used an 11-step process to 
evaluate the crash, primary cause, and contributing factors of 723 MVCs from four US 
locations between 1996 and 1997 (Hendricks, Freedman, Zador, & Fell, 2001). The UDA 
Study found that a driver behavioral error caused or contributed to 99% of the MVCs. 
The causal factors found to be frequently associated with driver behaviors were driver 
inattention (22.7%), vehicle speed (18.7%), alcohol impairment (18.2%), perceptual error 
(15.1%), decision errors (10.1%), and incapacitation (6.4%).  
100-Car Study 
The 100-Car Study in 2006 identified pre-crash causal and contributing factors 
from naturalistic data collected by in-vehicle sensors and cameras (Dingus, et al., 2006). 
A year of data was collected from each of 100 equipped vehicles provided to drivers in 
the Northern Virginia/Metropolitan Washington, DC area. The study focused on the 
following driver behavioral factors: driver inattention (including drowsiness), traffic 
violations, aggressive driving, and seat belt usage. Driver inattention was a factor in 
approximately 80% of the crashes and 60% of the near-crashes. Drowsy driving was a 
factor in 12% of the crashes and 10% of the near-crashes. 
UNC Serious MVC Study 
A 2002 study at University of North Carolina (UNC) Highway Safety Research 
Center identified the causal factors involved in over 1,200 serious MVCs in the state 
between 1993 and 1997 (Wierwille, et al., 2002). The study determined “willful 
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inappropriate behavior” as a principal contributor in the majority of serious incidents 
(57%). Both “inadequate knowledge” and “infrastructure” were determined to be 
principal contributors, each influential in approximately one-fifth of serious incidents. 
Factors such as alcohol impairment, curves, low shoulders, trees, darkness, and the 
number of wheels on the vehicle were determined to also be significant. 
Motorcycle Study 
The first comprehensive assessment of contributing operator (motorcycle and 
car), roadway environment, and vehicle causal factors for motorcycle crashes in the US 
was the Hurt Motorcycle Study (Hurt, et al., 1981). Between January 1976 and December 
1977, a multifaceted research team at the University of Southern California collected and 
reconstructed data for over 900 2W MVCs in the Los Angeles area resulting in a range of 
rider outcomes from no injury through fatality. Overall, the Hurt Study found that 2W 
MVCs were predominantly caused by other motor vehicle operators on the road who 
violated the motorcyclists’ right of way. Roadway environment and vehicle factors rarely 
contributed to 2W MVCs with weather, lighting, road defects and vehicle defects each 
involved in only 2% to 3% of the MVCs. Common contributing human factors were 
incorrect selection of braking and evading actions (36%), inadequate execution of 
braking and evading actions (38%), attention issues (38%), and alcohol involvement. 
Overall motorcycle operators involved in MVCs lacked formal motorcycle training 
(92%) and proper motorcycle licensure (46%). 
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2.2 US MILITARY 
The US military’s roots trace back to the beginnings of our country as an 
independent nation in 1776 with the establishment of the Continental Army under the 
command of General George Washington. In 1948, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
was established as the civilian agency responsible for providing, coordinating, and 
developing the armed services of the US. 
There are four services or branches of the US Armed Forces that operate under 
the DoD – Army, Navy (USN), Marine Corps (USMC), and Air Force (USAF). The US 
Army is responsible for military operations on land. The USN is responsible for military 
operations at sea. The USMC is responsible for amphibious military operations afloat and 
ashore. The USAF is responsible for military operations within the region of aerospace. 
An additional branch of the US military operates under the Department of Homeland 
Security in peacetime but under the USN in wartime or as directed by the President. This 
branch, the US Coast Guard (USCG) is responsible for maritime safety, security, and 
stewardship.  
2.2.1 US Military Demographics 
Paygrades 
Each branch of the US military has its own system of ranks and titles. However, 
all services use the same paygrade system to represent both salary range and level of 
seniority for service members within the command structure. Paygrades may be 
categorized according to the three basic types of service members – enlisted, officers, and 
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warrant officers. The former categories (enlisted and officer) exist for all military 
services while the latter category (warrant officer) exists for all services except the 
USAF. Officers outrank warrant officers who outrank enlisted personnel. 
Paygrades use a letter-number format where the letter represents the grade group 
(E, W, and O for enlisted, warrant, and officer respectively) and the number represents 
level of authority and responsibility in an ordinal manner (larger numbers for greater 
levels of authority and responsibility). There are nine enlisted grades (E-1 through E-9), 
five warrant grades (W-1 through W-5), and 10 officer grades (O-1 through O-10). For 
enlisted personnel, the lowest grade is E-1 and the highest grade is E-9. For warrant 
officers, the lowest grade is W-1 and the highest grade is W-5. For officers, the lowest 
grade is O-1 and the highest grade is O-10. The large majority of service members (84%) 
are enlisted (BLS). The remaining service members are primarily officers (15%) and a 
mere fraction of the force (1%) are warrant officers. 
Enlisted service members sign up to serve within the military structure for a 
period of two to four years. Each military service selects positions for its enlisted 
personnel based on its needs and the abilities of the service members, and then provides 
appropriate training for those positions. Junior enlisted personnel (grades E-1 to E-3/4) 
are basically apprentices whose role it is to learn, develop, and apply new (primarily 
technical) skills. More senior enlisted personnel (grades E-4/5 and above) include non-
commission and senior non-commission officers with increasingly greater expectations 
and responsibilities.  
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Promotions at the lower enlisted grades (E-1 to E-3 for USN and USMC; E-1 to 
E-4 for US Army and USAF) are practically guaranteed as they are based on time in 
service and time in grade. Promotions to the higher enlisted grades are more competitive 
as they are based on multiple factors, the most restrictive of which are the number of 
vacancies for career fields within a grade. For example, in 2011 the chances for USN 
enlisted personnel to advance to the paygrades of E-4, E-5, and E-6 were 30.97%, 
20.68%, and 10.75% respectively (Faram, 2011). 
Officers hold commissions from the US to function in a leadership role within the 
military structure. A commission is a document that authorizes a service member to hold 
a position in the military for the entirety of one’s term of service. To receive commission, 
one must meet certain standards of education and proven skill. A person can train to 
become an officer in the military by attending a service academy, going through Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) or Officer Candidate School (OCS), or by receiving 
direct commission. The three service academies under the DoD are the Military Academy 
at West Point for the US Army, the Naval Academy at Annapolis for the USN and 
USMC, and the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs for the USAF. Upon graduation 
from a service academy, one becomes commissioned as an officer in the military. The 
ROTC program acts as a preparatory school for commissioning. Many universities 
around the country provide ROTC courses that students can take while earning their 
college degrees. Upon graduation from college, ROTC students are eligible for 
commissioning as an officer in the military. OCS is a program for civilians with four year 
college degrees or enlisted service members with four year college degrees or equivalent 
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amounts of training or specialized education. Direct commissioning provides civilians 
with specific expertise such as doctors, lawyers, and chaplains to be commissioned into 
the military as restricted officers. 
Officers are required to be upstanding individuals who provide guidance and 
oversight to those under their command. With higher levels of responsibility and 
authority within the military structure, officers are typically held to higher standards than 
enlisted personnel and misconduct is not tolerated. Officer promotions in the military are 
regulated by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) enacted by 
Congress in 1981. DOPMA laws set the time in service required for promotion and the 
percent of applicants that must be denied or passed over for promotion. Promotions at the 
lower officer grades (O-2 and O-3) are pretty much automatic based primarily on time in 
service/grade with a promotion success rate close to 100% ("Navy - Officer Promotion 
Process," 2006). Subsequent promotions to higher officer grades are more restrictive. 
DOPMA specifies that 20%, 30%, and 50% of the applicants must be denied promotion 
to O-4, O-5, and O-6 positions respectively. 
Warrant officers hold warrants from the US to function as highly trained 
specialists in the military structure. A warrant is a document that authorizes a service 
member to carry out a specific task based on one’s expertise in one’s field. Warrant 
officers make up only a miniscule fraction of the armed forces due to service restrictions 
and stringent qualification requirements. Only military personnel in the US Army, USN, 
and USMC can become a warrant officer; the USAF discontinued this rank in 1959. In 
general, warrant officers in the US Army and USMC are selected midcareer while those 
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in the USN are selected late career (Fernandez, 2002). With few exceptions, an eligible 
enlisted USN or USMC service member can apply for a warrant officer position only 
after serving in the military for a minimum of 12 years and attaining at least a paygrade 
of E-7.  With a requirement for applicants to have served in the military for a minimum 
of 12 years, warrant officers are especially likely to be older than other officers and 
enlisted personnel. 
Warrant officers serve as technical experts in their fields and provide knowledge, 
skills, guidance, and oversight. Applicants for warrant officer positions must be 
upstanding individuals of good moral character whose records contain no disciplinary 
actions/convictions nor substantiated cases of drug/alcohol abuse for the prior three years 
(DoN, 2009). To even attain prerequisites for warrant officer positions, service members 
must perform as well as or better than their peers and build their skills, responsibilities, 
and leadership abilities as they move up the ranks. Indeed, warrant officers in the USN 
and USMC have slightly faster rates of promotion than their enlisted peers (Fernandez, 
2002). Warrant officer positions are quite competitive and only a small fraction of 
applicants receive promotions, particularly in the USN and USMC. In fact, less than one-
third of USN and USMC applicants (26% and 22% respectively) were promoted to 
warrant officer positions in 2000 (Fernandez, 2002). 
The demographic characteristics of active duty enlisted personnel differ from 
those of both warrant and commissioned officers (Table 2). The average age for active 
duty enlisted service members is 27.1 years old with over half (52.5%) of active duty 
enlisted personnel 35 years of age or younger (Segal & Segal, 2004). Officers in the US 
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military tend to be older than enlisted personnel. The average age of an active duty 
officer is 34.6 years old (Segal & Segal, 2004). The majority of active duty officers 
(85.8%) are over the age of 25 in comparison to fewer than half of enlisted personnel 
(47.5%) (Segal & Segal, 2004). 
Table 2: Demographics for Active-Duty Enlisted and Officer Personnel (Segal & Segal, 2004) 
 Enlisted Officer 
 USAF USN USMC USAF USN USMC 
Male 80% 86% 94% 82% 85% 94% 
Aged 30+ 64% 67% 68% 97% 70% 70% 
Married 56% 50% 41% 71% 66% 69% 
Branches 
Over one-third of the US Armed Forces active-duty personnel are in the US 
Army. This represents the largest single service component of the military. Smaller 
percentages of the US Armed Forces active duty personnel are in the USN and the USAF. 
Each of these service components represent approximately one-fourth of the military. The 
smallest single service component of the military is the USMC with a little more than 
one-tenth of the military.  
Since 2000, between 1.3 and 1.4 million active-duty military personnel have 
served for our country each year. In 2007, there were a total of 1,365,371 active-duty 
DoD military personnel – 37.9% in the US Army, 24.3% in the USN, 24.1% in the 
USAF, and 13.7% in the USMC (OneSource). The demographic characteristics of 
enlisted and officer personnel in the USAF, USN, and USMC is presented in Table 3. 
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Male 80% (82%) 86% (85%) 94% (94%) 
Aged 30+ 64% (97%) 67% (70%) 68% (70%) 
Married 56% (71%) 50% (66%) 41% (69%) 
High School (College) 80% (95%) 91% (57%) 95% (80%) 
The demographics of the military personnel serving in each of the four services 
differ from one another (OneSource). The USMC has the youngest active duty force with 
an average age of 25.0 years. The US Army, USN, and USAF have slightly older active 
duty service members with average ages of 28.4, 28.7, and 29.6 years respectively. The 
USMC also has the largest percentage of active duty enlisted personnel with one officer 
for every 8.5 enlisted service members. The US Army and USN each have approximately 
one officer for every five enlisted service members. With the largest percentage of active 
duty officers, the USAF has one officer for every four enlisted service members. 
2.2.2 Fatal MVCs in the US Military 
Researchers have generally overlooked the MVC phenomenon in the military. 
Leadership in the military is concerned with the number of service members who are lost 
to non-operational, off-duty PVMCs. To preserve combat capability and save lives, the 
military is supported by service-specific safety centers that target the prevention of 
mishaps. Each safety center is responsible for maintaining a mishap reporting system and 
a mishap database for its service members. The Naval Safety Center (NSC) at Norfolk 
Naval Base in Norfolk, Virginia maintains the online reporting system Web-Enabled 
Safety System (WESS) for USN and USMC mishaps. The Air Force Safety Center 
31 
 
(AFSC) at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico maintains the online 
reporting system Air Force Safety Automated System (AFSAS) for USAF mishaps.  
Prior research is inconclusive in its comparisons of MVC fatality rates for military 
and civilians. Some found service members to be more likely than the average civilian 
driver to be fatally injured during an MVC (Miller & Sack, 2004) while others have 
found MVC fatality rates for military personnel to be lower than the general population 
(Carr, 2001; Dellinger, Krull, Jones, Yore, & Amoroso, 2004; Markopoulos, 2009; 
OneSource, 2007). Estimated MVC fatality rates for both the US and military populations 
are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: MVC Fatality Rates for US and Military Populations (Ecola, et al., 2010) 
Population MVC Fatality Rate (per 100,000 population) 
US  15-24 year old males 37.3 
  24-35 year old males 24.1 
  All 14.7 
US Military Army 17.7 
  Air Force 11.9 
  Coast Guard 19.6 
  Marine Corps 27.1 
  Navy 15.9 
These MVC fatality rates were provided in a recent technical report prepared by 
the Private Motor Vehicle Task Force (PMVTF) for the Defense Safety Oversight 
Council (DSOC) (Ecola, et al., 2010). The US fatality rate used a seven-year average of 
MVC data from 2000 to 2006 and the military fatality rate used a ten-year average of 
MVC data from 2000 to 2009. All branches had MVC fatality rates that were lower than 
the US MVC fatality rate for 15-24 year old males and most had rates that were lower 
than the US MVC fatality rate for 24-35 year old males. The concerning exception was 
the MVC fatality rate for the USMC military branch.  
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2.2.3 Military MVC Individual Factors 
Common factors involved in fatal USAF 4W MVCs are impaired driving, speed 
too fast for conditions, and fatigue or over-extending oneself (DoD, 2003). Common 
factors involved in fatal USAF 2W MVCs are exceeded capabilities/lacked proficiency, 
speed too fast for conditions, and impaired operators. Similarly, the most common factors 
involved in fatal USN and USMC 2W MVCs are speeding and loss of control. 
2.2.4 Military MVC Human Factors 
Though studying individual demographic and behavioral factors associated with 
MVCs in the military provides some insight, there is still much to be learned. Limitations 
of prior military MVC studies are that they failed to that they identify causal factors 
comprehensively or exhaustively, often used data that were previously collected 
containing potential classification errors or inconsistencies, and often targeted just 
included a few factors to research. However, even with their limitations, prior studies 
have contributed a great amount to what is known about the MVC phenomenon in the 
military. Some of the key studies on MVCs in the military are discussed in the following 
section. These include the US Army MVC Injury Study, the USMC MVC Fatality Study, 
the Fatal Military MVC Study, the USAF-US MVC Comparison Study, and the USAF 
MVC Modeling Study. 
US Army MVC Injury Study 
A longitudinal study was conducted in the 1990s to identify demographic and 
behavioral risk factors associated with serious MVCs in the US military (Bell, Amoroso, 
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Yore, Smith, & Jones, 2000). After completing HRA surveys in 1992 to capture their 
health habits and behaviors, active-duty US Army personnel were followed until one of 
three events occurred – they were hospitalized due to injuries sustained in MVCs, they 
separated from the military, or the study period ended in 1997. During the six-year study 
period, 429 of the 99,981 Army personnel who had completed HRAs were hospitalized 
with injuries sustained in MVCs where they were acting as operators or passengers of 4W 
motor vehicles. Hazard ratios compared the times to event (hospitalization or 
separation/end of study) of the 429 injured and 99,552 uninjured service members to 
identify significant associations between demographic and behavioral factors and MVC 
injury hospitalizations.  
Looking at the demographic factors, both age and paygrade were found to be 
significantly associated with MVC injury hospitalization. Compared to service members 
over the age of 40, the risk of MVC injury hospitalization was approximately 6 times 
higher for 18-20 year old service members (HR=5.89), 4 times higher for 21-25 year old 
service members (HR=3.89), and 2 times higher for 26-30 year old service members 
(HR=1.93). Compared to officers, the risk of MVC injury hospitalization was 
approximately 2.5 times higher for enlisted service members (HR=2.62).  
Looking at the behavioral factors, both speeding and drinking and driving or 
riding with a drinking driver were found to be significantly associated with MVC injury 
hospitalization. The risk of MVC injury hospitalization was around 1.5 times higher for 
service members with typical speeding behaviors in excess of 10 mph over the limit than 
for service members with typical speeding behaviors within 5 mph of the limit 
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(HR=1.52). The risk of MVC injury hospitalization for service members who did not 
drive was twice the risk for service members with typical speeding behaviors within 5 
mph of the limit (HR=1.98). The risk of MVC injury hospitalization for service members 
who indicated drinking and driving or riding with drinking drivers was around 1.5 greater 
than the risk for service members who did not (HR=1.45).  
USMC MVC Fatality Study 
Bowes and Hiatt (2008) identified and compared the contributing factors 
associated with MVC fatalities for USMC and US populations. The USMC dataset 
contained 464 USMC MVC fatalities (94 2W and 370 non-2W vehicles) that occurred 
between FY1999 and FY2007. The general US dataset contained NHTSA FARS data 
from the same time period adjusted to match the age-gender demographics of the USMC. 
Overall, the MVC fatality rates for the USMC population were lower than those for the 
general US population (29 deaths per 100,000 USMC compared to 34.5 deaths per 
100,000 US).  
By vehicle type, USMC rates generally exceeded US rates for MVCs with non-
2W vehicles while US rates generally exceeded USMC rates for MVCs with 2W 
vehicles. Actually, MVC fatality rates for 2W vehicles were similar for the two 
populations until around 2001 when the rates for the USMC began to exceed those for the 
general US. Looking at age, the highest USMC fatality rates were found for 19 year olds 
for non-2W vehicles and for 25 to 32 years olds for 2W vehicles. Looking at paygrade, 
the highest USMC fatality rates were found for E-2 personnel followed by E-3 and E-4 
personnel. Furthermore, the risk of MVC fatalities for USMC personnel were 
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significantly higher for junior enlisted (E-1 to E-2) who joined the military at least six 
months prior and warrant officers compared to senior enlisted personnel (E-7 to E-9). 
Fatal Military MVC Study 
Hooper et al (2006) identified and quantified factors associated with fatal MVC 
events for military service members from all four branches between 1991 and 1995. 
Bivariate analyses were used to compare 980 male service member driver fatalities to 
12,807 male service member non-MVC fatalities which served as the control group. This 
study found that male service members killed in MVCs were more likely to be younger, 
enlisted and in the USMC. Looking at age, male service member MVC fatalities were 
significantly more likely to be younger than 36 and specifically more likely to be under 
the age of 26. Looking at paygrade, male service member MVC fatalities were 
significantly more likely to involve enlisted personnel than officers. Looking at service, 
male service member MVC fatalities were significantly more likely to be in the USMC 
than in the USAF, USN, or US Army. 
USAF-US MVC Comparison Study 
Carr (2001) selected five operator factors of interest captured by the USAF 
(excessive speed, fatigue, impairment, inexperience, and recklessness other than speed) 
and quantified their associations with severe MVC events for the USAF and general US 
populations. The dataset contained a total of 893 MVCs (182 motorcycle and 711 non-
motorcycle) that resulted in permanent disability or death of a USAF operator, passenger, 
bicyclist, or pedestrian between fiscal years 1988 and 1999. The most common event 
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factors were impairment (40%), excessive speed (39%), and fatigue (19%). Looking at 
just the motorcycle MVCs, the most common event factors were excessive speed (48%), 
impairment (32%), and inexperience (16%). Linearity tests of annual trends indicated 
small but significant reductions of impairment and excessive speed event factors in 
USAF MVCs between FY1988 and FY1999. Multivariate analyses were performed to 
compare the risk of MVC fatality for USAF male operators (per 100,000 person years as 
estimated using averaged annual USAF personnel strength data from the 12-year period) 
to the risk of MVC fatality for licensed male US drivers (per 100,000 licensed drivers as 
estimated by NHTSA FARS licensed driver data from 1996). Results of these analyses 
indicated that MVCs took the lives of approximately 40% fewer USAF than US licensed 
male operators.  
USAF MVC Modeling Study  
Markopoulos (2009) selected factors of interest from those captured by the USAF 
including age and paygrade and studied their associations with off-duty USAF MVCs. 
The dataset contained a total of 12,403 2W and 4W MVCs involving USAF operators 
between FY1999 and FY2007 that resulted in minor injury, lost time, permanent 
disability, or death of one or more USAF service members. Categorical analyses were 
performed to determine how each factor related to the rate of MVCs and the severity of 
the resulting injuries. Looking at age for MVCs between FY1994 and FY2007 (age data 
were not captured prior to FY1994), the young service members between the ages of 17 
and 24 had a significantly higher MVC rate than older age groups and were more likely 
to have MVCs that resulted in lost time cases and fatalities. Looking at paygrade, enlisted 
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service members (Airman, NCO, and Senior NCO) were more likely than officers 
(company grade, field grade) to be involved in MVCs, particularly for MVCs that 
resulted in lost time cases and fatalities. Comparisons by vehicle type were limited in 
value in that they did not compare rates of MVCs for operators of 2W to those for 
operators of 4W vehicles but instead looked at the percentage of all MVCs that occurred 
on each type of vehicle. In this regard, Markopoulos found that significantly more of the 
MVCs involved 4W vehicles with a consistent ratio of two 4W MVCs to every one 2W 
MVC. 
2.2.5 Military-Civilian Comparisons 
It is tempting to merely extrapolate MVC trends identified in the general 
predominantly civilian population to the military population. In fact, several similarities 
do exist between civilian and military populations. However, there are also several 
differences that suggest that the military population is actually quite unique. 
Starting with similarities between military and civilian, civilians and service 
members of similar ages typically die from the same causes (Segal & Segal, 2004). 
MVCs for both civilians and military personnel largely occur on roadways travelled by 
the general public.  
Next, for both civilian and military populations in the US, young drivers are 
involved in more MVCs than other age groups. Military personnel are representative of 
the age group typically involved in or affected by MVCs in the general population. The 
percentages of people in three young age ranges (15 to 24, 25 to 34, and 35 to 44) are 
consistently higher for drivers involved in fatal MVCs than for the people in the general 
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population. Almost one fourth (23%) of the drivers involved in fatal MVCs in the US are 
between the ages of 15 and 24. About one fifth of the drivers involved in fatal MVCs in 
the US are between the ages of 25 and 34 (20%) and 35 and 44 (18%). The percentages 
of the general population in these age ranges are 14% apiece. However, the percentages 
of people in these age ranges (15 to 24, 25 to 34, and 35 to 44) are consistently greater for 
those serving in the military than for both drivers in fatal MVCs and people in the general 
population. 
Finally, factors commonly associated with fatal MVCs in the military are similar 
to those associated with fatal MVCs in the general population. For example, speed and 
impairment are significantly associated with fatal MVCs for Air Force service members 
{DoD, 2003, Department of Defense Motor Vehicle Safety Initiatives - Report to 
Congress}. These factors are common factors associated with fatal MVCs for the general 
population, especially for younger age groups (NHTSA, 2008, 2010a). 
There are also a number of differences between civilians and military personnel 
(Lee & Mather, 2008). First of all, military personnel are younger than their civilian 
counterparts. One study found the average age of active duty service members to be 28 
years with the average enlisted being 27 years of age and the average officer being 32 
years of age. Almost one half (47%) of the active duty military personnel were between 
18 and 24 years of age. In contrast, only about one third (37%) of the general population 
are between 18 and 24 years of age with a median age for people in the civilian 
workforce of 41 years. 
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The differences between US military and civilian populations encompass more 
than just age. Military personnel are less likely to be Hispanic, slightly more likely to be 
white or black, and much likelier to be American Indian or Alaskan native than their non-
military peers (Watkins & Sherk, 2008). In addition, the marital rates for enlisted 
personnel (49.8%) and military officers (70.4%) differ from those for working civilians 
(57.0%) (GAO, 2002). Even more, American military personnel have more formal 
education than US civilians. Almost all military members (98%) have high school 
degrees compared to 90% of the civilian labor force and 80% of US civilian men between 
the ages of 18 and 24 (GAO, 2002; Watkins & Sherk, 2008). 
Not everyone in the civilian population is eligible to work in the military. Service 
members must meet certain health, intelligence, education, and criminal background 
requirements in order to be eligible to join the military. For example, prior to being 
accepted to the military, recruits must take the Armed Forces Qualification Tests 
(AFQT). The AFQT tests four fields of knowledge – Arithmetic Reasoning, Math 
Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, and Word Knowledge. The military rejects at 
least 75% of applicants with scores in the bottom thirtieth percentile and 100% of 
applicants with scores in the bottom tenth percentile (Kilburn, Hanser, & Klerman, 1998).  
Further, since serving for the military is a full time job, service members are 
automatically unlike the entire general population which contains both employed and 
unemployed people. The selection and retention criteria for military personnel make it so 
that service members are healthier, fitter, and more sober (use alcohol and drugs less 
frequently) than the civilian workforce population (Carr, 2001). 
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2.3 HUMAN ERROR MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS 
Human error has been defined as a planned sequence of actions that fails to 
achieve its desired outcome (Reason, 1990). Numerous human error models have been 
developed to explain the breakdown between expected and actual outcomes. Human error 
models may be categorized by the perspective in which it was based - cognitive, 
ergonomic, behavioral, epidemiologic, and psychosocial. The cognitive perspective 
(Rasmussen, 1982) is based on mental processes. The ergonomic perspective (Edwards, 
1988) is focused on aspects of design. The behavioral perspective (Petersen, 2003) is 
based on responses to external stimuli and the environment. The epidemiologic 
perspective (Suchman, 1960) is focused on at-risk populations. The psychosocial 
perspective (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993) is based on the effects of social factors.  
Using the original single-faceted perspectives as a foundation, subsequent 
generations of human error models have taken a multifaceted systems approach to human 
error. These models assert that accidents are caused by the combination of multiple 
factors. Human error taxonomies that stemmed from these models include the SCM, 
SHEL, BeSafe, Wheel of Misfortune, ICAM, and HFACS models. 
2.3.1 Swiss Cheese Model (SCM)  
James Reason’s model of accident causation commonly referred to as the Swiss 
Cheese Model (SCM), has greatly influenced the way that companies and professionals 
view human error (Reason, 1990). Reason categorized two types of errors – active and 
latent. Active errors are acts that result in immediate and observable outcomes. Latent 
errors are issues that may be present for longer periods of time, providing the opportunity 
41 
 
for failures to occur. The SCM captures active and latent errors in a system of planes. 
Successful integration of the planes provides a safe environment for a productive system. 
Unsuccessful integration of the layers results in system breakdowns. 
So far, Reason has developed three distinct versions of the SCM for various 
purposes – Mark I, II, and III. Mark I contained five layers of error - four productive 
planes (decision makers, line management, preconditions, and productive activities) and 
one destructive plane (defenses). Mark II integrated the defenses into the four productive 
planes. Mark III depicted SCM more abstractly and provided descriptions of both short-
term breaches and long-lasting latent conditions.  
Of the three versions of SCM, the structure of Mark II may be most applicable for 
error classification purposes. Mark II, as seen in Figure 3, has three planes each with 
areas where the system is protected and areas where the system is susceptible to 
problems. The planes show individual, task/environment, and organization levels of the 
system. The individual level relates to the person or people directly involved in an 
adverse event. Active failures at the individual level involve unsafe acts which may be 
categorized as errors or violations. The difference between an error and a violation is 
whether the incorrect selection or execution of an action is intentional (error) or 
unintentional (violation). The task/environment level relates to mediating conditions “in 
existence immediately prior or at the time of the incident that directly influence human 
and equipment performance” (De Landre & Bartlem, 2005). The organization level 
relates to management decisions, processes, and practices. These latent factors typically 




Figure 3: Mark II SCM (Reason, 1990) 
2.3.2 Software Hardware Environment Liveware (SHEL) Model 
The SHEL model was developed by Edwards (1972, 1988) to identify areas of 
potential failures in human-machine interactions. The SHEL model, as seen in Figure 4, 
involves three components (software, hardware, and liveware) that interact with one 
another within an environment. Software is the non-material aspect, hardware is the 
technical aspect and equipment, environment is the external influences, and liveware is 
the human aspect. The original SHEL model focused primarily on the relationships 




Figure 4: SHEL Model (Edwards, 1988) 
2.3.3 Behavioral Safety (BeSafe) Method 
The Behavioral Safety (BeSafe) method is a proactive evaluation tool based on 
Reason’s (1990) human error framework created to identify and prevent potential human 
errors in a system (Benedyk & Minister, 1998). BeSafe, originally Potential Human Error 
Audits, targets accidents that could result from active failures, latent failures, and 
violations with a focus on the role of management. Primarily used for product design 
safety improvement, BeSafe has four main stages – discovery of active failures and 
violations, evaluation of organizational influences, identification of latent failures, and 
development of action plans in response to the findings. After determining the latent 
failures in the system based upon findings from the first three stages, a BeSafe analysis 
seeks to target these failures with preventative strategies.  
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2.3.4 Wheel of Misfortune 
The Wheel of Misfortune is an abstract framework that can be used as an accident 
investigation tool (O'Hare, 2000). Drawing from Reason’s SCM, Rasmussen’s ‘Skill-
Rule-Knowledge’ activities, and Helmreich’s sphere model, the Wheel of Misfortune is a 
system with three levels – local actions, local conditions, and global context depicted as 
concentric circles as seen in Figure 5 below. The innermost disc represents local actions 
or the unsafe acts of individuals or teams. The middle disc represents local conditions or 
the internal and external precipitating task demand, interface, and resource factors. The 
outer disc represents the global context with recognized and unrecognized hazards related 
to the organization’s philosophies, policies, and procedures. 
 
Figure 5: Wheel of Misfortune (O'Hare, 2000) 
2.3.5 Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM) 
ICAM is a structured approach that allows for systematic safety investigations in 
different industries (De Landre & Bartlem, 2005; De Landre & Gibb, 2002). ICAM was 
developed jointly by Dr. James Reason, BHP Billiton, Dédale Asia Pacific, and the 
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Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI, now part of the Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau). Some of the objectives of ICAM are to capture the facts, identify the active and 
latent hazards, gather the findings, and recommend corrective actions. The ICAM 
approach stresses the importance of not apportioning blame in order to focus on 
identifying the true issues in the system. The ICAM framework focuses on four main 
areas that correspond to Reason’s Mark I SCM – absent/failed defenses, individual/team 
actions, task/environmental conditions, and organizational factors. 
2.3.6 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)  
HFACS is a comprehensive, user-friendly human error framework created by Drs. 
Scott Shappell and Douglas Wiegmann for use as an accident investigation and data 
analysis tool (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997, 2001, 2003). With roots in established 
human error philosophies, HFACS provides a systematic way to classify the active and 
latent failures described in Reason’s SCM of human error (Reason, 1990). With tiers that 
map to the layers of human error in the SCM, the HFACS framework defines the holes in 
the SCM to facilitate its application to accident investigation and analysis in real world 
operational settings. The four tiers of the HFACS framework are unsafe acts, 




Figure 6: HFACS Framework (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001) 
Unsafe acts are errors (skill-based, decision, and perceptual) and violations that 
directly result in adverse events. Preconditions are physical, psychological, 
environmental, and interpersonal factors that affect the ability to perform tasks safely. 
Unsafe supervision refers to situations in the workplace in which workers are not 
provided with adequate support to safely complete required tasks. Organizational 
influences are the decisions by those in the topmost positions within the company related 
to resources, formal policies and procedures, culture, and climate. 
The first tier of the HFACS framework captures the unsafe acts of operators that 
directly result in an adverse event (e.g. accident, incident, or near miss). There are five 
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categories of unsafe acts in the HFACS-MVC framework in two groups – errors (skill 
based, decision, and perceptual) and violations (routine and exceptional).  
The second tier of the HFACS framework captures the preconditions for unsafe 
acts relate to factors related to environmental, physical, and physiological conditions that 
affect performance of operators. The HFACS framework has seven categories of 
preconditions for unsafe acts in three groups – environmental factors (technical and 
physical), conditions of the operator (adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, 
and physical/mental limitations), and personnel factors (personal readiness and 
communication/coordination). 
The third tier of the HFACS framework captures the unsafe leadership factors that 
may affect operator conditions and environmental factors. There are four categories of 
unsafe supervision causal factors – inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate 
operations, failure to correct known problem, and supervisory violations. 
The fourth tier of the HFACS framework relates to organizational influences, 
decisions made by upper-level management that may have an effect on supervisory 
practices, operator and environmental preconditions, and subsequently the unsafe acts of 
its personnel. There are three categories of organizational influences – resource 
management, organizational climate, and organizational process. 
Four criteria are especially important for validating a framework – reliability, 
comprehensiveness, diagnosticity, and usability. The HFACS framework has proven its 
validity by demonstrating that it meets all four of these criteria. 
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The first criterion that a framework must meet is reliability. A framework that is 
reliable as an investigative tool gathers approximately the same findings every time it is 
used. Estimates for reliability are often based on the results of reliability tests looking at 
testing various types of reliability such as test-retest, inter-rater, and parallel-forms 
reliability. Test-retest reliability indicates a framework’s ability to gather the same 
findings consistently over time. Inter-rater reliability indicates a framework’s ability to 
gather the same findings consistently between multiple independent investigators. 
Parallel-forms reliability indicates a framework’s ability to gather the same findings 
consistently with related findings using other tools and techniques. The most relevant and 
valuable indicator of reliability for a framework to be used in operational settings by a 
variety of individuals throughout an organization is inter-rater reliability.  
Inter-rater reliability may be measured statistically using Cohen’s Kappa 
coefficient values. Kappa values range from 0.00 to 1.00 with 0.00 indicating no 
consistency between raters and 1.00 indicating perfect consistency between the raters. 
The better Kappa values range from 0.60 to 1.00 with scores above 0.60 indicating good 
consistency between raters, and scores above 0.75 indicating excellent consistency 
between raters (Fleiss, 1981). Inter-rater reliability Cohen’s kappa values have been 
calculated at the tier and category levels for various domains. Inter-rater reliability was 
strong for raters applying the HFACS framework to military aviation accidents in the US 
with a Cohen’s kappa of 0.94 (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). Inter-rater reliability was 
also strong for raters applying the HFACS framework to commercial aviation accidents 
with a Cohen’s kappa score of 0.75 (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). For raters applying 
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HFACS to military aviation accidents in the Republic of China’s Air Force, inter-rater 
reliability Cohen’s kappa values for each causal category ranged from 0.44 for the lowest 
categories through 0.83 for the highest category (Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008). Of the 18 
causal categories in the original HFACS model, kappa values were lower than 0.60 for 
only four of the 18 causal categories – one category in the preconditions tier, one 
category in the supervisory tier, and two categories in the organizational tiers (Li, et al., 
2008). 
The second criterion that a framework must meet is comprehensiveness. A 
framework that is comprehensive as an investigative tool captures all the different types 
of factors associated with an adverse event. With several tiers capturing a breadth of 
factors, the HFACS framework is able to capture a variety of factors. Within several 
industrial domains, the HFACS framework has proven to be a taxonomy that can 
comprehensively identify and address all contributing factors for adverse events. 
The third criterion that a framework must meet is diagnosticity. A framework that 
is diagnostic as an investigative tool identifies trends and causes. With various levels of 
the framework at the tier, category, subcategory, and causal factor or nanocode, the 
HFACS framework allows both causes and trends to be tracked. Additionally, these 
causes and trends can be viewed at various layers of granularity. 
The fourth criterion that a framework must meet is usability. A framework that is 
usable as an investigative tool is able to be transferred from theoretical to practical use. 
The HFACS framework has shown that is can easily be integrated and accepted for use in 
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operational settings. HFACS has been adapted and modified to apply to a variety of 
industrial domains. 
HFACS was originally designed for use within the USN and USMC to identify 
and examine common root causes among aviation-related accidents and has since been 
adopted for widespread use by the US Department of Defense (Belland, Olsen, & Lawry, 
2009; O'Connor, 2008; O'Connor, Cowan, & Alton, 2010). Successful HFACS 
framework extensions and variations for use in industry include the application of 
HFACS to commercial aviation and general aviation in the US (Detwiler, et al., 2006; 
Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, & Wiegmann, 2007; Wiegmann, et al., 2005; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001, 2003), civil aviation in India (Gaur, 2005), China (Li, et 
al., 2008) and Australia  (Lenne, Ashby, & Fitzharris, 2008), and military aviation in 
China, Taiwan, and India (Li & Harris, 2006, 2007; Li, Harris, & Chen, 2007). Similarly, 
the HFACS framework has been applied to other aviation related fields such as air traffic 
control (ATC) (Broach & Dollar, 2002; Hanowski, Olson, Hickman, & Dingus, 2006; 
Scarborough, Bailey, & Pounds, 2005) and operations of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) (Boquet, Detwiler, Roberts, Jack, & Wiegmann, 2004) and remotely-piloted 
aircraft (Tvaryanas, Thompson, & Constable, 2006). HFACS has also been successfully 
applied to non-aviation domains including construction (Walker, 2007), petroleum/gas 
(Aas, 2008), mining (Patterson & Shappell, 2010), maritime (Celik & Cebi, 2009), rail 
(Baysari, Caponecchia, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2009; Baysari, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2008; 
Reinach & Viale, 2006) and several areas of healthcare (Elbardassi, Wiegmann, Dearani, 
Daly, & Sundt, 2007; Maurizio, et al., 2010; Milligan, 2006). 
51 
 
Variations of the original HFACS framework have been created and applied 
across a range of industries. To accommodate the idiosyncrasies of their target audiences, 
the HFACS framework is modifiable for even the most minor modifications in order to 
accommodate the idiosyncrasies of an organization’s target audience (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). Derivative HFACS frameworks are all based upon the basics of the 
original HFACS framework. These variations may appear different from the original 
HFACS framework due to their unique set of nanocode exemplars and modifications to 
wording conventions used in the model. These differences are negligible with regards to 
the framework’s validation. Derivative HFACS frameworks have successfully been 
applied in a variety of industries. These derivative frameworks include HFACS-ME for 
aviation maintenance (Krulak, 2004), HFACS-MI for mining (Patterson, 2009), and 
HFACS-RR for railroad (Reinach & Viale, 2006). 
Berry (2010) analyzed high-level human error trends across a variety of industries 
and created four sets of HFACS causal category benchmarking standards. Binary HFACS 
datasets from 17 sources across seven industry types were collected and compared in 
order to assess the appropriateness of each dataset for use in benchmarking standard 
calculations. For each of the main HFACS causal categories, statistical two-proportion Z-
tests and False Discovery Rate methodology were applied to determine if any of the 
datasets were atypical and worthy of exclusion from calculations. Four sets of 
benchmarking standards were created for use in different circumstances (Accident and 
Near Miss Non-filtered, Accident and Near Miss Filtered, Accident Non-filtered, and 
Accident Filtered). Accident benchmarking standards sets are appropriate for datasets 
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containing accident cases and lacking near miss cases. Filtered benchmarking standards 
are appropriate for higher quality datasets containing cases that have been thoroughly 
investigated, captured, and classified. A typical dataset consisting of accident cases 
without near miss cases that were not investigated in a consistent or comprehensive 
manner should be compared to the non-filtered accident benchmarking standards set as 
captured in Table 5. 
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Table 5: HFACS Trend Comparison for Off-Duty MVCs and Non-Filtered Accident Benchmarking Standards (Berry, 2010) 
HFACS-MVC Category Off-Duty 
MVCs 
Main / Secondary Grouping  
Accident Benchmarking Standards  
 % Mean (LCI, UCI) 
Outside Influences 5.4 ----- ----- 
Organizational Influences    
      Organizational Climate 0.3 1.1 (0.2, 2.1) 
      Organizational Process 0.8 7.6 / 52.0 (4.8, 10.3) / (41.1, 62.9) 
      Resource Management 0.2 1.9 (0.8, 3.0) 
Unsafe Supervision    
      Inadequate Leadership 1.0 3.1 / 21.6 (1.5, 4.7) / (13.9, 29.4) 
      Planned Inappropriate Ops 0.6 3.7 / 22.1 (0.0, 7.4) / (13.6, 30.7) 
      Failure to Correct Problem 0.5 4.8 (0.5, 9.1) 
      Leadership Violations 0.1 2.3 (0.0, 4.8) 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts    
   Environmental Conditions    
      Physical Environment 18.2 41.0 / 13.4 (31.3, 50.7) / (10.4, 16.5) 
      Technical Environment 4.1 13.6 (7.8, 19.5) 
   Operator Conditions    
      Adverse Mental State 21.5 5.3 / 26.4 (2.9, 7.7) / (24.2, 28.6) 
      Adverse Physiological State 34.7 1.7 (0.8, 2.7) 
      Physical/Mental Limitation 12.5 14.0 / 2.9 (7.4, 20.5) / (0.7, 5.1) 
   Operator Factors    
      Comm., Coord., & Planning 4.8 6.9 / 18.8 (4.5, 9.3) / (10.1, 27.5) 
      Personal Readiness 0.2 1.3 / 10.8 (0.2, 2.4) / (1.9, 19.7) 
Unsafe Acts of the Operator    
      Skill Based Errors 70.7 64.7 (58.6, 70.5)  
      Decision Errors 28.8 43.1 (31.5, 54.7) 
      Perceptual Errors 0.8 5.2 / 32.5 (3.0, 7.3) / (23.6, 41.4) 
      Violations 54.0 10.5 / 25.0 (5.3, 15.7) / (21.3, 28.7) 
2.3.7 Criticisms to Error Frameworks 
Supervisory and organizational factors have historically been overlooked. There 
are a number of reasons that most accident databases contain few or even no supervisory 
and organizational factors. The higher the tier the harder it is to identify factors. Instead 
of observable actions or conditions which are clear-cut, these factors are less tangible and 
involve abstract concepts (Li & Harris, 2006). Investigators may not identify factors at 
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higher levels if the process is disorganized or lacks a clear, comprehensive framework to 
guide the investigation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). It is important to have good 
investigators who ask the right questions and a good framework with which it can be 
captured. Likewise, without good databases, coders may feel that they are inferring too 
much from the accident report narrative to be able to reliably assign codes at the 
organizational level (Li & Harris, 2006). Investigators and coders internal to or working 
for a company may be reluctant to identify factors for fear of reprisal if they make the 
company look bad (Patterson, 2009). On the flip side, outside personnel who investigate 
only certain situations (e.g. OSHA) may only look to identify factors that may have a 
larger breadth within the organization.  
Various researchers have identified relationships between factors at various levels 
of the system for adverse events in different domains. A study comparing fatal and non-
fatal mining accidents found that significantly more organizational factors were 
associated with fatal than with non-fatal accidents (Patterson, 2009). Another study 
describing relationship between factors identified at each of the HFACS levels concluded 
that basic relationships exist between organizational factors and factors at the 
supervisory, precondition, and unsafe act tiers. 
Certain domains are more amenable to having factors at the supervisory and 
organizational levels. For example, it may be relatively straightforward to identify 
organizational factors in a company where there are clear delineations between people at 
the organizational level (head honchos), supervisory level (managers), and individual 
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level (worker bees). However, in other domains identifying factors at the higher levels 
can be more difficult.  
Some critics argue that error frameworks like HFACS capture arbitrary factors 
with no relation to the causes of future events (Dekker & Hollnagel, 2004). By modeling 
failures as stochastic rather than deterministic, some have deduced that past failures play 
no role in predicting future failures. While it is true that no one can completely predict 
the future, it seems plausible that some of the factors that have contributed to adverse 
events in the past continue to be involved in adverse events in the present and future. 
Predicting the future is not a perfect science, but to leave the past in the past only ensures 
status quo. 
Critics claim that identifying individual factors oversimplifies the complexity of 
adverse events. In order to investigate human error, one must identify not only how a 
person “erred” but also what was happening at the time that made the selected behavior 
seem like the right choice at the time (Dekker, 2001). Critics maintain that identification 
of individual factors involved in an adverse event prevents identification of the effects of 
factor interactions at the heart of the problem. They speculate that factor interactions can 
be understood only by looking holistically by gathering thick behavioral descriptions for 
each complex event (Dekker, 2001; Snook, 2002). Ultimately, frameworks like HFACS 
actually facilitate the investigation, identification, and classification of factors involved in 
adverse events. Without a framework to ensure consideration of all areas which may have 




Studying traditional demographics provides some insight into operator 
characteristics, but cannot provide the type of insight necessary for MVC prevention.  For 
instance, research has found the typical driver/rider involved in fatal MVCs to be a young 
male operating a vehicle at night in a rural area. Unfortunately, knowing this profile does 
not provide any insight that is easily actionable. In contrast, studying the behaviors that 
lead to MVCs and the motivations behind these behaviors provide a platform for targeted 




CHAPTER 3: METHODS  
3.1 HFACS FOR MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES (HFACS-MVC) 
Using Wiegmann and Shappell’s HFACS model as a foundation, the HFACS-
MVC framework was created to capture the contributing factors for MVCs in the 
military. Individual factors in the HFACS-MVC framework were identified by reviewing 
existing traffic safety literature and subset of military MVC narratives. While the 
fundamentals of the original HFACS model exist in the HFACS-MVC framework, some 
modifications were made (Table 6). These modifications affect the categories of the tiers 
in the model, the categories of unsafe acts in the model, and the perspective from which 
the model is framed. 
Table 6: Causal Factor Components for HFACS and HFACS-MVC 
 # Tiers # Categories # Nanocodes 
HFACS  4 18 N/A 
HFACS-MVC 5 19  
3.1.1 HFACS-MVC Framework 
HFACS-MVC has five tiers – the four tiers of the original HFACS model (unsafe 
acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences) 
plus an additional tier (outside influences). Factors within three tiers (unsafe acts, 
preconditions for unsafe acts, and outside influences) are specific to the road user 
domain. Factors in the remaining two tiers, unsafe supervision and organizational 
influences, are more generic across a variety of domains. The basic framework of 
HFACS-MVC is presented in Figure 7. The full framework of HFACS-MVC with causal 




Figure 7: HFACS-MVC Framework 
To focus on preventing severe personal MVCs affecting military personnel, 
HFACS-MVC is framed from the perspective of off-duty service members operating 
personal motor vehicles on the road. The unsafe acts and preconditions for unsafe acts are 
specific to the individual service members driving or riding motor vehicles. The 
supervisory factors are the acts of military personnel serving in leadership roles 
overseeing these service members driving or riding motor vehicles. The organizational 
factors are the influences of the military as an organization that employs the 
aforementioned service members. Outside influence factors capture the instances where 
MVCs occur due to no fault of the military motor vehicle operator. Detailed descriptions 
of these tiers are provided in a subsequent section. 
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At the unsafe acts tier, HFACS-MVC has four factor categories instead of the 
original five. Typically, HFACS frameworks have two distinct categories of violations 
for routine and exceptional violations. Differentiating between the two types of violations 
can be difficult increasing the potential for error during classification. Consider reading a 
narrative for a MVC which lists excessive speed (85 mph in a 65 mph zone) as a causal 
factor. Is this a routine or an exceptional violation? Turns out, it could be either. 
Additionally, exceptional violations, by definition, are rare, isolated events that cannot be 
predicted; as such, classifying a violation as routine or exceptional may not provide 
additional benefit in its prevention. To minimize unnecessary effort and prevent error, 
both violation types are captured in a single violations category in HFACS-MVC. 
Unsafe Acts of the Operator 
Unsafe acts refer to actions of a motor vehicle operator that directly precede and 
result in a MVC. The first tier of the HFACS-MVC framework captures the unsafe acts 
of motor vehicle operators in four causal categories (Table 7). The four categories of 
unsafe acts in the HFACS-MVC framework are skill based errors, decision errors, 
perceptual errors, and violations. 
Table 7: Brief Descriptions of Unsafe Acts Causal Categories 
UNSAFE ACTS 
Errors 
Skill Based Errors: These “doing” errors represent highly practiced behavior that occurs 
with little or no conscious thought. These errors frequently appear as breakdown 
in visual scan patterns, inadvertent activation/deactivation of switches, forgotten 
intentions, and omitted items in checklists often appear. 
Decision Errors: These “thinking” errors represent conscious, goal-intended behavior that 
proceeds as designed, yet the plan proves inadequate or inappropriate for the 
situation. These errors typically manifest as poorly executed procedures, improper 
choices, or simply the misinterpretation and/or misuse of relevant information. 
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Perceptual Errors: These errors arise when sensory input is degraded as is often the case 
when operating a vehicle at night, in poor weather, or in otherwise visually 
impoverished environments. Acting on imperfect or incomplete information, 
drivers and riders run the risk of misjudging distances, rates, or incorrectly 
responding to visual illusions. 
Violations 
Violations: These intentional acts represent bending or breaking of established rules and 
regulations. Violations include habitual, rule-bending condoned by the 
organization as well as isolated, atypical rule-breaking not tolerated by the 
organization. 
Skill Based Errors. Skill based errors are “doing” errors where highly practiced 
behaviors are inadequately performed. The error occurs not in the selection of a behavior 
but in its execution. The four general categories of skill based errors are attention failures, 
postural errors, technique errors, and timing errors. One example of a skill based error is 
a driver trying to answer his cell phone who fails to notice that the traffic light has turned 
red. Another example is a driver who drifts off the road inadvertently and reacts by 
jerking the steering wheel too hard in the opposite direction without thinking. 
Decision Errors. Decision errors are “thinking” errors where an operator selected 
a behavior that proves to be inadequate.  Here, the error occurs in the selection rather than 
in the execution of a behavior. The six general categories of decision errors are 
information processing, planning, prioritizing, situational assessment, procedural and 
vehicular. One example of a decision error is a person riding his motorcycle who fails to 
adjust his behavior when it starts to rain and starts to coat the road surface. Another 
example is a person chooses to pass another vehicle a bad point in the road. 
Perceptual Errors. Perceptual errors are errors that occur due to degraded sensory 
input. This is often the case when operating a vehicle at night, in poor weather, or in 
otherwise visually impoverished environments. In situations with imperfect or incomplete 
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information, operators run the risk of misjudging distances, rates, or incorrectly 
responding to visual illusions. For instance, an example of a perceptual error is a 
motorcycle rider whose vision is impaired by glare causing him to misread the sign for 
the exit. Another example is a driver whose perception of a single light on an unlit road at 
night leads her to misjudge the distance between her vehicle and the motorcycle in front 
of her. 
Violations. Violations are conscious decisions to bend or break existing rules and 
regulations. Some violations are habitual and condoned by management while other 
violations are isolated occur with extreme rarity. The two general categories of violations 
are procedural and knowledge related. Speeding, or travelling above the posted speed 
limit, is a violation whether it’s by five or 45 miles per hour. Operating a vehicle without 
proper licensure such as a valid driver’s license or motorcycle endorsement is also a 
violation. 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
Preconditions for unsafe acts are the surrounding environment, conditions of the 
operators, and road user factors that affect performance. The HFACS-MVC framework 
has seven categories of preconditions for unsafe acts (Table 8). There are two categories 
of environmental factors – technological environment and physical environment. There 
are three categories of factors related to conditions of the operator – adverse mental 
states, adverse physiological states, and physical/mental limitations. There are two 




Table 8: Brief Descriptions of Preconditions for Unsafe Act Causal Categories 
PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS 
Environmental Factors 
Physical Environment: Issues related to both the operational and ambient environment 
such as visibility due to fog, rain, lighting, and road surface conditions. 
Technological Environment: Issues related to manmade items in the environment such as 
the design and condition of the vehicle, roads, signs, medians, and safety devices. 
Conditions of the Operator 
Adverse Mental States: Acute psychological and/or mental conditions that negatively 
affect performance such as mental fatigue, pernicious attitudes, and misplaced 
motivation. 
Adverse Physiological States: Acute medical and/or physiological conditions that 
preclude safe operations such as illness, intoxication, and the myriad of 
pharmacological and medical abnormalities known to affect performance. 
Physical/Mental Limitations: Permanent physical/mental disabilities that may adversely 
impact performance such as poor vision, lack of physical strength, mental 
aptitude, general knowledge, and a variety of other chronic mental illnesses. 
Operator Factors 
Personal Readiness: Activities performed prior to operating the vehicle required to 
perform optimally on the road such as obtaining adequate sleep, limiting the 
effects of alcohol, and other preparatory activities. 
Communication, Coordination, and Planning: Poor coordination/communication between 
road users (vehicle operators, passengers, bicyclists, pedestrians) and planning 
prior to operating the vehicle. 
Physical Environment. Physical environment refers to factors in the operational 
and ambient environment surrounding the operator that affect performance. The two 
general categories of physical environment are visibility (due to weather or lighting) and 
road surface condition. Take a driver who encounters heavy fog which prevents her from 
seeing a vehicle merging into his lane. Or consider a rider who encounters gravel on the 
road causing him to lose traction.  
Technological Environment. Technological environment refers to factors in the 
manmade and technological environment surrounding the operator that affect 
performance. The three general categories of technological environment are vehicle 
condition, road design, and protective devices on the road. One example is a driver whose 
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brakes fail causing her to rear-end the vehicle in front of her. Another example is a rider 
who ends up on a portion of the highway with excessive curves because the road hazards 
were not pre-empted by any warning signs. 
Adverse Mental State. Adverse mental state refers to mental conditions of the 
operator that affect performance. The four general adverse mental state categories are 
psychology (e.g. risk-taking personality), attitude (e.g. stressed), awareness (e.g. 
inattention), and drowsiness (e.g. sleepy but not asleep). One example of an adverse 
mental state factor is a distracted driver trying to type a text message who ends up 
running a red light without realizing. A second example is a rider, agitated and stressed 
after fighting with his fiancée, who takes out his aggression by riding aggressively. 
Adverse Physiological State. Adverse physiological state refers to temporary 
medical and physiological conditions of the operator that affect performance. These are 
not permanent states, but may last several hours or even several days. The four general 
categories of adverse physiological states are physiological condition, medical condition, 
physical fatigue, and incapacitation. An example of an adverse physiological state factor 
is a person who falls asleep while driving causing the car to drift into oncoming traffic. 
Another example is a person riding his motorcycle under the influence of alcohol who is 
unable to negotiate a sharp curve in the road. 
Physical/Mental Limitation. Physical/mental limitation refers to occasions where 
a person’s physical or mental abilities are insufficient for adequate driving or riding 
performance. The three general physical/mental limitation categories are mental 
limitations, physical limitations, and sensory deficiencies. For the most part, 
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physical/mental limitation factors may be thought of as conditions diagnosable by a 
physician, such as a chronic back problem. For example, a person suffering from sleep 
apnea who experiences difficulty staying awake while driving. One major exception to 
this generalization relates to a lack of sufficient knowledge for reasons such as 
inadequate training or lack of exposure or experience. For example, a person riding a 
motorcycle for the first time who applies too much pressure on the rear brake and sends 
the motorcycle into a skid. 
Personal Readiness. Personal readiness relates to situations where people are 
physically or mentally unprepared for the safe operation of a motor vehicle. Activities 
performed or omitted before operating a vehicle can have detrimental effects on driving 
or riding performance. Take, for example, a person who decides to drive over 500 miles 
home for Thanksgiving with a terrible hangover. Or consider someone who heads off to 
the beach to watch the sunrise after staying up with friends until 03:00 in the morning.  
Communication, Coordination, and Planning. This category relates to inadequate 
communication and coordination between various road users as well as planning carried 
out prior to getting on the road. For instance, a motorcycle rider who misinterprets 
gestures from a truck driver as meaning that the adjacent lane was clear of traffic when 
the truck driver is trying to convey his intent to yield right of way to the rider. Another 
example of a communication/coordination factor is a driver who enters the left lane ahead 




Unsafe supervision relates to the effect of leadership on operator conditions and 
environmental factors. There are four categories of unsafe supervision causal factors – 
inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failure to correct known 
problem, and supervisory violations (Table 9). 
Table 9: Brief Descriptions of Unsafe Supervision Causal Categories 
UNSAFE SUPERVISION 
Inadequate Supervision: Oversight and management of personnel and resources including 
training, professional guidance, and operational leadership among other aspects. 
Planned Inappropriate Operations: Management and assignment of work including 
aspects of risk management, crew pairing, operational tempo, etc. 
Failure to Correct Known Problem: Instances where deficiencies among personnel, 
equipment, training, or other related safety areas are “known” to the supervisor 
yet are allowed to continue uncorrected. 
Supervisory Violations: The willful disregard for existing rules, regulations, instructions, 
or standard operating procedures by management during the course of their duties. 
Inadequate Supervision. Inadequate supervision relates to the failure of leadership 
to provide its personnel with adequate and appropriate training, guidance, resources, and 
oversight. An example of an inadequate supervision factor is a supervisor who fails to 
provide adequate information to her service members about motorcycle training courses 
offered through the military. 
Planned Inappropriate Operations. Planned inappropriate operations relate to the 
improper management of personnel by leadership. Inappropriate operations include poor 
project planning and scheduling of personnel. While acceptable during emergency 
situations, these plans are inadequate for normal non-emergency situations. An example 
of a planned inappropriate operations factor is a supervisor who creates a schedule 
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assigning one of his service members to the early shift without considering that he and 
his wife have a newborn baby at home. 
Failure to Correct Known Problems. Failure to correct known problems relates to 
inadequate correction by leadership of hazards and deficiencies known to affect its 
personnel. An example of a failure to correct factor is a supervisor who learns of his 
service members recent struggles with alcohol but does nothing to intervene. 
Supervisory Violations. Supervisory violations relate to the willful disregard of an 
organizations rules and regulations by people in leadership positions. An example of a 
supervisory violation factor is a supervisor who is aware of shift-rest schedule regulations 
but decides to not abide by them when creating work schedules for her service members. 
Organizational Influences 
Organizational Influences. Organizational influences relate to the effects that 
decisions made by upper-level management have on supervisory practices, operator and 
environmental preconditions, and unsafe acts of its personnel. There are three categories 
of organizational influences – resource management, organizational climate, and 
organizational process (Table 10). 
Table 10: Brief Descriptions of Organizational Influences Causal Categories 
ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES 
Resource Management: How an organization manages its human, monetary, and 
equipment resources. 
Organizational Climate: Prevailing atmosphere/vision within the organization including 
such things as policies, command structure, and culture. 
Organizational Process: Formal process by which the vision of an organization is carried 
out including operations, procedures, and oversight among others. 
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Resource Management. Resource management relates to decisions made at the 
highest levels regarding the allocation and maintenance of organizational assets. Budget 
cuts, common in times of economic difficulty, can amplify these resource issues. An 
example of a resource management causal factor is an organization that replaces its full 
day training program with a cursory online module in an attempt to save money. 
Organizational Climate. Organizational climate relates to an organization’s 
policies both explicit and tacit that can set the stage for adverse events. An example of an 
organizational climate factor is an organization whose culture captured by Rear Admiral 
Grace Murray Hopper’s quote “it’s always easier to ask forgiveness later than it is to get 
permission” (Williams, 2004). 
Organizational Process. Organizational process relates to the manner in which 
standard operating procedures are established, updated, and followed within an 
organization.  An example of an organizational process factor is an organization without 
any formal process in place for updating established standard operating procedures as 
changes occur. 
Outside Influences 
Outside Influences. Outside influences captures MVCs that occur completely 
outside the control of a military road user that often result from unsafe behaviors of other 
road users completely outside the control of a military operator. An example of an 
outside influence factor is a service member struck head-on on his way home from work 
by a drunk driver travelling in the opposite direction of traffic. 
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3.1.2 HFACS-MVC Training 
Becoming an HFACS-MVC specialist involves an extensive amount of training 
and experience in applying human factors principles to the management of human error.  
Expertise as an HFACS specialist and Certified HFACS Professional are prerequisites for 
becoming an HFACS-MVC specialist.  
First, the specialists learned to use HFACS for accident analysis purposes. As 
such, the specialists participated in the Basic HFACS Training Workshop taught by the 
original creators of HFACS, Drs. Shappell and Wiegmann. During this intensive two-day 
course, HFACS specialists were taught how to use the HFACS framework to identify and 
manage human error. To gain proficiency, the specialists coded several sets of potential 
causal factors from different domains such as driving. A few of these are captured in 
Table 11; a complete set is provided in Appendix C. They also coded several sets of 
actual cases using real-world data. 
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Table 11: HFACS Category Coding Samples 
Causal Factor HFACS Category 
While waiting to turn onto the highway, a driver started to 
inch forward when he saw an oncoming truck in the right 
lane of traffic. He tried to stop the vehicle, but accidentally 
hit the gas instead forcing the truck to swerve to avoid a 
collision.  
Skill Based Error 
The driver drove 10 to 15 mph over the posted speed limit 
on the highway. 
Violation 




Though considered an authority figure, an officer drove his 
police vehicle faster than the posted speed limit and did not 
signal before changing lanes.  
Supervisory Violation 
The state did not allocate adequate funding for road 
maintenance or sufficient highway patrol. 
Resource Management 
Then, the HFACS specialists became certified as HFACS professionals. Certified 
HFACS professionals must demonstrate advanced knowledge and skills using HFACS by 
passing a comprehensive written exam, applying HFACS to a practical real-world 
situation, and submitting a sample HFACS work product. 
Finally, the HFACS professionals were trained to use the HFACS-MVC 
taxonomy. HFACS-MVC specialists became familiarized with the HFACS-MVC 
framework and nanocode guide (Appendix B). The HFACS-MVC nanocodes are 
arranged by causal category starting at the unsafe act level. To code a causal factor using 
the guide, go to the section containing the appropriate HFACS-MVC causal factor 
category, select the appropriate subcategory, and find the desired causal factor. The 
nanocode is the subcategory abbreviation followed by the number assigned the particular 
causal factor. 
Training to be HFACS-MVC specialists was similar to the HFACS specialist 
training. Samples of causal factors specific to MVCs were again coded, this time at the 
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nanocode level using the HFACS-MVC framework and nanocode guide. A few of these 
causal factors are captured in Table 12; a complete set is provided in Appendix D. The 
HFAC-MVC specialists also coded several complete MVC cases using real-world data. 
Table 12: HFACS-MVC Nanocode Coding Samples 




While waiting to turn onto the highway, a 
driver started to inch forward when he saw 
an oncoming truck in the right lane of 
traffic. He tried to stop the vehicle, but 
accidentally hit the gas instead forcing the 
truck to swerve to avoid a collision.  
Skill Based Error ATT4 Inadvertent 
operation of wrong 
control 
The driver travelled 10 to 15 mph over the 
posted speed limit on the highway. 
Violation VPRO1 Speeding 10-
19 mph over the 
speed limit 
The driver was physically impaired after 
going out for a few drinks. 
Adverse 
Physiological State 
PC2 “Impairment due 
to drugs or alcohol” 
Though considered an authority figure, an 
officer drove his police vehicle faster than 
the posted speed limit and did not signal 




The state did not allocate adequate funding 






3.2 MILITARY MVC DATA  
The military is supported by service-specific safety centers that focus on mishap 
prevention. Each safety center is responsible for maintaining a mishap reporting system 
and database for its service members. The Naval Safety Center (NSC) at Norfolk Naval 
Base in Norfolk, Virginia maintains the online reporting system for USN and USMC 
mishaps. The Air Force Safety Center (AFSC) at Kirtland Air Force Base in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico maintains the online reporting system for USAF mishaps. 
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Among the records maintained at the safety centers are those for severe (Class A and 
Class B) off-duty mishaps. 
Over the past decade, the NSC has actually maintained two mishap reporting 
systems – Safety Information Management System (SIMS) and Web Enabled Safety 
System (WESS). Mishaps were initially reported through SIMS. However, with limited 
functionality for exporting data and reporting results, SIMS was replaced with a new 
system, WESS available for use starting in 2002 (DoD, 2001; "US Naval Safety Center 
Selects JReport 6," 2003). In 2004, NSC required that WESS be the exclusive mishap 
reporting system used for all USN and USMC mishaps. WESS contains fields for 
investigators to capture narrative summaries, contributing factors (personnel, roadway, 
environmental, vehicular, and event), and related recommendations. With both SIMS and 
WESS, NSC personnel review each report submitted for USN and USMC Class A and B 
mishaps and assign all applicable causal codes. The list of applicable causal codes may 
be referenced in the glossary of the Navy and Marine Corps Mishap and Safety 
Investigations Manual (DoN, 2005). The AFSC has maintained the mishap reporting 
system Air Force Safety Automated System (AFSAS) for many years. AFSAS contains 
fields for investigators to enter mishap details, record narrative synopses, indicate 
contributing causal and non-causal factors (personnel, roadway, environmental, 
vehicular, and event), and submit recommendations. 
3.2.1 Data from Safety Centers 
Based on the scope of the research, the populations of interest included all USN, 
USMC, and USAF cases where service members were victims of severe (Class A/B) off-
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duty MVC mishaps. With specific interest in 2W and 4W off-duty MVCs, mishaps 
involving service members as pedestrians (e.g. joggers, post-crash outside vehicle) or 
riders of bicycles or all-terrain vehicles were excluded from this study. The specific 
parameters for MVC demographic and narrative mishap data requested from the 
respective safety centers are presented in Table 13. 
Table 13: Data Requested from Safety Centers 
Data Content 
Population of Interest USN, USMC, and USAF cases where service members were 
victims of severe (Class A/B) off-duty MVC mishaps 
Requested Cases Demographic and narrative data fields for the following cases: 
• Mishap Severity: A/B 
• Duty Status: Off-duty 
• Accidental Death Type: MVC 
• Vehicle Type: 2W/4W 
• Position of Service Member: Operator 
Eliminated Cases Service members acting as passengers, pedestrians, bicyclists, 
and riders of all-terrain vehicles 
Narratives containing insufficient detail 
Upon completion of all appropriate services’ documentation, the safety centers 
provided both quantitative (personnel, roadway environment, vehicle, and event 
demographics) and qualitative (narrative) information for each mishap stripped of any 
personal identifiers such as names and social security numbers to maintain the privacy of 
mishap victims. Sample mishap narratives from several MVCs are presented in Appendix 
E.  
Demographic data were provided for each service as individual worksheets in 
separate Microsoft Excel files (Table 14). The USAF narratives were provided as 
individual Microsoft Word files with one document per case. Narratives for the USN and 
USMC were provided in two Notepad text files, one for each of the military services. 
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Unfortunately, the USMC data was limited in that only four years of cases were provided 
and the demographic file lacked data related to service member ages and paygrades. 
Table 14: Data Provided by Safety Centers 
Content File Type File Created Dates Queried 
USAF demographics Microsoft Excel 97-
2003 Worksheet (.xls) 
2/02/2010 10/01/1998 – 
9/30/2008 
USAF narratives Microsoft Word 97-
2003 Document (.doc) 
11/23/2009 
USN demographics Microsoft Excel 97-
2003 Worksheet (.xls) 
 / 27/ 2008 10/01/1999 – 
5/30/2008 
USN narratives Text Document (.txt)  /2 / 2008 
USMC demographics Microsoft Excel 97-
2003 Worksheet (.xls) 
 / 27/ 2008 10/01/2004 – 
3/15/2008 
USMC narratives Text Document (.txt) 3/25/2008 
 
3.2.2 Data for Coders 
The datasets provided by the NSC were modified prior to classification with 
HFACS-MVC. The demographic and narrative data for 1300 MVC cases were provided 
by the safety centers. The datasets provided contained all mishaps resulting in severe 
injury or death of any service member, regardless of his/her seating position 
(operator/passenger). With a focus on preventing military losses from MVCs, cases 
where service members acted as passengers in or on vehicles were eliminated. After 
eliminating these cases, there were 1161 off-duty MVCs available for classification – 474 
USAF, 517 USN, and 171 USMC. The USAF cases occurred between October 1998 and 
September 2008. The USN cases occurred between October 1999 and May 2008. The 
USMC cases occurred between October 2004 and March 2008. 
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3.3 DATA CLASSIFICATION 
Data classification was conducted by eight HFACS-MVC specialists in teams of 
two. The coders were students in the Industrial Engineering department at Clemson 
University – four were undergraduate students and four were doctoral students with a 
concentration in Human Factors. All coders were highly trained in using HFACS and had 
extensive experience coding hundreds of cases from multiple domains with varying 
degrees of detail.  
Teams of coders generally classify cases with an HFACS framework using one of 
two methods – the arbitration method and the consensus method (Berry, 2010). Early 
HFACS studies typically used the arbitration method where a pair of experts classified 
each case independently and a third expert arbitrated any discrepancies. More recently, 
HFACS studies have increasingly gravitated towards using the more efficient consensus 
method in which two or more experts classify cases together. If disagreements arise 
during coding, the experts discuss the situation until they are able to reach a consensus. 
Previous studies have demonstrated high levels of inter-rater reliability for the HFACS 
causal categories (Shappell, et al., 2007; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2004; Wiegmann, et al., 
2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001, 2003). Furthermore, the consensus method fosters a 
shared understanding among the experts improving the consistency between experts at 
the nanocode level of detail. As such, the coders used the consensus method to classify 
the MVC mishaps in teams of two or three. 
For each MVC, a team of coders read the narrative, determined its causal factors, 
and determined the appropriate nanocode for each factor using the HFACS-MVC 
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framework and nanocode guide. Suppose a team read a case where a service member was 
unable to negotiate a curve due to his speed (90 mph in a 65 mph zone) and crossed over 
the center lane into oncoming traffic. Looking at the HFACS-MVC causal categories at 
the unsafe acts level, the coders would identify the service members speeding as a 
violation and his inability to safely negotiate a curve as a skill based error. Looking at the 
HFACS-MVC causal factor nanocodes, the coders would identify speeding as a 
procedural violation, specifically a VPRO2 “Speeding 20-29 mph over the speed limit” 
and the skill based error as a technique error, specifically a TQ7 “Failed to negotiate 
curve/turn/bend/ramp.” Whenever any debate arose as to whether a causal factor was a 
decision error or violation, the coders erred on the side of caution and classified these 
ambiguous factors as decision errors rather than as violations.  
Initially, the coders were unsure how to classify the four main factors related to 
alcohol, drunk driving, buzzed driving, alcoholism, and driving with a hangover. The 
teams classified drunk driving using two codes – one in the unsafe acts tier (violation for 
drinking and driving – VDD) and one in the preconditions tier (physical condition for 
impairment due to alcohol – PC2). The teams used the latter precondition code, PC2 to 
classify buzzed driving, interpreted for this study as having positive blood alcohol 
content under the legal limit of 0.08%. Both alcoholism and hung over were classified 
with codes in the preconditions tier. The teams classified alcoholism as a physical/mental 
limitation factor (PMO) and hung over as a personal readiness factor (PR4). 
Inevitably, not every case could be classified. Some narratives lacked adequate 
description or sufficient detail due to poor documentation practices. A narrative capturing 
76 
 
only the paths travelled by vehicles involved in a MVC prior to collision from an aerial 
perspective or a narrative focusing on events post-MVC may prove inadequate for 
identifying the behaviors and conditions of the human operators. Other narratives were 
omitted completely due to the nature of the MVCs. It is not always possible to determine 
the chain of events leading up to a MVC, especially for single-vehicle crashes without 
passengers or witnesses. 
3.4 DATA ANALYSES 
Data analyses were performed using Microsoft Excel 2010 and Minitab 16 
Statistical Software. To determine the overall HFACS-MVC trends for the population, 
data were coded and organized using Microsoft Excel 2010. A master file was created 
that consolidated the Microsoft Excel files from the various branches of the military. 
Cases with only an outside influence causal factor were deleted; cases with an outside 
influence and at least one service member causal factor were retained. The presence or 
absence of a causal factor for each of the 19 HFACS-MVC categories was indicated with 
a binary variable of 0 (no causal factor from that category) or 1 (at least one causal factor 
from that category). 
To compare the HFACS-MVC trends between subsets of the population, data 
were analyzed using Minitab 16 Statistical Software. First, a Chi-Square statistical test 
was performed to identify the existence of significant differences between subsets. If the 
Chi-Square statistic was significant, Odds Ratio statistical tests was performed to 
determine the direction and magnitude of significant difference(s). 
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3.4.1 Variables of Interest 
This study looked at the relationships between each of four independent variables 
and one dependent variable (Table 16). Both the independent (vehicle type, service, 
paygrade, and age) and dependent (number of cases involving factors from each HFACS-
MVC causal factor category) variables were categorical. Vehicle type reflected whether 
the military operator was riding a 2W or driving a 4W motor vehicle at the time of the 
MVC. Service reflected whether the military operator served as a member of the United 
States Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps. Rank reflected whether the military operator 
served as an enlisted service member or as an officer. Age group reflected the age of the 
military operator was at the time of the MVC in one of six groups (17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 
31-35, 36-40, or >40).  
Table 15: Research Variables 
Independent Variable Variable Levels Dependent Variable 
Vehicle Type 2W, 4W Number of cases 
with HFACS-MVC 
causal categories and 
nanocodes 
Service USAF, USN, USMC 
Rank Enlisted, Officer 
Age Group 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, >40 
The six age groups selected for the present study were based on those for prior 
MVC studies. The age group sets used in prior MVC studies in the general population by 
NHTSA, the USAF population by Carr and Markopoulos are presented in Table 17. 
NHTSA provides information related to the vehicle occupants killed in fatal US MVCs 
such as age in its FARS database. Not including occupant age groups younger than 16 
years of age, who were assumed to be passengers based on age restrictions for licensure, 
there are eight FARS age groups. The age groups used in the two USAF MVC studies by 
Carr and Markopoulos reflect the younger demographic of the US military with upper 
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limits of 40 and 50 years of age compared to an upper limit of 74 years of age from 
FARS for the general US population. 
Table 16: Comparison of Age Groups Used in MVC Studies 




USAF, USN, USMC 
Present Study 
16-20 17-20 17-25 17-20 
21-24 21-25 26-30 21-25 
25-34 26-30 31-35 26-30 
45-54 31-35 36-40 31-35 
55-64 36-40 >40 36-40 
65-74 41-45  >40 
>74 46-50   
Unknown >50   
Contingency tables may be used to present the relationships between two 
categorical variables in matrix format with r rows and c columns with r*c cells. For this 
dissertation, the independent variables will be presented across the rows and the 
dependent variable will be presented down the columns. The individual cells contain 
counts for cases where a particular causal factor category was present or absent. The 
following 2x2 contingency table (Table 18) presents the relationship between vehicle 
type and number of cases with at least one violation.  
Table 17: Sample Contingency Table 
 HFACS-MVC Causal Category       (e.g. Violation) 
Vehicle Type Absence of Causal Category Presence of Causal Category 
2W a b 
4W c d 
Hypothesis testing for each independent variable compares the observed and 
expected values for each HFACS-MVC causal category at the different variable levels. 
The observed values represent the actual data while the expected values represent 
theoretical data where there are no differences between variable levels. The general null 
(H0) and alternate (H1) hypotheses are as follows: 
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H0:                        
H1:                                
where  is the observed value and                                              
3.4.2 Pearson’s Chi-Square (  ) 
Pearson’s Chi-Square (  ) Test for Independence (Equation 1) is a nonparametric 
test that compares the distributions for two categorical variables using frequencies. It 
basically addresses whether the two variables in a contingency table are statistically 
related to one another (Scanlan, 2007). The null hypothesis for the Chi-Square Test for 
Independence assumes statistical independence between the independent variable (e.g. 
2W, 4W) and dependent variable (causal factor patterns). The alternate hypothesis (H1) 
states that there is a statistical relationship of the causal factor patterns between variables. 
In other words, different levels of the independent variable exhibit similar causal factor 
patterns. To determine the relationship between the independent and dependent variables 
of interest, the Pearson’s Chi-Square Test of Independence was conducted at a 
significance level of p=0.05. 
Equation 1: Pearson’s Chi-Square (  ) Test of Independence 
    ∑ [(     )
 
  
]                          
Pearson’s Chi-Square Test of Independence has two underlying assumptions: (1) 
sample is randomly selected and (2) expected frequencies are sufficiently large 
("Electronic Statistics Textbook," 2011). To prevent the occurrence of Type II errors, 
sample sizes should meet expected cell count requirements or have the ability to be 
corrected using a statistical correction. For small (2x2) tables, the minimum expected 
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count requirement for each cell is five. If the minimum expected count requirements are 
not met, statistical corrections such as Yates’ correction or Fisher’s exact test should be 
applied (McDonald, 2009). For small (2x2) tables, Fisher’s exact should be used with 
small sample sizes (<1000) while Yates’ correction should be used with large sample 
sizes (≥1000). For larger tables, the minimum expected count requirement is five for 80% 
of the cells and zero for none of the cells. For larger tables, an exact test or a randomized 
test should be used with small sample sizes (<1000) while no correction should be used 
for large sample sizes (≥1000). 
3.4.3 Odds Ratio (OR) 
While the Pearson’s Chi-Square Test of Independence determines whether two 
variables are statistically related, it does not quantify this relationship. For determining 
the direction and strength of relationships between two categorical variables, the Odds 
Ratio (OR) descriptive statistic may be used. The odds ratio is a measure of effect size 
that compares the likelihood of a binary outcome for two or more levels of a categorical 
independent variable. Odds ratios are used with categorical independent variables and 
binary dependent variables. 
To illustrate the basic concepts behind the odds ratio, a sample (2x2) contingency 
table is presented below with marginal totals for the variable levels and the grand total 
(Table 19). The independent variable, vehicle type, is in the rows and the dependent 
variable, HFACS-MVC causal category, is in the columns. The odds ratio for these 




Table 18: Sample Contingency Table with Marginal and Grand Totals 
 HFACS-MVC Causal Category - Violation  
Vehicle Type Absence Presence Total 
2W a b a+b 
4W c d c+d 
Total a+c b+d a+b+c+d 
Using the notations from the sample contingency table above, the odds ratio 
descriptive statistic is presented in Equation 2. Possible values for the odds ratio are 
rational values between zero and infinity with a neutral value of one (Declerq, 2001). 
When the odds ratio is equal to one, the outcome is equally likely for both levels of the 
independent variable. When the odds ratio is greater than one, the outcome is more likely 
for that level of the independent variable. When the odds ratio is less than one, the 
outcome is more likely for that level of the independent variable.  
Equation 2: Odds Ratio (OR) Descriptive Statistic 







An odds ratio only looks at two levels for both the independent and dependent 
variables. To use the odds ratio statistic for an independent variable with three or more 
levels, each level may be captured in multiple (2x2) contingency tables and the odds 
ratios for each table should be calculated (Uebersax, 2006). For example, an independent 
variable with three levels would calculate the odds ratio for three separate (2x2) 
contingency tables.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS, DATA AND OVERALL TRENDS 
The military safety centers provided a total of 1300 Class A and B off-duty MVC 
cases that occurred between October 1999 and March 2008 (Table 20). Of these cases, 
1161 involved military service members as motor vehicle operators. About one-fourth of 
the cases provided were eliminated from the dataset prior to analyses. Excluded cases 
were caused exclusively by sources external to the service member (lacked at least one 
unsafe act committed by the military operator) or were unable to be coded (lacked 
insufficient narrative information or detail). The final dataset contained at total of 883 
cases, 797 Class A and 86 Class B mishaps, which resulted in 704 fatalities and 179 
serious injuries. In each case, the involved service member was operating a motor vehicle 
on the roadway when he/she committed at least one unsafe act that contributed to the 
MVC. 
Table 19: Cases Classified 
 Dates Provided 
[Operator, Passenger] 
Eliminated 
[Without UA, Uncodeable] 
Analyzed 





Some but not all of the years between FY99 and FY08 contained full datasets. 
MVC cases were provided for most, but not all, of FY2008. Some years, MVC cases 
came from all three branches (USAF, USN, and USMC) while other years, they came 
from only one or two of these branches. One military branch provided MVC cases for the 
one year period of FY1999. Two military branches provided MVC cases for the five year 
period from FY2000 through FY2004. All three military branches provided MVC cases 
for the four year period from FY2005 through FY2008. 
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An average of 73.6 MVC cases occurred each month. The distribution of MVCs 
over the 12 months of the year is presented in Figure 8. The month of March had the 
fewest cases per month with 55 cases. The months of July and August had the most cases 
per month with 90 cases each. 
 
Figure 8: MVC Cases by Month 
An average of 126.1 MVC cases occurred each day. The distribution of MVCs 
over the seven days of the week is presented in Figure 9. Wednesday had the least cases 
per day with 68 cases while Saturday had the most cases per day with 212 cases. More 
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Figure 9: MVC Cases by Day of the Week 
An average of 36.8 MVC cases occurred each hour. The distribution of MVCs 
over 24 hours in the day is presented in Figure 10. Fewer cases occurred in the morning 
and early afternoon hours with the least number of cases occurring between 0900 and 
1000. More cases occurred in the late afternoon and late night hours with the greatest 
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Figure 10: MVC Cases by Time of Day 
4.1 HFACS-MVC TRENDS 
The following section presents the HFACS-MVC trends associated with off-duty 
crashes. All cases in the final dataset contained at least one unsafe act. The dataset 
contained 883 cases with a total of 2,642 nanocodes across the five HFACS-MVC tiers 
(Figure 11). The overwhelming majority of nanocodes (n=2,559) were from the lower 
two tiers, unsafe acts (n=1,622) and preconditions to unsafe acts (n=937). The remaining 
nanocodes were from the upper two tiers, unsafe leadership (n=22) and organizational 
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Figure 11: HFACS-MVC Tiers, percentage of nanocodes (N=2,642) 
The frequencies and percentages of cases associated with the HFACS-MVC 
causal categories for all five tiers are presented in Table 21. Each case could contain 
factors from several causal categories. As such, it was possible for the sum of the 
percentages of cases associated with each causal category to exceed 100%. 








Table 20: Frequency and Percentage of Cases, number and percent of cases with presence of at least one causal factor in category 
HFACS-MVC Category # (%) 
Outside Factors 
 Outside Influences 48 (5.4) 
Organizational Influences 
 Organizational Climate 3 (0.3) 
 Organizational Process 7 (0.8) 
 Resource Management 2 (0.2) 
Unsafe Leadership 
 Inadequate Leadership 9 (1.0) 
 Planned Inappropriate Operation 5 (0.6) 
 Failed to Correct Known Problem 4 (0.5) 
 Leadership Violations 1 (0.1) 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
   Environmental Conditions   
 Physical Environment 161 (18.2) 
 Technical Environment 36 (4.1) 
   Operator Conditions   
 Adverse Mental State 190 (21.5) 
 Adverse Physiological State 306 (34.7) 
 Physical/Mental Limitation 110 (12.5) 
   Operator Factors   
 Communication, Coordination & Planning 42 (4.8) 
 Personal Readiness 2 (0.2) 
Unsafe Acts of the Operator 
 Skill Based Errors 624 (70.7) 
 Decision Errors 254 (28.8) 
 Perceptual Errors 7 (0.8) 
 Violations 477 (54.0) 
* N = 883 
The frequencies and percentages of cases associated with the HFACS-MVC 
causal factor subcategories for the two most populated tiers, preconditions for unsafe acts 
and unsafe acts, are presented in Tables 22 and 23. Again, cases could contain factors 
from several causal subcategories so the sum of the percentages can be over 100%. 
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Table 21: Preconditions for Unsafe Act Subcategories, number and percent of cases with presence of factor in subcategory 
HFACS-MVC Precondition Subcategories # (%) 
Physical Environment 
 Surface Conditions 121 (13.7) 
 Visibility 49 (5.5) 
 Physical Environment, Misc. 7 (0.8) 
 Physical Environment, Other 3 (0.3) 
Technological Environment 
 Protective Devices on Road 14 (1.6) 
 Vehicular Tech. Environment 5 (0.6) 
 Design 17 (1.9) 
 Tech. Env. Other 2 (0.2) 
Adverse Mental State 
 Attitude 38 (4.3) 
 Awareness 55 (6.2) 
 Drowsiness 67 (7.6) 
 Psychology 58 (6.6) 
 Adverse Mental State, Other 2 (0.2) 
Adverse Physiological State 
 Physiological Condition 276 (31.3) 
 Medical Condition 9 (1.0) 
 Incapacitation 42 (4.8) 
 Adverse Physiological State, Other 1 (0.1) 
Physical/Mental Limitation 
 Mental Limitation 101 (11.4) 
 Sensory Deficiency 1 (0.1) 
 Physical Limitation 0 (0.0) 
 Physical/Mental Limitation, Other 8 (0.9) 
Personal Readiness 
 Personal Readiness 2 (0.2) 
 Personal Readiness, Other 0 (0.0) 
Communication, Coordination, & Planning 
 Communication  11 (1.2) 
 Coordination 1 (0.1) 
 Planning 31 (3.5) 
 Comm., Coord., & Planning, Other 1 (0.1) 
* N = 883 
The top three preconditions for unsafe act subcategories associated with MVCs in 
descending order were physiological conditions, surface conditions, and mental 
limitations. Approximately one-third of the MVCs contained at least one physiological 
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condition causal factor. Much smaller percentages of the MVCs were associated with 
surface conditions and mental limitations, each present in only around one-tenth of the 
cases.  
Table 22: Unsafe Act Subcategories, number and percent of cases with presence of factor in subcategory 
HFACS-MVC Unsafe Act Subcategories # (%) 
Skill Based Errors 
 Attention Failure 92 (10.4) 
 Postural Error 1 (0.1) 
 Technique Error 428 (48.5) 
 Timing Error 15 (1.7) 
 Unknown Control Error 115 (13.0) 
 Skill Based Error, Other 4 (0.5) 
Decision Errors 
 Information Processing Error 5 (0.6) 
 Prioritization Error 53 (6.0) 
 Procedural Decision Error 61 (6.9) 
 Situational Assessment Error 147 (16.6) 
 Vehicular Decision Error 1 (0.1) 
 Decision Error, Other 1 (0.1) 
Violations 
 Procedural Violation, Speed 307 (34.8) 
 Procedural Violation, Drunk Driving 219 (24.8) 
 Procedural Violation, Other 78 (8.8) 
 Knowledge Violation 36 (4.1) 
 Violation, Other 8 (0.9) 
* N = 883 
The top unsafe act subcategories associated with MVCs in descending order were 
technique errors, procedural speeding violations, procedural drunk driving violations, 
situational assessment errors, unknown control errors, and attention failures. Of these 
unsafe act subcategories, four were errors (three skill based errors and one decision error) 
and two were violations (both procedural in nature). Almost one-half of off-duty MVCs 
contained at least technique error causal factor. Around one-third and one-fourth of 
MVCs contained at least one procedural speeding and procedural drunk driving violation 
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respectively. Between one-tenth and one-fifth of MVCs were associated with each of the 
situational assessment error, unknown control error, and attention failure subcategories. 
Two of the subcategories, physiological condition and drunk driving violation, are 
related. The drunk driving violation subcategory exclusively captured factors reflecting a 
conscious disregard of the laws related to being over the legal drinking limit and 
operating a motor vehicle (in the US, the legal drinking limit is below a blood alcohol 
content of 0.08%). The physiological condition subcategory exclusively captured factors 
related to being impaired due to the drugs or alcohol which relates to being intoxicated 
(drunk) as well as to being impaired (buzzed), hung-over, etc. Simply put, all cases with 
drunk driving violations will have physiological condition factors but not all cases with 
physiological condition factors will have drunk driving violations. In this dataset, 276 
cases were associated with impairment from drugs or alcohol – 219 cases associated with 
operator intoxication from being drunk with a BAC over 0.08% and 57 cases associated 
with operator impairment from drugs or from being buzzed with a BAC under 0.08%. 
The most common causal factor nanocodes associated with off-duty MVCs 
involving US military service members are presented in Table 21. Of the 15 most 
commonly classified nanocodes, 10 causal factors were at the unsafe act level (four skill 
based errors, one decision error, and five violations) and five causal factors were at the 
precondition for unsafe act level (one environmental condition factor and four operator 
condition factors). As discussed, PC2 and VDD are related to one another with PC2 
capturing the physiological effects related to driving drunk (VDD) as well as other 
physiological impairments. Assuming all VDD factors are already captured by the PC2 
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nanocode, the top five nanocodes associated with off-duty MVCs were impairment due to 
drugs or alcohol/drunk driving (PC2), failure to negotiate curve or turn (TQ7), failure to 
modify behavior for hazards (SA2), lost control for an unknown reason (LCU), and over-
steered or overcorrected to regain position on road (TQ6). 
Table 23: Common causal factors associated with off-duty military MVCs 
Ranking Description of Nanocode Nanocode Tier 
1 Impairment due to drugs or alcohol PC2 PC 
2 Failure to negotiate curve or turn TQ7 UA 
3 Drunk driving VDD UA 
4 Situational assessment SA2 UA 
5 Lost control, due to unknown reason LCU UA 
6 Over-steered or overcorrected to regain position TQ6 UA 
7 Limited experience or proficiency ML4 PC 
8 Speeding, unknown illegal speed VPRO0 UA 
9 Slippery road surface SC1 PC 
10 Mental fatigue, drowsy AMF1 PC 
11 Inadvertent drifting out of lane ATT5 UA 
12 Speeding, 20-29 mph over the speed limit VPRO2 UA 
13 Speeding, 10-19 mph over the speed limit VPRO1 UA 
13 Speeding, 40+ mph over the speed limit VPRO4 UA 
13 Personality style PSY1 PC 
Detailed analyses of HFACS-MVC categories, subcategories, and nanocodes 
were conducted for the lower two tiers, unsafe acts and preconditions to unsafe acts. The 
upper two tiers, unsafe leadership and organizational influences, were excluded from 
analysis due to the paucity of factors identified. The fifth tier, outside influences, was 
excluded from analysis because it captures factors associated with non-military personnel 
and is therefore outside the scope of this effort. 
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4.2 UNSAFE ACT TRENDS 
All cases contained at least one unsafe act by the service member operating the 
motor vehicle. The 883 cases contained one (n=365), two (n=341), three (n=141), four 
(n=28) or even five (n=8) unsafe act causal factors per case. The percentage of cases 
containing at least one factor from each of the four unsafe act causal categories is 
presented in Figure 12. The leading unsafe act causal categories associated with off-duty 
MVCs were skill based errors and violations followed by decision errors. Of the 883 
cases in the dataset, approximately three-fourths contained at least one skill based error, 
one-half contained at least one violation, and one-fourth contained at least one decision 




Figure 12: Unsafe Act Categories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per category (N=883) 
4.2.1 Unsafe Acts over Time 
The trend lines for unsafe act categories involved in MVCs between FY1999 and 
FY2008 are presented in Figure 13. The temporal trends for all four unsafe act categories 
















HFACS-MVC Unsafe Act Causal Categories 




Figure 13: Unsafe Act Category Temporal Trends, percentage of cases per fiscal year with at least one factor per category 
 
4.2.2 Skill Based Errors 
Most cases (n=624) contained at least one skill based error. These 624 cases 
contained one (n=555), two (n=66), or three (n=3) skill based error nanocodes per case. A 
total of 696 skill based error nanocodes were identified. Breakdowns of decision errors 
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Figure 14: Skill Based Error Causal Factor Subcategories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per subcategory (N=883) 
 
 
Figure 15: Skill Based Error Causal Factors, count of skill based error nanocodes (N=696) 
The most common skill based error subcategory captured technique errors. These 
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Skill Based Errors Associated with MVCs 
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curve or turn (TQ7) or who overcorrected trying to maintain or regain their position on 
the road (TQ6). Other common causal subcategories of skill based errors were control 
errors and attention errors. 
4.2.3 Decision Errors 
Several hundred cases (n=254) contained at least one decision error. These 254 
cases contained either one (n=239) or two (n=5) decision error nanocodes per case. A 
total of 269 decision error nanocodes were identified. The breakdowns of decision errors 
associated with MVCs by subcategory and nanocode are presented in Figures 16 and 17. 
 






















Figure 17: Decision Error Causal Factors, count of decision error nanocodes (N=269) 
The most common subcategory of decision errors was related to situational 
awareness. In particular, these decision errors were made by operators who should have 
but did not modify their behaviors on the road to accommodate for travel conditions 
(SA2). Other common sub-categories of decision errors were procedural errors and 
prioritization errors. Prioritization decision errors were often committed by operators who 
made decisions based on inappropriate prioritizations (PRI1) or ignored cautions or 
recommendations from others (PRI2). Procedural decision errors typically involved 
operators who selected an inappropriate maneuver (DPRO2), decided to pass or change 
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Over half of the cases (n=477) contained at least one violation. These 477 cases 
contained one (n=327), two (n=129), three (n=19), or four (n=2) violations per case. A 
total of 650 violation nanocodes were identified. The breakdowns of violations associated 
with MVCs by subcategory and nanocode are presented in Figures 18 and 19. 
 
























Figure 19: Violation causal factors, count of violation nanocodes (N=650) 
The most common violation subcategories were procedural in nature. Over one-
third of the cases contained procedural violations were related to speeding. One-fourth of 
the cases contained drunk driving violations. In fact, the top violation nanocode was 
VDD which captured service members who operated motor vehicles with a BAC of 
0.08% or greater. 
4.3 PRECONDITION TRENDS 
Most cases contained at least one causal factor from the preconditions tier 
(n=583). The 583 cases with preconditions had one (n=351), two (n=153), three (n=52), 
four (n=18), five (n=9), or even six (n=2) precondition causal factors per case. The 
percentage of cases associated with each of the three groups of precondition 
subcategories (environmental conditions, operator conditions, operator factors) is 
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Figure 20: Precondition Causal Category Groups, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per group (n=883) 
The most common groups of precondition causal categories associated with off-
duty MVCs were operator conditions followed by environmental conditions and finally 
operator factors. Of the 883 MVC cases in the dataset, over half contained operator 
conditions, one-fifth contained environmental conditions, and one-twentieth contained 
operator factors. 
4.3.1 Preconditions over Time 
The trend lines for the three groups of precondition causal categories involved in 
MVCs between FY1999 and FY2008 are presented in Figure 21. The temporal trends for 
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Figure 21: Temporal Trends of Precondition Causal Category Groups 
4.3.2 Environmental Conditions 
Environmental conditions include physical environment and technological 
environment causal categories. A large majority of the cases classified lacked any 
environmental condition causal factors (n=703). Figure 22 shows the percentage of cases 
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Figure 22: Environmental Condition Categories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per category (N=883) 
One-fifth of the cases (n=180) contained at least one physical or technical 
environmental condition factor. The 180 cases containing environmental conditions had 
one (n=142), two (n=32), or three (n=6) environmental condition nanocodes per case. A 
total of 224 environmental condition nanocodes were identified. Breakdowns of 
environmental conditions associated with MVCs by subcategory and nanocode are 
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Figure 23: Environmental Condition Subcategories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per subcategory (N=883) 
 
 
Figure 24: Environmental Condition Causal Factors, count of environmental condition nanocodes (N=224) 
Environmental conditions include physical and technological environment causal 
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environment factors (n=186) rather than technological environment factors (n=38). The 
physical environment factors typically involved surface conditions (SC1-3) and visibility 
issues (VIS1-2). The technological environment factors typically involved road sign 
(PPE4) and road design (DES2) issues. 
4.3.3 Operator Conditions 
Operator conditions include adverse mental state, adverse physiological state, and 
and physical/mental limitation causal categories.  Figure 25 shows the percentage of 
cases associated with each of the three operator condition causal categories. The leading 
operator condition causal categories associated with off-duty MVCs were adverse 
physiological state factors followed by adverse mental state factors. Of the 883 MVC 
cases in the dataset, one-third contained adverse physiological state factors, one-fifth 





Figure 25: Operator Condition Categories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per category (N=883) 
The majority of cases contained at least one operator condition factor (n=492). 
These 492 cases contained one (n=363), two (n=94), three (n=26), or four (n=9) operator 
condition nanocodes per case. A total of 665 operator condition nanocodes were 
identified. Breakdowns of operator conditions associated with MVCs by subcategory and 
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Figure 26: Operator Condition Subcategories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per subcategory (N=883) 
 
 
Figure 27: Operator Condition Causal Factors, count of operator condition nanocodes (N=665) 
Most operator conditions captured were adverse mental conditions (n=226) and 
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The adverse mental condition factors were related to drowsiness (ML4), breakdowns in 
awareness (AW1), and the psychological makeup of operators (PSY1). The adverse 
physiological state factors were related to operator impairment due to drugs and/or 
alcohol (PC2). The physical/mental limitation factors were related to lack of experience 
or proficiency of service members with the vehicles they were operating or with the areas 
in which they were travelling (ML4). 
4.3.4 Operator Factors 
Operator factors include personal readiness and communication, coordination, and 
planning causal categories. Figure 28 shows the percentage of cases associated with each 
of the two operator factor categories. By far, the leading operator factor causal category 




Figure 28: Operator Factor Categories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per category (N=883) 
Only 44 cases were associated with any operator factors. The 44 cases containing 
operator factors had one (n=41), two (n=2), or three (n=1) operator factors per case. A 
total of 48 operator factor nanocodes were identified. The overwhelming majority of the 
operator factors classified were communication, coordination, and planning factors 
(n=46) rather than personal readiness factors (n=2). Breakdowns of operator factors 
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Figure 29: Operator Factor Causal Factor Subcategories, percentage of cases with at least one factor per subcategory (N=883) 
 
 
Figure 30: Operator Factor Causal Factors, count of operator factor nanocodes (N=48) 
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Common operator factor subcategories include communication and planning. In 
particular, these factors were related to inadequate travel planning by the operator prior to 




CHAPTER 5: RESULTS, COMPARISONS OF TRENDS 
The following section presents the general trends associated with off-duty MVCs 
for each of the independent variables. Nonparametric statistical analyses were conducted 
to compare HFACS-MVC causal factor patterns for each independent variable. For 
statistically significant causal categories, odds ratios were calculated and causal factor 
(nanocode) comparisons were included. Insufficient cell counts prevented calculations of 
valid Pearson Chi-Squares for the perceptual error and personal readiness causal 
categories. 
Again, the four independent variables of interest were military branch, vehicle 
type, paygrade, and age group. For each independent variable, contingency tables were 
created and presented alongside Pearson Chi-Square and Odds Ratio statistics for each 
HFACS-MVC unsafe act and precondition category (except Technical Environment and 
Personal Readiness which lacked sufficient cell counts). These can be found in Appendix 
F for military branch comparisons, in Appendix G for vehicle type comparisons, in 
Appendix H for paygrade comparisons, and in Appendix I for age group comparisons. 
5.1 MILITARY BRANCHES: USAF, USN, USMC 
The dataset contained about ten years of MVCs from both the USAF and USN. In 
contrast, the dataset contained only about three years of MVCs from the USMC. Similar 
percentages of cases were eliminated from all three services’ datasets due to an absence 
of unsafe acts committed by the service member. Interestingly, a notably larger 




As such, the large majority of classified cases involved operators in the USAF 
(43%) and USN (42%) and a much smaller percentage involved operators in the USMC 
(15%). There were a total of 1,384 nanocodes, 942 nanocodes, and 316 nanocodes 
classified for cases in the USAF, USN, and USMC. As such, there were 3.7 factors per 
case for the USAF, 2.5 factors per case for the USN, and 2.4 factors per case for the 
USMC. 
5.1.1 Temporal Trends 
The number of cases in the final dataset from each branch by fiscal year is 
provided in Figure 31. Again, keep in mind that the dataset for FY2008 was limited and 




Figure 31: Temporal Trends of MVC Cases by Military Branch 
5.1.2 Unsafe Act Trends 
The unsafe act trends by military branch are shown in Figure 32. The leading 
unsafe act causal categories associated with off-duty MVCs for the USAF, USN, and 
USMC were skill based errors followed by violations and decision errors with few, if 
any, perceptual errors. Differences in unsafe act category trends between the three 
branches were significant for skill based errors (  = 6.906, p<0.01) and violations 
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Figure 32: Unsafe Act Categories by Branch, percent of cases per branch with at least one factor per category 
Approximately two-thirds of USAF cases and three-fourths of USN and USMC 
cases contained skill based errors. The difference between the percentages of USN and 
USMC cases associated with skill based errors was insignificant (  =0.868, ns).  
However, the differences between the percentages of USN and USMC cases and the 
percentage of USAF cases associated with skill based errors were significant. 
Specifically, MVCs in the USAF were associated with significantly fewer skill based 
errors than MVCs in both the USN (  =5.926, p<0.05) and the USMC (  =6.906, 
p<0.05). The relative odds of a service member having a MVC involving one or more 
skill based errors was approximately 1.5 times greater in the USN (OR=1.47) and almost 
two times greater in the USMC (OR=1.84) than in the USAF. 
The percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases associated with each of the 























subcategories for all three military branches were related to technique, attention, and 
control. The three main skill based error subcategories associated with cases for all three 
branches were related to technique, control, and attention. Technique errors were 
associated with the highest percentage of MVCs for service members in the USAF 
followed by service members in the USN and USMC. The opposite trend was identified 
for errors related to loss of control due to unknown reasons which were associated with 
the highest percentage of MVCs for service members in the USMC followed by service 
members in the USN and eventually those in the USAF. In fact, less than one-twentieth 
of the USAF cases were associated with loss of control for unknown reasons. 
 
Figure 33: Skill Based Error Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory 
The USAF cases contained 281 skill based error nanocodes. The USN contained 























nanocodes. The skill based error nanocodes associated with each of the three military 
branches are presented in Figure 34. 
  
Figure 34: Skill Based Error Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per branch 
The three most common skill based errors associated with USAF MVCs were all 
related to technique (TQ7, TQ6, and TQ2). The most common skill based errors 
associated with USN MVCs were related to technique (TQ7, TQ6), control (LCU), and 
attention (ATT5). The most common skill based errors associated with USMC MVCs 
were related to technique (TQ6, TQ7) and control (LCU). 
Approximately one-fourth of USN and USMC cases and one-third of USAF cases 
contained decision errors. Any differences amongst the branches in the percentages of 
cases containing decision errors were insignificant (  =0.264, ns). 
The percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases associated with each of the 























trends for MVCs were similar across the military branches. The most common decision 
errors subcategories in MVCs for all three branches were related to situational 
assessment, procedures, and prioritization. However, MVCs in the USAF were associated 
with more prioritization errors than MVCs in either the USN or the USMC. 
 
Figure 35: Decision Error Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory 
A little less than one-half of USN and USMC cases and two-thirds of USAF cases 
contained violations. Differences between the percentages of USN and USMC cases 
associated with violations were insignificant (  =0.868, ns). In comparison, about and 
two-thirds of USAF cases contained violations. The percentage of cases associated with 
violations was significantly higher in the USAF than in both the USN (  =34.607, 
p<0.05) and the USMC (  =23.015, p<0.05). In fact, the relative odds of having a MVC 
involving one or more violations was over two times greater for a service member in the 























The percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases associated with each of the 
violation subcategories are presented in Figure 36. The main violation subcategories 
associated with cases for all three branches were all procedural in nature – speeding, 
drunk driving, and other. Around one-third of the USN and USMC cases but closer to 
one-half of the USAF cases were associated with speeding violations. Around one-fourth 
of the cases for all three branches were associated with drunk driving violations with the 
highest involvement seen for USAF cases and the least involvement seen for USMC 
cases. The USAF and USN contained similar percentages of cases associated with other 
procedural violations. A smaller percentage of USMC cases contained other procedural 
violations. Interestingly, the percentage of cases associated with knowledge-related 
violations for the USAF was approximately twice those for both the USN and USMC. 
 




























The USAF cases contained 340 violation nanocodes. The USN contained 236 
violation nanocodes. The USMC cases contained 74 violation nanocodes. The violation 
nanocodes associated with each of the three military branches are presented in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37: Violation Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per branch 
The violations associated with MVCs for the three military branches were similar. 
The most common violation associated with MVCs for all three branches was drunk 
driving (VDD). For the USAF, the top three violations were drunk driving (VDD) and 
travelling 10-29 mph over the speed limit (VPRO1, VPRO2). For the USN, the top three 
violations were drunk driving (VDD), travelling at an unknown speed in excess of the 
posted limit (VPRO0), and travelling 30-39 mph over the speed limit (VPRO3). For the 
USMC, the top three violations were drunk driving (VDD), travelling at an unknown 
speed in excess of the posted limit (VPRO0), and travelling 20-29 mph over the speed 























nanocodes classified with the nanocode VPRO0 which captures speeding at unknown 
speeds over the posted limit than cases for both the USN and USMC. 
5.1.3 Precondition Trends 
Overall, the MVC data for the three military branches exhibited similar trends at 
the preconditions level. Across the board, the USAF generally had the highest 
percentages of cases with at least one factor from each precondition causal category for 
six of the seven precondition causal categories with the only exception being personal 
readiness. The differences between the USAF as compared to the USN and USMC were 
most noticeable in their percentages of cases containing AMS and PML causal factors. 
The preconditions for unsafe act trends for the USAF, USN, and USMC are shown in 
Figure 38.  
 
































HFACS-MVC Precondition Causal Categories 
Precondition Causal Categories 






These trends suggest that there are differences in the preconditions associated 
with USAF, USN, and USMC MVCs. Looking at environmental conditions, significant 
differences were found between the branches for physical environment factors 
(  =8.852, p<0.05) and technological environment factors (  =17.716, p<0.01). Looking 
at operator conditions, significant differences were found between the branches for 
adverse mental state factors (  =100.399, p<0.01) and physical/mental limitation factors 
(  =22.459, p<0.01) but not for adverse physiological state factors (  =5.084, ns). 
Looking at operator factors, significant differences were found between branches for 
communication, coordination, and planning factors (  =18.713, p<0.01). 
Physical environment factors were associated with approximately one-fourth of 
the USAF cases and between one-tenth and one-fifth of the USN and USMC cases. No 
significant differences were found for physical environment factors between the USMC 
and the USAF (  =2.322, ns) or the USN (  =0.304, ns). However, there was a 
significant difference for physical environment factors between the USAF and the USN 
(  =8.388, p<0.05). In fact, the relative odds of a service member having a MVC 
associated with one or more physical environment factors was over 1.5 times greater in 
the USAF than in the USN (OR=1.72). 
Similar percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases were associated with each 
of the four physical environment subcategories (Figure 39). The main physical 
environment subcategories for all three branches were related to surface conditions and 
visibility. Higher percentages of surface condition and visibility factors were found in 




Figure 39: Physical Environment Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory 
The USAF cases contained 106 physical environment nanocodes. The USN 
contained 58 physical environment nanocodes. The USMC cases contained 22 physical 
environment nanocodes. The physical environment nanocodes by military branch are 



























Figure 40: Physical Environment Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per branch 
The physical environment conditions associated with MVCs were similar across 
the military branches. The most common physical environment conditions associated 
with MVCs in the USAF, USN, and USMC were related to surface conditions (SC1-2) 
and visibility (VIS2). Slippery road surface condition (SC1) was the leading physical 
environment factor associated with MVCs for all three military branches. 
Technological environment factors were associated with less than one-tenth of the 
USAF cases, a miniscule percentage of the USN cases, and none of the USMC cases. No 
significant difference was found for technological environment factors between cases in 
the USN and USMC (  =3.283, ns).  However, the percentage of cases in the USAF 
associated with technological environment factors was significantly higher than the 
percentages of cases in both the USN (  =9.404, p<0.05) and USMC (  =10.188, 





















technological environment factors in the USAF were three times greater than in the USN 
(OR=3.125) and infinitely greater than in the USMC (OR=∞). 
Few if any of the cases for all three branches were associated with any of the four 
technological environment subcategories (Figure 41). The main technological 
environment subcategories were related to the vehicle, protective devices on the road, and 
design of the road. Miniscule percentages of cases for the USN contained factors from 
any of the technological environment subcategories. Higher percentages of cases for the 
USAF contained road design and protective devices technological environment 
subcategories. 
 
Figure 41: Technological Environment Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory 
The USAF cases contained 29 technological environment nanocodes. The USN 

























technological environment nanocodes. The technological environment nanocodes 
associated with each of the three military branches are presented in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42: Technological Environment Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per branch 
Technological environment conditions associated with USAF cases all related to 
the road environment. The top technological environment factors for the USAF captured 
inadequate signs (PPE4) and inadequate road design (DES2). Technological environment 
conditions associated with USN cases were related to the road environment and vehicle 
environment. The top technological environment nanocodes for the USN captured 
deficiencies associated with the vehicle (TVEH1), vehicular equipment (TVEH2), 
guardrails (PPE2), and road design (DES2). 
Over one-third of USAF cases contained adverse mental state factors. In 
comparison, around one-tenth of USN and USMC cases contained adverse mental state 



















state factors (  =1.100, ns). However, the percentage of MVCs in the USAF associated 
with adverse mental state factors was significantly different from the percentages of 
MVCs in both the USN (  =86.945, p<0.05) and USMC (  =30.473, p<0.05). The odds 
of a service member having a MVC involving one or more adverse mental state factors in 
the USAF was over four times greater than in the USMC (OR=4.17) and over six times 
greater than in the USN (OR=6.25). 
The percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases for all three branches 
associated with each of the adverse mental state subcategories are presented in Figure 43. 
The main adverse mental state subcategories for all three branches were related to mental 
fatigue/drowsiness, awareness, and attitude. However, the USAF had higher percentages 
of its cases associated with all five of the adverse mental state subcategories compared to 
both the USN and the USMC. This discrepancy was especially true for adverse mental 




Figure 43: Adverse Mental State Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory 
The USAF cases contained 172 adverse mental state nanocodes. The USN 
contained 37 adverse mental state nanocodes. The USMC cases contained 17 adverse 
mental state nanocodes. The adverse mental state nanocodes associated with each of the 

























Figure 44: Adverse Mental State Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per branch 
Though there were similar numbers of MVCs classified for the USAF and USN, 
USAF cases contained over four times as many adverse mental state factors as USN 
cases. For the USAF, the top adverse mental state factors were personality style (PSY1) 
followed by drowsiness (AMF1) and inattention/distraction (AW1). The top adverse 
mental state factor for both the USN and USMC was drowsiness (AMF1). Other adverse 
mental state factors associated with both the USN and USMC were inattention/distraction 
(AW1) and stress (A7). 
Over one-third of USAF and USN cases and one-fourth of USMC cases contained 
adverse physiological state factors. Any differences between the percentages of MVCs 
associated with adverse physiological state factors in the USAF, USN, and USMC were 
insignificant (  =5.084, ns). The percentages of MVCs associated with the adverse 






















Figure 45: Adverse Mental State Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory 
The top physical/mental limitation subcategories associated with cases for all 
three branches captured physical condition followed by mental limitation and 
incapacitation factors. Larger percentages of USAF and USN cases were associated with 
physiological conditions than USMC cases with physiological condition factors identified 
in one-third of the USAF and USN cases and one-fourth of the USMC cases. Higher 
percentages of cases were associated with mental limitations, medical conditions, and 
incapacitation in the USAF than in the USN and USMC. The percentage of USAF cases 
associated with mental limitation factors was approximately double and over triple the 
percentages of cases associated with mental limitation factors in the USN and USMC 
respectively.  The percentage of USAF cases associated with incapacitation factors was 
approximately double and over triple the percentages of cases associated with mental 


























Approximately one-fifth of USAF cases contained physical/mental limitation 
factors. In comparison, less than one-tenth of USN and USMC cases contained 
physical/mental limitation factors. No significant difference in percentages of cases 
containing physical/mental limitation factors was found between the USN and the USMC 
(  =1.988, ns). However, the percentage of USAF MVCs associated with 
physical/mental limitation factors was significantly different from the percentages of 
MVCs in both the USN (  =13.681, p<0.05) and USMC (  =13.494, p<0.05). The 
relative odds of a service member having a MVC involving one or more physical/mental 
limitation factors in the USAF was over two times greater than in the USN (OR=2.27) 
and over four times greater than in the USMC (OR=4.17). 
The percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases associated with each of the 
physical/mental limitation subcategories are shown in Figure 46. For all three branches, 
the most common physical/mental limitation subcategory for MVCs captured mental 
limitation factors. A higher percentage of cases were associated with mental limitations 




Figure 46: Physical/Mental Limitation Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory 
The USAF cases contained 61 physical/mental limitation nanocodes. The USN 
contained 34 physical/mental limitation nanocodes. The USMC cases contained only 7 
adverse mental state nanocodes. The physical/mental limitation nanocodes associated 

























Figure 47: Physical/Mental Limitation Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per branch 
The top physical/mental limitation factor associated with cases for all three 
branches involved limited experience or proficiency (ML4). In fact, limited experience or 
proficiency was the primary physical/mental limitation factor classified for the USAF and 
the sole physical/mental limitation factor classified for the USN and the USMC. 
Factors from the category of communication, coordination, and planning were 
present in less than one-tenth and one-twentieth of cases in the USAF and USN 
respectively. Insignificant differences in the percentages of cases associated with 
communication, coordination, and planning factors were found between the USMC and 
both the USN (  =2.107, ns) and the USAF (  =3.090, ns). However, a significant 
difference was found between the percentages of cases associated with communication, 
coordination, and planning factors for the USN and USAF (  =17.000, p<0.05). The 





















communication, coordination, and planning factors was over five times greater in the 
USAF than in the USN (OR=5.56). 
Small percentages of cases for all three branches were associated with each of the 
four communication, coordination, and planning subcategories (Figure 48). The leading 
communication, coordination, and planning subcategory for all three branches captured 
planning factors. The USAF contained higher percentages of cases associated with all 
four communications, coordination, and planning subcategories. 
 
Figure 48: Comm., Coord., and Planning Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory 
The USAF cases contained 35 communication, coordination, and planning 
nanocodes. The USN cases contained 5 communication, coordination, and planning 
nanocodes. The USMC cases contained 6 communication, coordination, and planning 
nanocodes. The communication, coordination, and planning nanocodes associated with 

























Figure 49: Comm., Coord., and Planning Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per branch 
For all three branches, the leading communication, coordination, and planning 
factor associated with MVCs was related to poor travel planning (PLA1). In fact, poor 
travel planning was the primary communication, coordination, and planning factor 
classified for the USAF and the sole communication, coordination, and planning factor 
classified for the USN and the USMC. Following poor travel planning, the next most 
common communication, coordination, and planning factor classified for the USAF was 






















5.2 VEHICLE TYPES: 2W, 4W 
The final dataset contained cases involving operators of both 2W and 4W 
vehicles. Though more cases involved 4W vehicles (n=548), a sizeable portion of the 
cases involved 2W vehicles (n=335). There were a total of 978 and 1,664 nanocodes 
classified for cases involving 2W and 4W vehicles respectively. As such, there were 2.9 
factors per case for 2W MVCs and 3.0 factors per case for the 4W MVCs. 
5.2.1 Temporal Trends 
The temporal trends comparing MVCs by vehicle type are shown in Figure 50. 
This comparison used the percentages of MVCs that involved 2W and 4W vehicles each 
fiscal year. This was done to account for any differences in the number of services 





Figure 50: Temporal Trends of MVC Cases by Vehicle Type 
Earlier in the decade between FY1999 and FY2008, 2W vehicles were involved 
in approximately one third of the total MVCs each year. Over time, however, there was 
an upward trend in the involvement of 2W vehicles relative to 4W vehicles involved in 
MVCs each fiscal year. The data suggest that the contributing percentages of 2W and 4W 
MVCs are trending towards a 50/50 split where half of the MVCs involve 2W vehicles 
and half of the MVCs involve 4W vehicles each year. 
5.2.2 Unsafe Act Trends 
The unsafe act trends for 2W and 4W MVCs are shown in Figure 51. The 
percentages of cases associated with the four categories of unsafe acts were practically 
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4W MVCs for skill based errors (  =0.642, ns), decision errors (  =0.745, ns), or 
violations (  =0.490, ns). 
 
Figure 51: Unsafe Acts for 2W and 4W MVCs, percentages of cases containing at least one factor in category 
Even though no significant differences were identified at the causal category 
level, the causal subcategories associated with MVCs for each vehicle type were 
identified. The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with skill based error causal 
factor subcategories are presented in Figure 52. The main skill based error subcategories 
were similar for 2W and 4W MVCs. Common skill based error subcategories for both 
vehicle types were related to technique, attention, and control. However, 2W MVCs were 
associated with more technique errors while 4W MVCs were associated with more 
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Figure 52: Skill Based Error Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory 
The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with decision error causal factor 
subcategories are presented in Figure 53. The decision error subcategory trends for 
MVCs were almost identical for the two vehicle types. The most common decision errors 
subcategories for both 2W and 4W MVCs were related to situational assessment, 
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Figure 53: Decision Error Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory 
The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with violation causal factor 
subcategories are presented in Figure 54. The main violation subcategories were similar 
for 2W and 4W MVCs. Common violation subcategories for both vehicle types related to 
speeding and drunk driving. However, 2W MVCs were associated with more speeding 
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Figure 54: Violation Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory 
5.2.3 Precondition Trends 
The precondition trends for 2W and 4W MVCs are shown in Figure 59. These 
trends suggest that differences exist in the preconditions associated with 2W and 4W 
MVCs. Several of the causal pattern trends for preconditions were found to be 
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Figure 55: Preconditions by Vehicle Type, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in category 
Looking at environmental conditions, the difference between 2W and 4W MVCs 
was significant for physical environment factors (  =6.397, p<0.05) but not for 
technological environment factors (  =0.675, ns). Approximately one-tenth of the 2W 
cases and one-fifth of the 4W cases were associated with physical environment factors. 
The relative odds of a service member having a MVC associated with one or more 
physical environment factors was over 1.5 times greater in a 4W vehicle than on a 2W 
vehicle (OR=1.61). About one-twentieth of the cases for both 2W and 4W vehicles were 
associated with technological environment factors. 
The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with each of the physical 
environment subcategories are presented in Figure 56. The leading physical environment 
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Higher percentages of cases were associated with surface condition and visibility 
physical environment factors for 4W vehicles compared to 2W vehicles. 
 
Figure 56: Physical Environment Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory 
The 2W vehicle cases contained 51 physical environment nanocodes. The 4W 
vehicle cases contained 135 physical environment nanocodes. The physical environment 


























Figure 57: Physical Environment Causal Factors, count of nanocodes by vehicle type 
The leading physical environment causal factors for both 2W and 4W MVCs were 
related to road surface conditions followed by visibility issues. For 4W MVCs, the most 
common physical environment factors were slippery road conditions (SC1) followed by 
inadequate visibility issues stemming from insufficient lighting (VIS2) and ambient 
weather conditions (VIS1). For 2W MVCs, the most common physical environment 
factors were road surface debris (SC2) followed by slippery road conditions (SC1) and 
inadequate visibility due to insufficient lighting (VIS2). Fewer 4W MVCs were 
associated with road surface debris (SC2) and obscured view of traffic due to interaction 
of vehicle and environment (VIS3) compared to 2W MVCs. Fewer 2W MVCs were 
associated with slippery road surface (SC1) and inadequate visibility due to weather 






















Looking at operator conditions, significant differences were found between 2W 
and 4W MVCs for all causal categories – adverse mental state factors, adverse 
physiological state factors, and physical/mental limitation factors. Cases for 4W vehicles 
contained more adverse mental and physiological state factors. Cases for 2W vehicles 
contained more physical/mental limitation factors.  
Approximately one-fifth of 2W cases and one-fourth of 4W cases contained 
adverse mental state factors. Cases for 2W vehicles were associated with significantly 
fewer adverse mental state factors compared to cases for 4W vehicles (  =4.159, 
p<0.05). The relative odds of a service member having a MVC associated with one or 
more adverse mental state factors was almost 1.5 times greater in a 4W vehicle than on a 
2W vehicle (OR=1.43). 
The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with adverse mental state 
subcategories are presented in Figure 58. Similar percentages of 2W and 4W cases were 
associated with attitude and awareness adverse mental state subcategories. The leading 
adverse mental state subcategories for 2W and 4W cases were drowsiness and 
psychology respectively. The top adverse mental state subcategory for 2W cases was 
psychology. One-tenth of the 2W cases but less than one-twentieth of the 4W cases were 
associated with psychology factors. The top adverse mental state subcategory for 4W 
cases was drowsiness. Around one-tenth of the 4W cases but less than one-fortieth of the 




Figure 58: Adverse Mental State Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory 
The 2W vehicle cases contained 73 adverse mental state nanocodes. The 4W 
vehicle cases contained 153 adverse mental state nanocodes. The adverse mental state 
























Figure 59: Adverse Mental State Factors, counts of adverse mental state nanocodes per vehicle type 
The leading adverse mental state causal factors associated with both 2W and 4W 
MVCs were drowsiness (AMF1), personality style (PSY1), and inattention/distraction 
(AW1). However, 2W and 4W MVCs contained different proportions of these adverse 
mental state factors. More 2W MVCs were associated with personality style (PSY1) than 
4W MVCs. More 4W MVCs were associated with drowsiness (AMF1) than 2W MVCs. 
For 2W MVCs, the most common adverse mental state factors are personality style 
(PSY1) followed by inattention/distraction (AW1) then drowsiness (AMF1). For 4W 
MVCs, the most common adverse mental state factors are drowsiness (AMF1) followed 
by inattention/distraction (AW1) then personality style (PSY1).  
Slightly less than one-fifth of 2W cases contained adverse physiological state 
factors. In comparison, almost one-half of 4W cases contained adverse physiological 




















physiological state factors than cases for 4W vehicles (  =57.639, p<0.01). The relative 
odds of a service member having a MVC associated with one or more adverse 
physiological state factors was almost 3.5 times greater in a 4W vehicle than on a 2W 
vehicle (OR=3.35). 
The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with adverse physiological state 
subcategories are presented in Figure 60. The top adverse physiological state subcategory 
for both 2W and 4W cases captured physiological conditions. However, the percentages 
of the cases associated with physiological conditions were different for each of these 
vehicle types. Two-fifths of the 4W cases compared to one-fifth of the 2W cases 
contained at least one physiological condition causal factor. The percentages of cases 
involving incapacitation also differed by vehicle type. Almost one-tenth of the 4W cases 




Figure 60: Adverse Physiological State Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory 
The 2W vehicle cases contained 64 adverse physiological state nanocodes. The 
4W vehicle cases contained 265 adverse physiological state nanocodes. The adverse 



























Figure 61: Adverse Mental State Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per vehicle type 
The leading adverse physiological state factor associated with both 2W and 4W 
MVCs was impairment due to drugs or alcohol (PC2). In fact, impairment was the 
primary adverse physiological state factor classified for 4W MVCs and the sole adverse 
physiological state factor classified for 2W MVCs. Following impairment, the next most 
common adverse physiological state factor classified for 4W MVCs was incapacitation 
due to falling asleep (INC2). None of the 2W MVCs contained incapacitation factors 
related to falling asleep or otherwise. 
In contrast to adverse mental and physiological state factors, physical/mental 
limitation factors are associated with significantly more MVCs for 2W vehicles than 4W 
vehicles (  =90.376, p<0.01). Less than one-twentieth of 2W cases contained 
physical/mental limitation factors compared to over one-fourth of 4W cases. The relative 























limitation factors was over eight times greater on a 2W vehicle than in a 4W vehicle 
(OR=8.33). 
The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with each of the physical/mental 
limitation subcategories are presented in Figure 62. The leading physical environment 
subcategory for both vehicle types captured mental limitation factors. However, the 
percentage of cases with mental limitation factors was eight times higher for 2W vehicles 
than for 4W vehicles. In fact, one-fourth of all 2W cases contained at least one mental 
limitation causal factor compared to one-thirtieth of the 4W cases. 
 
Figure 62: Physical/Mental Limitation Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory 
The 2W vehicle cases contained 87 physical/mental limitation nanocodes. The 
4W vehicle cases contained 23 physical/mental limitation nanocodes. The 
physical/mental limitation nanocodes associated with the two vehicle types are presented 
























Figure 63: Physical/Mental Limitation Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per vehicle type 
The leading physical/mental limitation factor associated with both 2W and 4W 
MVCs captured inadequacies in proficiency or experience. In fact, limited 
experience/proficiency (ML4) was the primary physical/mental limitation factor 
classified for 4W MVCs and the sole physical/mental limitation factor classified for 2W 
MVCs.  
Looking at operator factors, few cases for either vehicle type – two percent of 2W 
MVCs and six percent of 4W MVCs – contained communication, coordination, and 
planning factors. The difference between the percentages of 2W and 4W MVCs 
associated with communication, coordination, and planning factors was found to be 
significant (  =6.684, p<0.05). The relative odds of a service member having a MVC 
associated with one or more communication, coordination, and planning factors was over 






















The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with each of the communication, 
coordination, and planning subcategories are presented in Figure 64. The leading 
communication, coordination, and planning subcategories for both vehicle types were 
planning followed by communication. The percentage of cases associated with planning 
causal factors was higher for 4W vehicles than for 2W vehicles. 
 
Figure 64: Comm., Coord., and Planning Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory 
The 2W vehicle cases contained 9 communication, coordination, and planning 
nanocodes. The 4W vehicle cases contained 37 communication, coordination, and 
planning nanocodes. The communication, coordination, and planning nanocodes 
























Figure 65: Comm., Coord., and Planning Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per vehicle type 
The top communication, coordination, and planning causal factors associated with 
both 2W and 4W MVCs were poor travel planning (PLA1) and inadequate knowledge 
transfer (COM5). Similar proportions of cases for 2W MVCs were associated with poor 
travel planning and inadequate knowledge transfer. In comparison, a larger proportion of 






















5.3 PAYGRADES: ENLISTED, OFFICER  
Paygrade data were provided for cases from the USAF and USN but not for cases 
from the USMC. The overwhelming majority of cases involved enlisted service 
members. A much smaller percentage of cases involved officers with only one warrant 
officer in the entire dataset. Due to the uniqueness of the warrant officer population and 
its singular representation in the dataset, the warrant officer case was excluded. A small 
fraction of the cases (n=10) involved operators with unknown paygrades which were 
excluded from the dataset.  
The final paygrade dataset contained 739 cases involving enlisted (n=689) and 
officer (n=49) service members in the USAF and USN (Figure 66). There were a total of 
2,167 and 131 nanocodes classified for cases involving enlisted and officer paygrades 
respectively. As such, there were 3.2 factors per case for enlisted paygrades and 2.7 




Figure 66: Enlisted, Officer, and Warrant Service Members Involved in MVCs (USAF and USN; excluding USMC) 
5.3.1 Temporal Trends 
The temporal trends for MVCs by paygrade are shown in Figure 67. These trends 
used the percentages of MVCs that involved officer and enlisted paygrades each fiscal 
year. This was done to account for any differences in the number of services providing 





























Figure 67: Temporal Trends of MVC Cases by Paygrade 
A comparison of the relative contributions of officer and enlisted paygrades 
indicate stable trends over time. Enlisted personnel were consistently involved in over 
90% of MVCs each year.  
5.3.2 Unsafe Act Trends 
The unsafe act trends for MVCs by paygrade are shown in Figure 68. Overall, 
trends for unsafe act causal categories were similar for MVCs involving enlisted and 
officer paygrades. No significant differences between enlisted and officer MVCs were 
found for skill based or decision errors. However, a significant difference was found 
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Figure 68: Unsafe Acts for Officers and Enlisted Personnel, percentage of cases containing at least one factor per category 
Around two-thirds of the cases for both paygrades contained skill based errors. A 
slightly higher percentage of cases for enlisted paygrades contained skill based errors 
than cases for officer paygrades. The difference between the percentages of cases 
associated with skill based errors for enlisted and officer paygrades was found to be 
insignificant (  =1.584, ns). 
The skill based error subcategories associated with MVCs by military paygrade 
are presented in Figure 69. The skill based error subcategory trends for MVCs involving 
enlisted and officer paygrades were generally similar. Common skill based error 
subcategories for MVCs for both paygrades were related to technique and control. 
However, MVCs involving enlisted service members were associated with more attention 
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Figure 69: Skill Based Error Subcategories, percentages of cases per paygrade containing at least one factor per subcategory 
Around one-third of the cases for both paygrades contained decision errors. A 
slightly higher percentage of cases for officer paygrades contained decision errors than 
cases for enlisted paygrades. The difference between the percentages of cases associated 
with decision errors for enlisted and officer paygrades was found to be insignificant 
(  =1.413, ns). 
The decision error subcategories associated with MVCs by military paygrade are 
presented in Figure 70. The decision error subcategory trends were similar for MVCs 
involving enlisted and officer paygrades. The most common decision errors subcategories 
for MVCs for both paygrades were related to situational assessment, procedures, and 
prioritization. However, MVCs involving officers were associated with more 























Figure 70: Decision Error Subcategories, percentages of cases per paygrade containing at least one factor per subcategory 
Around three-fifths of the cases for enlisted paygrades and two-fifths of the cases 
for officer paygrades contained violations. The difference between the percentages of 
cases associated with violations for enlisted and officer paygrades was found to be 
significant (  =5.162, p<0.05). The relative odds of a service member having a MVC 
associated with one or more violations was two times greater with an enlisted paygrade 
than an officer paygrade (OR=1.96). 
The percentages of enlisted and officer cases associated with each of the violation 
subcategories are presented in Figure 71. The main violation subcategories associated 
with cases for both paygrades were procedural in nature – speeding, drunk driving, and 
other. Higher percentages of cases were associated with virtually all of the violation 
subcategories for enlisted than for officer paygrades, especially for the top two violation 






















cases compared to one-fourth of the officer cases were associated with speeding 
violations. The next most common violation subcategory, drunk driving, was associated 
with over one-fourth of the enlisted cases less than one-fifth of the officer cases. 
 
Figure 71: Violation Subcategories, percentage of cases per paygrade with at least one factor in subcategory 
Cases for enlisted paygrades contained 543 violation nanocodes. Cases for officer 
paygrades contained 26 violation nanocodes. The violation nanocodes associated with 



























Figure 72: Violation Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per paygrade 
The violations associated with MVCs for the two paygrades were similar. The 
most common violation associated with MVCs for both paygrades was drunk driving 
(VDD). For enlisted paygrades, the top violations were drunk driving (VDD), travelling 
at an unknown speed in excess of the posted limit (VPRO0), and travelling 10-19 mph 
over the speed limit (VPRO1). For officer paygrades, the top violations were drunk 
driving (VDD), travelling 20-29 mph over the speed limit (VPRO2), and travelling 40 
mph or more over the speed limit (VPRO4).  
5.3.3 Precondition Trends 
The precondition trends for cases involving enlisted and officer paygrades are 
shown in Figure 73. The trends for the two paygrades appear to be fairly similar for 


























Figure 73: Preconditions for MVCs by Paygrade, percentages of cases containing at least one factor per category 
There were minor differences between the precondition categories associated with 
MVCs for enlisted and officer paygrades but these were found to be insignificant. 
Specifically, no significant differences were found between MVCs for enlisted and 
officer paygrades for physical environment (  =1.158, ns), technological environment 
(  =0.072, ns), adverse mental state (  =0.753, ns), adverse physiological state 
(  =1.361, ns), physical/mental limitation (  =1.467, ns) or communication, 
coordination, and planning (  =1.093, ns) causal categories. 
The percentage of cases associated with precondition subcategories are presented 
in Figure 74. The trends were generally similar for preconditions subcategories associated 
with enlisted and officer MVCs. However, a much higher percentage of physiological 
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5.4 AGE GROUPS: 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, >40 
Age data were provided for cases from the USAF and USN cases but not for cases 
from the USMC. The breakdown of cases by age group is presented in Figure 75. As 
expected, involved service members were quite young. The most common age of 
involved service members was 21 years. The large majority of involved service members 
were under the age of 30 (78.1%) with close to half (48.7%) between the ages of 19 and 
23. Only a fraction of cases involved service members under the age of 20 (1.4%) or over 
the age of 39 (4.3%). 
 
Figure 75: MVC Cases by Age of Service Member Operating Vehicle (USAF and USN; excluding USMC) 
There were a total of 450, 1,081, 385, 193, 134, and 83 nanocodes classified for 
cases involving 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 32-35, 36-40, and >40 year old service members 
respectively. As such, the average number of factors per case was similar across age 
groups. Cases involving 17-20, 21-25, and 36-40 year old service members contained 
slightly more than 3 factors per case and MVCs involving 26-30, 31-35,  and over 40 
year old service members contained slightly fewer than 3 factors per case. 









5.4.1 Temporal Trends 
Temporal trends for cases by age group are shown in Figure 76. The percentages 
of cases for all six age groups remained stable between FY1999 and FY2009. MVCs 
consistently involved young service members, particularly those under the age of 26. The 
trends indicate that approximately 30% and 40% of MVCs each fiscal year involved 
service members between the ages of 17-20 and 21-25 respectively. 
 
Figure 76: Temporal Trends for MVCs by Paygrade, percentages of cases containing at least one factor per category 
5.4.2 Unsafe Act Trends 
The unsafe act trends by age group are shown in Figure 77. The unsafe act 
category trends were generally similar across age groups. The leading unsafe act causal 
categories associated with MVCs for all age groups were skill based errors followed by 
violations and then decision errors for all age groups except the oldest (>40). Differences 
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(  =4.286, ns) and decision errors (  = 3.570, ns). However, the MVC causal category 
trends by age group were significantly different for violations (  =20.453, p<0.01). 
 
Figure 77: Unsafe Acts by Age Group, percentages of cases with at least one factor per category (USAF, USN) 
The percentage of cases associated with violations was highest for the second 
youngest age group (21-25). In fact, almost two-thirds of the cases for 21-25 year old 
service members contained violations. The percentage of cases with violations for 21-25 
year old service members was not significantly higher than the percentages of cases with 
violations for 31-35 year old (  = 1.373, ns) or 36-40 year old (  = 2.059, ns) service 
members. However, the percentage of cases with violations for 21-25 year old service 
members was significantly higher than the percentages of cases with violations for 17-20 
year old service members (  =6.139, p<0.05), 26-30 year old service members 
(  =5.964, p<0.05), and service members over the age of 40 (  =15.495, p<0.01). The 
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violations was over 1.5 times greater than a 17-20 year old (OR=1.64) or 26-30 year old 
(OR=1.66) service member and 4.5 times greater than a service member over the age of 
40 (OR=4.50).  
The percentage of cases associated with violations was lowest for the oldest group 
of service members (>40). Less than one-third of the cases for service members over the 
age of 40 contained violations. The percentage of cases with violations for service 
members over the age of 40 was significantly lower than the percentages of cases with 
violations for 17-20 year old (  = 5.857, p<0.05), 21-25 year old (see above), 26-30 year 
old (  = 5.663, p<0.05), 31-35 year old (  = 7.040, p<0.01), and 36-40 year old 
(  =4.390, p<0.05) service members. The odds of a service member over the age of 40 
having a MVC involving one or more violations was at least 2.5 times less than a service 
member in any other age group. Specifically,  the relative odds of a service member over 
the age of 40 having a MVC involving one or more violations was over 2.5 times less 
than 17-20 year old (OR=0.36), 21-25 year old (see above), 26-30 year old (OR=0.37), 
31-35 year old (OR=0.30), and 36-40 year old (OR=0.36) service members. 
One-fourth to two-thirds of MVCs for all age groups contained violations. The 
percentages of cases associated with each of the violation subcategories for the six age 
groups are presented in Figure 78. The leading violation subcategories associated with 
cases for all six age groups were speeding and drunk driving. For the younger age groups 
(17-35), the top violation subcategory associated with MVCs was speeding. The highest 
percentages of cases associated with speeding violations were found for service members 
aged 17-20 (37%) and 21-25 (41%). For older age groups (36+), the top violation 
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subcategory associated with MVCs was drunk driving. The highest percentages of cases 
associated with drunk driving violations were found for service members aged 31-35 
(30%) and 36-40 (40%). 
 
Figure 78: Violation Subcategories, percentage of cases per age group with at least one factor in subcategory 
There were 106, 287, 88, 51, 33, and 11 violation nanocodes identified for cases 
involving 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, and >40 year old service members 



























Figure 79: Violation Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per age group 
The most common violations for all six age groups were procedural violations 
related to drunk driving and speeding. The most common violation for all six age groups 
was drunk driving (VDD). The most common speeding violations for 21-25 year old 
service members were travelling at an unknown but unsafe speed (VPRO0) and travelling 
40+ mph over the speed limit. The most common speeding violations for 26-30 year old 
service members were travelling 40+ mph over the speed limit (VPRO4) and travelling 
10-19 mph over the speed limit (VPRO1). The most common speeding violations for 31-
35 year old service members were travelling at an unknown illegal speed (VPRO0) and 
travelling 20-29 mph over the speed limit (VPRO2). The most common speeding 
violations for 17-20 year old and 36-40 year old service members were travelling at an 

























While two-thirds to three-fourths of MVCs for all age groups contained skill 
based errors, no significant differences were found between age groups at the causal 
category level (  =4.286, ns). The percentages of cases associated with skill based error 
causal factor subcategories by age group are presented in Figure 80. The main skill based 
error subcategories were similar for MVCs involving service members of all ages. 
Common skill based error subcategories for both vehicle types were related to technique, 
attention, and control. However, technique errors were associated with fewer MVCs for 
36-40 and >40 year old service members, control errors were associated with fewer 
MVCs for 36-40 year old service members, and attention errors were associated with 
fewer MVCs for 21-25 year old service members compared to other age groups. 
 
Figure 80: Skill Based Error Subcategories, percentages of cases per age group with at least one factor per subcategory (USAF, USN) 
One-fourth to two-fifths of MVCs for all age groups contained decision errors 


























subcategories by age group are presented in Figure 81. Overall, the main decision error 
subcategory trends for MVCs were fairly similar across all age groups. Common decision 
error subcategories for both vehicle types were related to situation assessment, 
procedures, and prioritization. Compared to other age groups, MVCs were associated 
with fewer situational assessment errors for 36-40 year old service members, fewer 
control errors for service members over the age of 40, and fewer prioritization errors for 
21-25 year old service members. Interestingly, MVCs for older service members (aged 
36-40 and over the age of 40) were associated with more prioritization errors than 
compared to other age groups. 
 
Figure 81: Decision Error Subcategories, percentages of cases per age group with at least one factor per subcategory (USAF, USN) 
5.4.3 Precondition Trends 
The precondition trends by age group are shown in Figure 82. The leading 


























adverse physiological state followed by adverse mental state, physical environment, and 
physical/mental limitation. There were minor differences between precondition 
categories associated with MVCs for the six age groups. Most of these differences were 
insignificant, specifically those between age groups for physical environment (  =7.266, 
ns), technological environment (  =3.395, ns), adverse mental state (  =4.189, ns), 
physical/mental limitation (  =5.035, ns) and communication, coordination, and 
planning (  =10.432, ns) factors. However, the difference between age groups was found 
to be significant for adverse physiological state factors (  =14.162, p<0.05). 
 
Figure 82: Preconditions for Unsafe Acts: Presence of Causal Categories 
The percentage of cases associated with adverse physiological state factors was 
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youngest group of service members (21-25) and lowest for the oldest group of service 
members (>40). Approximately one-half or more of the cases for 21-25 year old and 35-
40 year old service members contained adverse physiological state factors. 
Comparatively, the other age groups were not nearly as likely to contain adverse 
physiological state factors with approximately one-third or less of their cases associated 
with adverse physiological state factors. Only one-fifth of cases involving service 
members over the age of 40 contained adverse physiological adverse physiological state 
factors. 
The percentage of cases with adverse physiological states for 36-40 year olds was 
significantly higher than the percentages of cases for service members ages 17-20 
(  =7.244, p<0.01), 26-30 (  =6.116, p<0.05), and over 40 (  =7.092, p<0.01). The 
odds of a service member between the ages of 36 and 40 having a MVC involving at least 
one adverse physiological state factor was approximately 4 times greater than a service 
member over the age of 40 (OR=3.93) and 2.5 times greater than a 17-20 year old 
(OR=2.58) or 26-30 year old (OR=2.41) service member. 
The percentage of cases with adverse physiological states for 21-25 year olds was 
significantly higher than the percentages for 17-20 year olds (  =4.880, p<0.05) and >40 
year olds (  =4.277, p<0.05). The odds of a 21-25 year old service member having a 
MVC involving at least one adverse physiological state factor was over 1.5 times greater 
than a 17-20 year old service member (OR=1.60) and almost 2.5 times greater than a 
service member over the age of 40 (OR=2.44). 
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The percentages of cases associated with adverse physiological state 
subcategories by age group are presented in Figure 83. Subcategory trends were similar 
across age groups with the exception of 36-40 year old and over 40 year old service 
members with higher and lower percentages of MVCs with physiological conditions 
respectively. 
 
Figure 83: Adverse Physiological State Subcategories, percentage of cases per age group with at least one factor in subcategory 
There were 49, 142, 45, 27, 22, and 8 adverse physiological state nanocodes 
identified for cases involving 17-20 year old, 21-25 year old, 26-30 year old, 31-35 year 
old, 36-40 year old, and over 40 year old service members respectively. The adverse 































Figure 84: Adverse Physiological State Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per age group 
The majority of the adverse physiological state factors associated with all six age 
groups captured impairment due to drugs or alcohol (PC2). The other common adverse 
physiological state factor associated with all six age groups captured incapacitation due to 
falling asleep (INC2). 
Though HFACS-MVC preconditions were insignificant across age groups for 
environmental condition categories, the subcategory trends were presented for MVCs 
involving the different age groups in Figure 85. Similar trends were found for 
environmental condition subcategories across age groups except visibility which were 





























Figure 85: Environmental Condition Subcategories, percentage of cases per age group with at least one factor per subcategory 
Though HFACS-MVC preconditions were insignificant across age groups for 
operator condition categories other than adverse physiological state, these subcategory 
trends were presented for MVCs involving the different age groups in Figure 86. Fairly 
similar trends were found for operator condition subcategories across age groups. Slight 
differences were observed for awareness which was associated with a higher percentage 
of MVCs for service members over age 40 and a lower percentage of MVCs for 31-35 
year old service members and mental limitations which were associated with higher 







































Figure 86: Operator Condition Subcategories (excl. APS), percentage of cases per age group with at least one factor per subcategory 
Though HFACS-MVC preconditions were insignificant across age groups for 
operator factor categories, the subcategory trends were presented for MVCs involving the 
different age groups in Figure 87. Similar trends were found for operator factor 
subcategories across age groups. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, DATA AND OVERALL TRENDS 
Prior studies have identified several demographic and behavioral characteristics 
associated with MVCs in the US for both the general and military populations. However 
no studies to date have comprehensively and systematically identified the human factors 
causes associated with MVCs in the military. The present study demonstrated that it is 
possible to modify and apply an established human error framework to classify the 
underlying human factors causes associated with MVCs in a comprehensive and 
systematic manner. Furthermore, this classification provided the opportunity to identify 
the main human factors trends associated with severe off-duty MVCs. 
This chapter presents a discussion of the key findings from the present study. The 
main human factors trends associated with off-duty MVCs in the present study are 
reviewed. These trends are compared to those from existing literature for MVCs in the 
military, MVCs in the general population, and accidents in other industries. To account 
for variations in the overall quality and level of detail applied when identifying 
contributing factors at all four of the HFACS framework tiers, comparisons to other 
industries used the HFACS benchmarking standards from a non-filtered dataset 
containing accidents from a range of sources (Berry, 2010). The implications of these 
trends and their comparisons are discussed. 
6.1 UNSAFE ACT TRENDS 
The temporal trends for the unsafe acts affecting military personnel involved in 
serious off-duty MVCs remained stable between FY1999 and FY2008. Unfortunately, 
these trends suggest that intervention strategies implemented over the past decade have 
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been unsuccessful in sufficiently reducing the underlying errors and violations performed 
by service members on the roadways. 
At the unsafe acts tier, the human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs 
captured high levels of skill based errors and violations. Skill based errors were mainly 
related to technique, specifically driving or riding techniques for negotiating curves/turns 
and regaining positions on the roadways. Violations were mainly related to procedures, 
specifically breaking laws and regulations by exceeding posted speed limits and 
operating motor vehicles while legally intoxicated with a BAC of 0.08% or more.  
Serious off-duty MVCs contained a lower level of decision errors and virtually no 
perceptual errors. Decision errors were mainly related to situational assessment, 
specifically failing to modify behaviors for potential hazards like selecting legal but 
inappropriate speeds for travel conditions or pressing on when falling asleep. 
While direct comparisons between the unsafe act causal category levels are not 
possible due to differences in the definitions and calculations used in prior studies, it is 
possible to compare the overall trends found in the existing MVC literature. For skill 
based errors, prior studies have identified braking, lane-control, and overcorrection errors 
as factors in MVCs (Evans, 2004; NHTSA, 2009). For violations, prior studies have 
identified speeding over the posted speed limits, drunk driving/riding, aggressive 
driving/riding, and operating a vehicle without legal licensure as factors in MVCs. For 
decision errors, prior studies have identified travelling too fast for road conditions and 
improper lane changing as factors in MVCs. These findings from existing literature on 
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MVCs in the general population are similar to those from the present study of off-duty 
MVCs in the military. 
The unsafe act levels associated with serious off-duty MVCs in the military from 
the present study and both fatal MVCs from prior studies in the general population (Iden 
& Shappell, 2006) and accidents in other occupational industries (Berry, 2010) are 
presented in Table 22. It appears that unsafe act category levels are generally comparable 
between off-duty MVCs in the military and MVCs in the general US population with the 
possible exception of skill based errors. In both off-duty MVCs and MVCs in the general 
population, unsafe act levels were higher for skill based errors and violations and lower 
for decision errors followed by perceptual errors. The unsafe act category levels were less 
similar between off-duty MVCs in the military and accidents in other occupational 
industries. In most industries, unsafe act levels are higher for skill based errors followed 
by decision errors and lower for violations followed by perceptual errors. Compared to 
accidents in other industries, off-duty military MVCs contained higher levels of skill 
based errors and violations and lower levels of decision errors and perceptual errors. 
These comparisons suggest that serious MVCs for both military personnel and the 












SBE 70.7% 49% 64.7% 
DE 28.8% 30% 43.1%  
PE 0.8% 2% 5.2% 
VIO 54.0% 52% 10.5% 
The differences between the human factors trends for off-duty MVCs in the 
military and prior studies for other industries may be expected considering the nature of 
the domain and the serious/fatal nature of the MVCs targeted in the present study. With 
the combination of a skill-dependent process and a task environment that allows little 
time to react to hazards, it is not surprising that severe off-duty MVCs contain a higher 
percentage of skill based errors and a smaller percentage of decision errors than other 
occupational industries. 
The unsafe act trend of greatest concern is likely the high percentage of off-duty 
MVCs with violations. Violation trends were almost identical for severe off-duty MVCs 
in the military and fatal MVCs in the general population as found in prior studies by 
(Iden & Shappell, 2006; Wierwille, et al., 2002). However, violation levels are noticeably 
higher for off-duty MVCs than for accidents in occupational industries. Violations are not 
condoned in other domains the way they are for motor vehicle operators on the roadways. 
Speeding violations are so commonplace that the large majority of drivers in the US 
admit to travelling at speeds in excess of the posted speed limit (Allstate, 2011). Young 
males are the likeliest demographic for risk-taking and committing violations on the road. 
And fatal events have been shown to involve significantly more violations than less 
serious non-fatal and near-miss events (Wiegmann, et al., 2005). As such, the high levels 
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of violations in MVCs are likely the result of several factors including the domain which 
condones violations, the population of interest comprised of young, male risk-takers, and 
the severity of the Class A and B MVCs included in the present study. 
6.2 PRECONDITION TRENDS 
The temporal trends for preconditions for unsafe acts affecting military personnel 
involved in serious off-duty MVCs remained stable between FY1999 and FY2008. 
Unfortunately, these trends suggest that intervention strategies implemented over the past 
decade have been unsuccessful in sufficiently reducing the conditions and factors 
affecting service members operating motor vehicles on the roadways. 
At the preconditions tier, the human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs 
captured higher levels of adverse physiological state, adverse mental state, and physical 
environment factors followed by a lower level of physical/mental limitation factors. 
Serious off-duty MVCs contained low levels of technological environment and 
communication, coordination, and planning factors and virtually no personal readiness 
factors. 
Adverse physiological state factors were mainly related to physiological 
conditions and to a lesser extent incapacitation, specifically being impaired due to drugs 
or alcohol and falling asleep. Adverse mental state factors were mainly related to mental 
fatigue, psychology, and awareness, specifically drowsiness, personality style 
(particularly related to risk-taking), and attention issues. Physical environment factors 
were mainly related to surface conditions and visibility, specifically slippery or debris-
covered roads and insufficient lighting. Physical/mental limitation factors were mainly 
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related to mental limitations, specifically limited experience or proficiency. 
Technological environment factors were mainly related to road sign and design issues. 
Communication, coordination, and planning factors were mainly related to poor travel 
planning and inadequate knowledge transfer. 
As was the case at the unsafe act tier, the specific levels of each HFACS causal 
category at the preconditions tier cannot easily be compared directly due to definition and 
calculation differences. For instance, NHTSA uses the causal factor category 
“inattention” to capture a mix of factors including distraction, fatigue, physical condition, 
emotional condition and looked but did not see. Further, NHTSA defines “distraction” is 
several different ways over the past decade referencing fewer factors in at present than 
five years ago. However, general comparisons can be made for the key trends identified 
in the present study and those found in existing MVC literature.  
For adverse physiological states, prior studies have identified alcohol 
use/impairment and falling asleep as factors in MVCs. For adverse mental states, prior 
studies have identified inattention, drowsiness, and mental/emotional state as factors in 
MVCs. For physical environment conditions, prior studies have identified slick roads, 
adverse weather conditions, and visibility issues as factors in MVCs. For physical/mental 
limitations, prior studies have identified inadequate knowledge and limited experience 
and exposure as factors in MVCs. For technological environment conditions, prior 
studies have identified road design, signs/signals/intersections, and vehicle problems as 
factors in MVCs. These findings suggest that the preconditions that affect service 
184 
 
members on the roads are the basically the same as those that affect roads users in the 
general population. 
The precondition causal category levels associated with serious off-duty MVCs in 
the military from the present study and two groupings of category standards (Berry, 
2010) based on accidents in various occupational industries are presented in Table 26. 
For each of the accident benchmarking standards, the main grouping captures the average 
category level from a larger group of datasets and the secondary grouping captures the 
average category level from a smaller group of datasets with more thorough 
investigations for that particular category. 
Table 25: MVC and Industry HFACS Preconditions for Unsafe Act Trends 
HFACS Category Off-Duty MVCs Accident Benchmarking Standards 
PhyE 18.2% 41.0% [13.4%] 
TechE 4.1% 13.6% 
AMS 21.5% 5.3% [26.4%] 
APS 34.7% 1.7% 
PML 12.5% 14.0%  [2.9%] 
CCP 4.8% 6.9%  [18.8%] 
PR 0.2% 1.3% 
The levels of physical and technological environment conditions for off-duty 
MVCs were lower than the levels for the main grouping of accidents in other industries. 
The level of physical environment conditions for MVCs was similar to the level for the 
secondary grouping of accidents in other industries suggesting that these factors are 
typically investigated and captured with to higher level of detail for MVCs. The higher 
level of detail likely reflects the relative ease of detection and is able to be determined 
irrespective of the other details surrounding a MVC. Additionally investigators are 
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accustomed to capturing weather and road conditions which are standard portions of the 
forms used during crash scene investigations. Technological environment conditions may 
be less prevalent for MVCs compared to other industries due to the limited involvement 
of technology for motor vehicle operators compared to workers in other industries who 
may have to operate several pieces of equipment and tools increasing the probability of 
experiencing a technological issue that contributes to an event. As such, the lower levels 
of physical and technological environment factors associated with off-duty MVCs 
compared to other occupational industries likely reflect a relative lack of association 
between environmental conditions and MVCs as well as a fairly successful management 
of potentially hazardous environmental conditions.  
The levels of adverse mental state conditions for off-duty MVCs were higher than 
the main grouping but similar to the secondary grouping of accidents in other industries. 
The higher level of adverse mental state conditions in the present study may reflect the 
susceptibility of motor vehicle operators to these types of factors, particularly of motor 
vehicle operators in the military. Inattention/distraction and drowsiness are prevalent 
factors for MVCs in the general population (Hendricks, et al., 2001). Furthermore, as part 
of a courageous force with stressful jobs and demanding schedules, military personnel 
may be particularly susceptible to adverse mental state conditions like drowsiness, 
overconfident attitudes, and risky personality styles. 
The levels of adverse physiological state conditions were much higher for off-
duty MVCs than for accidents in other industries. For the same reasons mentioned in the 
prior paragraph, military personnel run a real risk of falling asleep on the roads. A bigger 
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issue, however, is that of alcohol impairment which is known to be associated with a 
large portion of serious and fatal MVCs in the US each year. Several skills integral to 
driving and riding performance including attention, vision, perception, information 
processing, psychomotor, and steering are significantly degraded by alcohol. The higher 
level of adverse physiological state conditions in the present study likely reflects a 
domain that is deeply sensitive to the negative effects of alcohol. There have been recent 
improvements in this area with downward trends in alcohol-related MVCs for both the 
military and civilian populations, but this is still a top area in need of mitigation. 
The levels of physical/mental limitation conditions for off-duty MVCs was 
similar to the main grouping and higher than the secondary grouping of accidents in other 
industries. Both age and experience have been shown to affect MVC fatality rates for 
drivers in the general population (Evans, 2004). The relationships between age, 
experience, and MVC fatalities may be reflected in the slightly elevated level of 
physical/mental limitation conditions for off-duty MVCs compared to that of other 
industries. Even though level of physical/mental limitation conditions was not 
abnormally high, this is an area that could benefit from mitigation efforts. These efforts 
should focus on providing opportunities for service members to practice their driving and 
riding skills in order to increase their levels of experience and proficiency. 
The levels of both categories of operator factors for off-duty MVCs were lower 
than the levels for both the main and secondary groupings of accidents in other industries. 
The lower level of communication, coordination, and planning factors likely stems from 
the nature of the domain in the present study. While miscommunications can and do 
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occur on the roads, they tend to be difficult to capture especially for fatal MVCs. 
Furthermore, the concept of coordination amongst road users is slightly foreign and is not 
as applicable as the concept of coordination amongst workers in other industries. As 
such, the communication, coordination, and planning causal category primarily captured 
planning factors. The lower level of personal readiness factors may be a result of 
inadequate investigation, reporting, or classification for this causal category. In support of 
the notion that HFACS experts under-classified personal readiness factors was the fact 
that many off-duty MVCs involved fatigue-related factors such as drowsiness and falling 
asleep but only one contained the personal readiness factor capturing lack of sleep. The 
HFACS experts may have overlooked personal readiness factors because they were not 
accustomed to classifying this category and didn’t consider classifying sleep-related 
issues as anything other than operator conditions or because they did not equate off-duty 
driving or riding to being at work as referenced within the HFACS framework. 
6.3 UPPER TIER TRENDS 
A limited number of causal factors for MVCs were classified at the supervisory 
and organizational tiers in the present study. The causal category levels associated with 
serious off-duty MVCs in the military from the present study and benchmarking 
standards associated with accidents in various occupational industries are presented in 
Table 27. The levels of supervisory and organizational causal categories for off-duty 
MVCs were lower than the main and secondary groupings of accidents in other 
industries. These lower levels are likely the result of inadequacies in MVC investigation 
and documentation processes. In all industries, investigation and identification of causal 
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factors at the upper HFACS tiers are less obvious and more difficult. However, the nature 
of the industry also complicates the investigation into higher level causal factors. 
Additional challenges are introduced by the fact that these MVCs occur while service 
members are off-duty which raises the question of who to consider as people in 
supervisory and organizational roles – those in leadership positions above the service 
members within the structure of the US military, those acting in positions of authority 
within the structure of state law enforcement, or both. 
Table 26: HFACS Trend Comparison for Off-Duty MVCs and Non-Filtered Accident Benchmarking Standards 
HFACS Category Off-Duty MVCs Accident Benchmarking Standards 
Outside Influences 5.4 ----- 
Organizational Influences   
      Organizational Climate 0.3 1.1 
      Organizational Process 0.8 7.6 / 52.0 
      Resource Management 0.2 1.9 
Unsafe Supervision   
      Inadequate Leadership 1.0 3.1 / 21.6 
      Planned Inappropriate Ops 0.6 3.7 / 22.1 
      Failure to Correct Problems 0.5 4.8 
      Leadership Violations 0.1 2.3 
No industry benchmarking standards were available for comparison to the level of 
outside influences factors associated with off-duty MVCs. However, more factors were 
classified at the outside influence tier than at the uppers supervisory and organizational 
tiers combined. Perhaps this is because identification of outside influence factors which 
ultimately capture the unsafe acts of other road users are easier to identify than factors 
which capture inadequate leadership or organizational influences that act upon military 
road users.  
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION, COMPARISONS OF TRENDS 
A handful of studies have looked at the demographic and behavioral 
characteristics associated with MVCs in the military but none have done so based on a 
comprehensive and systematic classification of human factors causes. The present study 
was able to successfully identify and compare the main human factors trends associated 
with severe off-duty MVCs for service members by military branch, vehicle type, 
paygrade, and age group. 
This chapter presents the key findings for severe off-duty MVCs across military 
branches, vehicle types, paygrades, and age groups found in the present study. The main 
human factors trends associated with off-duty MVCs for each of these demographic 
variables are reviewed and compared to those from existing literature for MVCs in both 
the military and general populations. Implications of human factors trends and 
comparisons found in the present study are discussed. 
7.1 MILITARY BRANCHES: USAF, USN, USMC 
Interestingly, there were noticeable differences in the number of factors classified 
for serious off-duty MVCs involving USAF, USN, and USMC service members. Both 
the average and maximum number of factors classified per case were greatest for USAF 
MVCs. In fact, USAF MVCs contained an additional causal factor per case on average 
compared to USN and USMC MVCs. The differences in the number of causal factors 
classified may reflect differences in the quality of MVC investigation and documentation 
processes across the three military branches. As such, readers are cautioned to refrain 
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from drawing conclusions about potential differences in the MVC causal factor trends 
across the branches based on the findings in the present study. 
7.1.1 Unsafe Acts 
The main HFACS-MVC unsafe act causal category trends associated with serious 
off-duty MVCs involved skill based errors and violations for all three military branches. 
Though no significant differences between branches were identified for decision errors, 
there were significant differences for skill based errors and violations. Specifically, 
USAF MVCs contained a lower percentage of skill based errors and a higher percentage 
of violations than both USN and USMC MVCs. In general, HFACS-MVC unsafe act 
subcategory levels were similar or higher for USAF MVCs and similar or lower for 
USMC MVCs. 
Skill based error category and subcategory differences across the three branches 
were most intriguing. This was the only HFACS-MVC causal category involving a 
significantly lower level for USAF MVCs. An interesting trend was found for the 
percentages of MVCs associated with the skill based error causal factor nanocode “LCU” 
which captured loss of control for unknown reasons. In many cases, skill based errors 
classified as “LCU” would likely have been classified using other skill based error 
nanocodes if the MVC narrative had provided additional information or detail. The 
branches with the highest percentage of MVCs associated with “LCU” skill based errors 
were the USMC followed by the USN and finally the USAF. The differences between 
branches for “LCU” suggest imply that MVC data provided by the USAF were of better 
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quality and contained more detail compared to MVC data provided by the USN and the 
USMC. 
Serious off-duty MVCs contained significantly higher levels of skill based errors 
for military personnel in the USN and USMC compared to military personnel in the 
USAF. Higher percentages of MVCs involving USN and USMC personnel contained 
skill based errors related to attention compared to MVCs involving USAF personnel. A 
higher percentage of MVCs involving USAF personnel contained skill based errors 
related to technique compared to MVCs involving USN and USMC personnel. 
USAF MVCs were associated a significantly higher percentage of violations than 
USN and USMC MVCs. At first, this trend was surprising as service members in the 
USMC are younger and more predominantly male compared to service members in the 
USN and especially the USAF. With young males committing the most violations on the 
roads like speeding, racing, and drunk driving, USMC MVCs were expected to have the 
highest percentage of violations, not the lowest. However, as is discussed in further detail 
shortly, any difference between the percentages of violations associated with MVCs in 
the three branches is likely an artifact of the higher quality of MVC investigations in the 
USAF. 
7.1.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
The main HFACS-MVC precondition causal category trends associated with 
serious off-duty MVCs were significantly higher in the USAF than in the USN and often 
the USMC for all precondition categories except adverse physiological state (and 
personal readiness which was excluded from analysis). These findings most likely reflect 
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differences in investigation and reporting practices across the three branches. The USN 
and USMC appear to be under-investigating and/or under-reporting causal factors from 
most HFACS-MVC causal categories while the USAF appears to have more thorough 
investigation and reporting practices. The more thorough investigation and reporting 
process allowed more instances where causal factors could be identified and classified, 
resulting in an increased number of causal factors classified for USAF MVCs.  
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7.2 VEHICLE TYPES: 2W, 4W 
Given that only an estimated 10% of military personnel own motorcycles, it 
initially seemed surprising that over one-third (38%) of the serious and fatal off-duty 
MVCs between FY1999 and FY2008 involved service members operating 2W vehicles. 
However, MVCs are more hazardous and less survivable on 2W vehicles than in 4W 
vehicles. In fact, riders of 2W vehicles are 35 times more likely than drivers of 4W 
vehicles to be fatally injured in a MVC (NHTSA, 2007). As reflected here, the small 
subset of riders in the military is disproportionately represented in the set of Class A and 
B off-duty personal MVCs included in the present study. 
7.2.1 Unsafe Acts 
The main HFACS-MVC unsafe act causal category trends associated with serious 
off-duty MVCs were almost identical for 2W and 4W vehicles. Though no significant 
differences between 2W and 4W MVCs were identified at the causal category level, there 
appeared to be some differences at the unsafe act subcategory level for skill based errors 
and violations. 
Though safe operation of a 2W vehicle is more challenging and requires a greater 
level of skill, 2W MVCs did not contain significantly more skill based errors than 4W 
MVCs. However, the additional intricacies associated with riding 2W vehicles are 
captured at the skill based error subcategory level where 2W MVCs had a higher 
percentage of technique errors. In comparison, 4W MVCs had higher percentages of 
control errors for unknown reasons and attention errors. 
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The less forgiving nature of riding 2W vehicles is reflected at the violation 
subcategory level where 2W MVCs were associated with a higher percentage of speeding 
violations than 4W MVCs. The greater difficulty of recovery from errors on 2W vehicles 
along with the positive relationship between speed and severity of MVC may help to 
explain this finding.  
Additional differences in violation subcategories between 2W and 4W vehicles 
were the higher percentage of knowledge violations for 2W MVCs and the higher 
percentage of drunk driving violations for 4W MVCs. Like fatal MVCs in the US 
population, 2W MVCs in the present study were associated with a higher percentage of 
knowledge violations (i.e. lack of licensure) compared to 4W MVCs. However, the actual 
percentages with unlicensed 2W and 4W motor vehicle operators were higher for fatal 
MVCs in the US population than for serious off-duty MVCs in the military population 
perhaps reflecting the composition of the underlying military population of citizens and 
legal immigrants with fairly clean driving/riding records.  
7.2.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
In contrast to unsafe act trends, the main HFACS-MVC precondition causal 
category trends associated with serious off-duty MVCs were quite different for 2W and 
4W vehicles. Significant differences between 2W and 4W MVCs at the causal category 
level were found for all precondition categories except technological environment (and 
personal readiness which was excluded from analysis). 
A significantly higher percentage of 4W MVCs contained physical environment 
factors and were associated with more surface condition and visibility factors. Further 
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differences between vehicle types exist at the physical environment nanocode level which 
indicates that 2W MVCs involved more surface debris and obscured visibility conditions 
while 4W MVCs involved more slippery road surface and weather visibility conditions. 
These findings make sense considering that riders are more likely to operate 2W vehicles 
in better weather and environmental conditions. 
A significantly higher percentage of 4W MVCs contained adverse mental state 
factors and were associated with more drowsiness factors. However, 2W MVCs were 
associated with more psychology factors perhaps reflecting a difference between 2W and 
4W operator personality styles especially for risk-taking. 
A significantly higher percentage of 4W MVCs contained adverse physiological 
state factors and had a higher percentage of cases associated with alcohol/drug 
impairment and falling asleep. This could again be related to rider preference with 
regards to weather, environmental, and lighting conditions which may limit the amount of 
associations of impairment and falling asleep with off-duty MVCs. However, the absence 
of any occurrences of falling asleep on 2W MVCs may be an artifact of the nature of 2W 
MVCs which would not really allow for recovery if the rider actually did fall asleep on 
the vehicle. 
A significantly higher percentage of 2W MVCs contained physical/mental 
limitation factors related to limited experience/proficiency. These findings are similar to 
those from prior studies which have found that a high percentage of riders in fatal 2W 
MVCs had only a matter of a few months of experience operating the mishap motorcycle. 
The much higher percentages of both lack of experience/proficiency and knowledge 
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violations for 2W MVCs stresses how critical it is for riders to have adequate levels of 
experience and proficiency prior to operating 2W vehicles. This is especially true for 
service members in situations where they are trying to ride for the first time (by 
themselves or with friends) without adequate instruction or understanding and where they 
are riding with one or more people in situations that exceed their skill levels. 
A significantly higher percentage of 4W MVCs contained communication, 
coordination, and planning factors and were associated with more pre-travel planning 
factors. Again, this is likely related to the rider preference for operating 2W vehicles in 
more agreeable weather and visibility conditions.  
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7.3 PAYGRADES: ENLISTED, OFFICER 
The percentage of enlisted personnel was higher for those in serious off-duty 
MVCs from the present study (93%) than for service members in the general US Active 
Duty military population (84%) (OneSource). The disproportion between MVCs by 
paygrade was not unexpected given that prior military MVC studies have found enlisted 
personnel to have higher MVC fatality rates than officers (Bowes & Hiatt, 2008; Hooper, 
et al., 2006). Furthermore, both the present study and a prior study of MVCs involving 
Army service members contained the same percentage (93%) of enlisted personnel (Bell, 
et al., 2000). 
7.3.1 Unsafe Acts 
The main HFACS-MVC unsafe act causal category and subcategory trends 
associated with serious off-duty MVCs were fairly similar for enlisted and officer 
paygrades, particularly for errors. There was a significant difference between enlisted and 
officer MVCs for violations. 
A significantly higher percentage of enlisted MVCs contained violations and were 
associated with higher percentages of almost all violation subcategories especially 
speeding and drunk driving. This discrepancy may reflect the differences between 
enlisted and officer paygrades with regards to age, educational background, marital status 
and especially their roles and responsibilities within the military. Enlisted personnel are 
held to a high standard of conduct, but tend to have some slack from the military when it 
comes to traffic offenses. However, officers are held to an even higher standard of 
conduct and are expected to act reasonably and responsibly both on and off duty. The 
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military does not tolerate officers being convicted of serious moving traffic violations 
such as speeding, reckless driving, or driving while intoxicated. Even seasoned officers 
can expect to be discharged if convicted for driving under the influence (DUI). Based on 
these high expectations and the severe consequences of violating procedures, it is only 
logical that significantly fewer MVCs involved violations for officers than for enlisted 
personnel.  
7.3.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
The main HFACS-MVC preconditions for unsafe act causal category trends 
associated with serious off-duty MVCs were similar for enlisted and officer paygrades 
suggesting that they are negatively affected by basically the same general preconditions 
on the roads. Though no significant differences in enlisted and officer MVC trends were 
identified for any precondition causal categories, there were some interesting trends at the 
subcategory level. 
Officer MVCs were associated with higher percentages of road surface, visibility, 
awareness, incapacitation (particularly falling asleep), and planning factors than enlisted 
MVCs. Looking at these trends together suggests that officers may have performed their 
pre-travel planning inadequately particularly by selecting poor travel times and durations 
which increased their exposure to hazards. For example, selecting a poor departure time 
or route may increase the risk of encountering adverse weather and lighting conditions or 
of experiencing personal conditions related to attention and fatigue. These trends are not 
surprising considering that officers are more likely to have families (particularly spouses 
199 
 
and children) and be juggling several different roles and responsibilities that compete for 
their time. 
Enlisted MVCs were associated with higher percentages of factors related to 
operator impairment and lack of experience/proficiency than officer MVCs. These 
findings were in line with what is known about the enlisted military population. Enlisted 
personnel are typically younger with fewer responsibilities within the military compared 
to officers and have relatively less education and experience both in life and in operating 
motor vehicles. The serious MVCs in the present study reflect their lower levels of 
experience and proficiency particularly with 2W vehicles. Additionally, the 
comparatively high percentage of MVCs with impairment for enlisted personnel suggests 
that they may not grasp the entirety of all the ramifications of drunk driving/riding on 
both their personal and professional lives. 
A significantly higher percentage of 2W MVCs contained physical/mental state 
factors and had a much higher percentage of cases associated with limited 
experience/proficiency. These findings are similar to those from prior studies which have 
found that a high percentage of riders in fatal 2W MVCs had only a matter of a few 
months of experience operating the mishap motorcycle.  
7.4 AGE GROUPS: 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, >40 
The majority (81%) of military personnel in the present study were under the age 
of 30 with the largest portion in the 21-25 year old age group. These findings were 
similar to those from prior studies which found that younger military personnel under the 
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age of 26 were most likely to be involved in serious MVCs (Bell, et al., 2000; Hooper, et 
al., 2006). 
7.4.1 Unsafe Acts 
The main HFACS-MVC unsafe act causal category and subcategory trends 
associated with serious off-duty MVCs were fairly similar for service members in the six 
age groups, particularly for errors. For the most part, error subcategory trends also 
appeared fairly similar for MVCs involving the six age groups. However, significant 
differences were found for the percentages of MVCs associated with violations for 21-25 
year old and over 40 year old service members. 
At the subcategory level of decision errors, an interesting result was the higher 
percentages of MVCs associated with prioritization decision errors for older (36-40 and 
>40 year old) service members. Older service members are generally busy with families 
at home and several off-duty roles and responsibilities that compete for their time. 
Prioritization decision errors may relate to placing a higher priority on an off-duty role or 
responsibility than on personal safety on the roadway. 
At the category level of violations, 21-25 year old service members and service 
members over the age of 40 had the highest and lowest percentages of MVCs associated 
with violations respectively. In fact, 21-25 year old service members had a significantly 
higher percentage of MVCs associated with violations than both the next youngest (17-20 
year old) and next oldest (26-30 year old) age groups. MVCs involving 21-25 year old 
service members had the highest percentage of speeding violations and a higher 
percentage of drunk driving violations than both 17-20 year old and 26-30 year old 
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service members. These findings, particularly the association with speeding, has been 
identified in prior MVC studies which have found young males as the most likely 
demographic to engage in risky behaviors such as speeding and racing. 
In contrast to the younger service members, MVCs for the oldest age group (>40 
year old) were associated with a significantly lower percentage of violations than all 
other age groups. The violation subcategory trends showed that MVCs had decreasing 
percentages of speeding violations with increased age starting with 26-30 year old service 
members. Furthermore, MVCs involving the oldest group of service members (>40 years 
old) were associated with much lower percentages of both speeding and drunk driving 
violations than other age groups. 
7.4.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
The main HFACS-MVC precondition causal category trends associated with 
serious off-duty MVCs were fairly similar for service members in the six age groups. The 
only precondition causal category associated with significantly different percentages of 
MVCs across age groups was adverse physiological state. Significantly higher 
percentages of MVCs were associated with adverse physiological state factors for 36-40 
year old service members compared to all age groups except 31-35 year olds and for 21-
25 year old service members compared to the youngest (17-20 year old) and oldest (>40 
years old) service members. These differences predominantly reflected the relative 





CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The overall purpose of the present study was to identify the main human factors 
trends associated with serious off-duty MVCs involving military personnel with the end 
goal of preventing future losses of service members to MVCs. The five main research 
questions as outlined in Chapter 1 were addressed. 
Q1: What are the main human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs involving 
military service members? 
At the unsafe acts level, the main human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs 
are skill based errors and violations related to procedures. At the preconditions level, the 
main human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs are adverse physiological states, 
adverse mental states, and physical environment conditions. 
Now that the main human factors trends associated with serious off-duty MVCs in 
the military have been identified and assessed using the HFACS-MVC framework, the 
next step is to select which problems to address first and the manner with which to target 
them. Prevention efforts based on the skill based error trends identified in the present 
study should focus on technique skills related to negotiating curves/turns and regaining 
road positions. Providing military personnel with opportunities to practice these specific 
skills may help to reduce their involvement in MVCs. Prevention efforts based on the 
violation trends identified in the present study should focus on procedural violations 
related to speeding and drunk driving. Enforcing existing rules and implementing stricter 
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penalties for military personnel who commit speeding and drunk driving violations may 
help to reduce their involvement in MVCs. 
Q2: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving service 
members from the USAF, USN, and USMC? 
The main human factors trends for USAF, USN, and USMC MVCs are generally 
similar for unsafe acts but significantly different for preconditions. Specifically, 4W 
MVCs are more affected by physical environment, adverse mental state, adverse 
physiological state, and communication, coordination, and planning factors while 2W 
MVCs were more affected by physical and mental limitations. 
Similarities between the three military branches for some human factors trends 
but not others may indicate that some trends are universal for service members and others 
are service-specific or may actually reflect differences in MVC data quality across the 
branches. The quality of an investigation process and subsequently the data captured 
during the investigation may affect the number and types of factors identified. Data 
quality differences across branches are provided in more detail in the limitations section 
of this chapter. 
Due to the differences between data quality for MVCs in the USAF, USN, and 
USMC, it is not possible to make any valid conclusions about similarities or differences 
in human factors trends between the three military branches. Prior to performing further 
comparisons of MVC human factors trends, the MVC investigation and reporting 




Q2: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving 2W and 4W 
vehicles? 
At the unsafe acts causal category level, the main human factors trends for 2W 
and 4W MVCs are not significantly different though 2W MVCs are associated with more 
technique errors and knowledge violations. At the preconditions causal category level, 
the main human factors trends for 2W and 4W MVCs are significantly different with 4W 
MVCs associated with more physical environment, adverse mental state, adverse 
physiological state, and communication, coordination, and planning factors and 2W 
MVCs were associated with physical and mental limitations. 
Differences in human factors trends for MVCs involving 2W and 4W vehicles 
suggest that military personnel may benefit most from vehicle-specific prevention 
strategies. These findings suggest that there may be benefit in developing additional 
vehicle-specific strategies based on the problem areas for 2W and 4W MVCs identified 
in the present study. 
Q4: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving enlisted and 
officer service members? 
At both the unsafe acts and preconditions category levels, the main human factors 
trends for MVCs are generally similar for enlisted and officer personnel. The only 
difference between human factors trends between paygrades is in violations which are 
associated with a higher percentage of MVCs for enlisted personnel. 
Similarities between the human factors trends for MVCs involving enlisted and 
officer paygrades suggest that creating specialized prevention strategies for officers and 
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enlisted personnel may not be necessary. However, the significantly higher percentage of 
violations for enlisted MVCs may be a reflection of the underlying differences between 
paygrades related to authority, accountability, and responsibility. As such, one potential 
strategy to combat these violations involves changing the standards to which enlisted 
service members are held by enforcing existing rules and implementing stricter penalties 
for enlisted personnel who receive moving traffic citations both on and off base. 
Q5: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving service 
members in different age groups? 
At both the unsafe acts and preconditions category levels, the main human factors 
trends for MVCs are generally similar for service members in different age groups except 
for violations and adverse physiological states. Significantly higher percentages of MVCs 
involving 21-25 year old service members and significantly lower percentages of MVCs 
involving service members over the age of 40 are associated with violations (particularly 
speeding and drunk driving) and adverse physiological states (particularly impairment 
due to alcohol) compared to MVCs for other age groups. 
The similarities between human factors trends for MVCs involving all age groups 
suggest that prevention strategies may not need to be targeted towards specific age 
groups. Additionally, other age groups could potentially benefit from prevention 
programs that are currently in place but only mandated for young service members such 
as AAA DIP. Instead, larger streamlined prevention programs should be developed and 




Any age-specific programs, if deemed necessary, should be applied to areas in 
which they can make the most impact. Though one of the age groups with the most 
unique human error trend profile is that for service members over the age of 40, it may be 
more sensible to focus resources set aside for age-specific strategies to younger age 
groups due to the relative lack of involvement of older service members in off-duty 
MVCs. The 21-25 year old and 17-20 year old service member age groups may be the 
best candidates for age-specific strategies. Both age groups are involved in high 
percentages of serious off-duty MVCs with unique human factors trends for MVCs and 
may be able to benefit from tailored preventions specialized to the nuances unique to 
their specific age groups. 
8.2 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
The present study had several strengths including the data set, framework, and 
methods used for classification. First, the MVCs provided by the service centers 
contained the entire population of Class A and B off-duty MVCs for all three military 
branches, not just a subset that would require extrapolation to the larger military 
population. Using the same framework and methodology for classification of human 
factors trends for MVCs in all three branches offers a potential for comparisons across 
branches in the future.  
Next, the present study used original MVC narratives to identify the causal factors 
instead of previously identified human factors data containing potential errors and 
inconsistencies. Focusing solely on MVCs where service members were operating a 
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motor vehicle, multiple HFACS experts evaluated each MVC which reduced bias or 
oversight on the part of a single individual. 
Finally, causal factors were identified and classified using an established human 
error framework (HFACS) already adopted throughout the military and modified 
specifically for the MVC domain. Using an HFACS-based framework for classification 
of MVCs allowed for comparisons of human factors trends across multiple industries.  
The present study had a few limitations as well including sample size and data 
quality. Though almost a decade of data was classified for USAF and USN MVCs, there 
was only a few years of data for USMC MVCs. Further complicating matters were 
differences between the variables captured for MVCs by the different military branches. 
On a related topic, due to the archival nature of the data, the quality of available data was 
restricted by what was originally investigated and documented for each MVC. 
Several findings from the present study suggest that investigation and reporting 
practices for USAF MVCs were superior to those for USN and USMC MVCs. First, 
several of the HFACS experts coding the off-duty MVCs commented on the relative lack 
of detail contained in the narratives for MVCs in the USMC compared to the USN and 
especially the USAF. Next, the counts of causal factors classified for each MVC and for 
MVCs overall were so much higher for the USAF cases than either USN or USMC cases. 
Further, the frequencies of classifying skill based errors with the “LCU” nanocode which 
captured loss of control for unknown reasons were highest for USMC MVCs followed by 
USN MVCs and lowest for USAF MVCs. Also, MVCs contained a higher percentage of 
skill based errors related to technique in the USAF compared to both the USN and 
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USMC. Additionally, USAF MVCs were associated with significantly higher levels of 
virtually all precondition causal categories and had similar or higher percentages of 
almost all subcategories. Finally, there were only a few causal factors classified at the 
upper two HFACS-MVC tiers in the entire study and all were identified in MVCs from 
the USAF. 
More thorough investigations may capture less salient factors (e.g. poor driving 
technique as opposed to speeding) and provide more opportunities for causal factors to be 
identified increasing the number of causal factors classified. Based on the findings of the 
present study, it is likely that the similarities and differences in the main trends are 
indicative of underlying differences in MVC data quality and reflect differences in 
investigation and reporting practices across the three branches. As such, any significant 
differences between human factors trends for MVCs in the USAF, USN, and USMC may 
be an artifact of better data quality for USAF MVCs, not an indication of differences in 
the underlying human factors trends across branches. 
8.3 UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Findings from the present study have generated a new set of additional questions 
related to the study of human factors trends associated with MVCs. Future analyses of the 
HFACS-MVC data from the present study might look at the human factors trends over 
time in order to find how the main issues have been changed throughout the years. 
Comparisons of the human factors trends for other demographic factors such as 
geographic locations and time since deployment may provide additional insight into the 
profile of service members who at-risk for off-duty MVCs. 
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Based on the results of the present study, future studies should look at differences 
in investigation and reporting practices for MVCs in the USAF, USN, and USMC. 
Identification of these differences would provide the basis for streamlining investigation 
and reporting practices across the branches and for comparing the human factors trends 
across branches. Additional research should develop and evaluate previous, current, and 
future prevention strategies to combat the common human factors plaguing military 
MVCs. A historical look at the human factors trends in combination with a timeline of 
implemented prevention programs can aid in evaluating the effectiveness of prior 
programs on the causal factors associated with MVCs. Additional benefits may result 
from applying the prospective Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX) tool to assist 
with the development of targeted programs by identifying and assessing intervention 
strategies in a comprehensive and systematic manner. Future research might also look at 
evaluating the HFACS-MVC framework with other data sets including both MVCs in the 
military and civilian populations. Future benefits could also be achieved by developing 
data collection tools that allow investigators to quickly and easily capture the information 









APPENDIX A: TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS 
TERMS DEFINITIONS 
Motor Vehicle a privately owned non-government, non-commercial vehicle that 
can be operated on public highways (USAF, 2008); includes 
motorcycles, passenger vehicles, and light trucks 
Two Wheeled (2W) 
Motor Vehicle 
a powered motor vehicle with two wheels; includes cruisers, 
sport, touring, standard, and dual-purpose motorcycles 
Four Wheeled (4W) 
Motor Vehicle 
a powered motor vehicle with four wheels; includes cars and light 
trucks 
Motor Vehicle Crash 
(MVC) 
an event in which a motor vehicle in motion collides with 
obstacle(s) in the environment resulting in injury and/or property 
damage 
Crash Demographics characteristics capturing the setting of a MVC such as location 
(rural or urban) and temporal information (month, day, and time) 
Road Traffic Fatality death of a person due to injuries sustained in a MVC within 30 
days of the event (WHO, 2009) 
Permanent Total 
Disability 
permanent nonfatal incapacitation that prevents a service member 
from keeping gainful employment after losing multiple body parts 




permanent nonfatal impairment that restricts a service member’s 
range of motion after losing the use of body part(s) (USAF, 2008) 
Mishap an unplanned event or chain of events caused by unidentified or 
uncorrected hazards that result in property damage, injury, or 
death (DoN, 2005); includes afloat, ground, industrial, motor 
vehicle categories of mishaps (USAF, 2008) 
Class A a mishap resulting in property damage costs in excess of 
$1,000,000, the loss of a destroyed DoD aircraft, or the permanent 
total disability or death of a service member (DoN, 2005) 
Class B a mishap resulting in property damage costs between $200,000 
and $1,000,000, the inpatient hospitalization of three or more 
service members for care, or the permanent partial disability of a 
service member (DoN, 2005) 
Class C a mishap resulting in property damage costs between $20,000 and 





APPENDIX B: HFACS-MVC FRAMEWORK AND NANOCODE GUIDE 
UNSAFE ACTS 
Skill Based Errors: Occur during highly automated tasks, often without thought; 
Vulnerable to attention, memory, and/or technique failures 
Attention Failures (ATT) 
1. Forgot to check blind spot 
2. Forgot to use communication device (e.g. horn or turn signal) 
3. Didn’t keep eyes on the road 
4. Inadvertent operation of wrong control (e.g. pressed gas instead of brake, put 
vehicle into reverse instead of drive) 
5. Inadvertently drifted out of lane (note: not due to falling asleep) 
Postural Error (POS) 
1. Operated vehicle from an awkward position/posture 
Technique Error (TQ) 
1. Improper passing maneuver (e.g. passed without looking at the road situation – 
enough room, vehicle approaching, etc.)  
2. Improper application of acceleration or brakes 
3. Usual method of executing procedure is flawed/improper/imperfect 
4. Failed to maintain a sufficient following distance (due to speed and/or distance 
between vehicles; not due to misjudgment of distance or speed) 
5. Over-steered/overcorrected when avoiding collision 
6. Over-steered/overcorrected when attempting to regain position on roadway 
7. Failed to negotiate curve/turn/bend/ramp 
8. Failed to negotiate lane change/passing maneuver 
Timing Error (TM) 
1. Reacted too slowly 
2. Reacted too quickly 
Lost Control due to Unknown Reason (LCU) 
Skill Based Error – Other (SO) 
Decision Errors: Occur when chosen action is inadequate or inappropriate for the 
situation; “Honest mistake”, poor choice; often due to inadequate knowledge 
Information Processing (IP) 
1. Misinterpreted information 
2. Selected a poor or unfamiliar route for travel (e.g. selected a shorter route) 
Prioritization (PRI) 
1. Misplaced prioritization (e.g. swerved into traffic to avoid a small animal) 
2. Ignored caution or recommendation (e.g. from a friend) 
3. Wrong response to abnormal situation 
Procedural Decision Error (DPRO) 
1. Failed to give way/yield 
2. Inappropriate behavior/maneuver 




oncoming lane of traffic, etc.) 
Situational Assessment (SA) 
1. Failed to recognize hazardous conditions 
2. Failed to modify behavior to protect against potentially hazardous conditions 
(tactical planning decisions on the road like pressing on when tired) 
Vehicular Decision Error (DPMV) 
1. Inadvertently exceeded capabilities of vehicle 
2. Inadequate loading/securing of items within vehicle 
3. Improper loading/securing of items on top of vehicle 
4. Poor maintenance of PMV (e.g. failure to change oil regularly) 
5. Inadvertently used defective/inadequate vehicle 
Decision Error – Other (DO) 
Perceptual Errors: Occur when degraded or “unusual” sensory input lead to an error. 
Perceptual Error (PE) 
1. Misjudged distance 
2. Misjudged speed 
3. Misjudged depth 
4. Misjudged height 
5. Misjudged surface conditions 
6. Missed information due to degraded sensory input (e.g. sensory information led to 
misreading a sign or equipment) 
7. Misheard traffic cue (e.g. horn) due to noise issues/degradation 
Perceptual Error – Other (PEO) 
Violations: Conscious decisions to bend/break existing rules/regulations 
Procedural Violations (VPRO) 
0. Speeding – unknown illegal speed (over the limit)  
1. Speeding 10-19 mph over the speed limit 
2. Speeding 20-29 mph over the speed limit 
3. Speeding 30-39 mph over the speed limit 
4. Speeding 40+ mph over the speed limit  
5. Illegal passing or lane changing behavior 
6. Reckless/erratic operation of PMV 
7. Racing with another vehicle 
8. Excessive risk taking 
9. Violation of training rules/laws 
10. Disregard of traffic signals 
Knowledge Violations (VKNO) 
1. Operated vehicle without a valid license/endorsement 
2. Entry into unauthorized areas 
Drunk Driving – BAC ≥ 0.08% (VDD) 




PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS 
Physical Environment: Operational and ambient environment. 
Surface Conditions (SC) 
1. Slippery road surface (e.g. due to ice, rain) 
2. Debris on road surface (e.g. dirt, loose rocks, mud) 
3. Inadequate maintenance of road surface (e.g. potholes, ruts) 
Visibility (VIS) 
1. Inadequate visibility due to sun/sun glare, rain, snow, or fog 
2. Inadequate visibility due to insufficient lighting  
3. Obscured view of traffic due to interaction of vehicle and environment (e.g. 
obscured view of environment due small vehicle, like a motorcycle, travelling 
behind larger vehicle, like a truck or bus) 
Miscellaneous (MIS) 
1. Clutter/loose items inside vehicle 
2. Congestion due to traffic 
3. Noisy environment 
4. Wind 
Physical Environment – Other (PHYO) 
Technological Environment: Vehicle and road environment. 
Protective Devices on the Road (PPE) 
1. Median: inadequate or missing 
2. Guardrail: inadequate or missing 
3. Traffic control: inadequate/defective or missing; poor location 
4. Signs (informational/warning): inadequate/defective or missing; poor location 
Vehicle (TPMV) 
1. Defective or dysfunctional vehicle 
2. Defective or dysfunctional vehicular equipment 
3. Inadequately maintained vehicle/vehicular equipment 
Design (DES) 
1. Inadequate design of control systems/signs/displays 
2. Inadequate road design (e.g. extremely curvy, too narrow, etc.) 
3. Inadequate road gradient 
4. Inadequate shoulder for road (e.g. missing or very narrow) 
5. Inadequate placement of objects alongside the road 
6. Inadequate ergonomic design/Poor man-system interface (in vehicle) 
Technical Environment – Other (TEO) 
Adverse Mental States: Mental conditions of the operator that affect performance. 
Attitude (A) 
1. Overconfidence/Lack of confidence 
2. Get-home-it is 





PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS 
6. Frustration 
7. Stress 
8. Focus/attitude towards task 
Awareness (AW) 
1. Attention (inattention, distraction, channelized attention, task fixation, 
preoccupation with problems, etc.) 
2. Time pressure (perceived haste to complete task/rushing) 
3. Confusion 
4. Boredom 
5. Extreme concentration/perception demands 
6. Inappropriate peer pressure 
Mental Fatigue (AMF) 
1. Drowsy driving (e.g. mental fatigue after a taxing workday; note: differs from fell 
asleep) 
Psychology (PSY) 
1. Personality style 
2. Pre-existing personality disorder 
3. Fears or phobias 
4. Emotional overload 
Adverse Mental State – Other (AMO) 
Adverse Physiological States: Medical/physiological conditions of the operator that affect 
performance. 
Physiological Condition (PC) 
1. Visual illusions 
2. Impairment due to drugs or alcohol 
3. Overexertion of physical activities 
Medical Condition (MC) 
1. Medical illness 
2. Dehydration 
3. Inability to sustain body position 
4. Previous injury or illness 
5. Influenced by medication 
 Incapacitation (INC) 
1. Fainted/passed out 
2. Fell asleep 
Adverse Physiological State – Other (APO) 
Physical/Mental Limitations: Occur when situation exceeds the capabilities of the 
operator. 
Mental Limitations (ML) 
1. Pre-existing psychological disorder 
2. Incompatible intelligence/aptitude 
3. Not familiar with job performance standards 
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PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS 
4. Limited experience/proficiency 
Sensory Deficiencies (SD) 
1. Visual limitations or deficiencies 
2. Hearing limitations or deficiencies 
Physical Limitations (PL) 
1. Lack of competency 
2. Lack of proficiency 
3. Incompatible physical capabilities 
4. Inadequate practice of skills 
5. Musculoskeletal disorder 
6. Inability to sustain body movement 
7. Restricted range of body movement 
8. Inappropriate height, weight, size, strength, etc. 
9. Motor skill, coordination, or timing deficiencies 
10. Substance sensitivities or allergies 
Physical/Mental Limitation – Other (PMO) 
Communication, Coordination, and Planning: Poor coordination/communication between 
road users (vehicle operators, passengers, bicyclists, pedestrians) and planning prior to 
operating the vehicle. 
Coordination (COR) 
1. Failed to use all available resources 
2. Lack of teamwork 
Communication (COM) 
1. Ineffective/no communication methods 
2. Misunderstood instructions (e.g. verbal training or writing manuals) 
3. Inadequate communication of hazards 
4. Incorrect instructions provided 
5. Inadequate knowledge transfer 
Planning (PLA) 
1. Poor travel planning (e.g. starting a long trip at 02:00, without adequate rest) 
Communication, Coordination, Planning – Other (CCPO) 
Personal Readiness: Activities performed prior to operating a vehicle that affect 
performance. 
Personal Readiness (PR) 
1. Inadequate rest requirements 
2. Self-medication 
3. Use of illicit drugs and alcohol 
4. Hung-over 
5. Inadequate nutrition/diet 
6. Overexertion off duty 
7. Lack of sleep 





Inadequate Supervision (IS) 
1.  Training 
2.  Guidance/Oversight 
Inadequate Supervision – Other (ISO) 
Planned Inappropriate Operations (PI) 
1.  Scheduling 
2.  Task Assignment 
Planned Inappropriate – Other (PIO) 
Failed to Correct Known Problem (FC) 
1.  Deficiencies not addressed 
2.  Deficiencies inadequately addressed  
Failed to Correct – Other (FCO) 
Supervisory Violations (SV) 
1.  Violated rules and regulations 
2.  Failed to enforce rules and regulations 
Supervisory Violations – Other (SVO) 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES 
Resource Management (RM) 
1.  Human resources 
2.  Monetary/budget resources  
3.  Equipment/facility resources 
Resource Management – Other (RMO) 
Organizational Climate (OC) 
1.  Structure 
2.  Policies 
3.  Culture 
Organizational Climate – Other (OCO) 
Organizational Process (OP) 
1.  Operations 
2.  Procedures 
3.  Oversight 





Outside Influences: Causes completely outside the control of the military motor vehicle 
operator; Often due to other drivers/riders not following safe road procedures. 
Outside Influences (OI) 
 Civilian operator entered roadway on which military operator travelling 
 Civilian operator changed lanes or merged while travelling in the same direction on 
roadway as military operator 
 Civilian operator exited roadway on which military operator travelling 
 Civilian operator failed to yield right of way at intersection 
 Civilian operator travelled in wrong direction/opposite direction of traffic; military 
operator struck head-on by civilian operator 
 Rear-ended by civilian operator 
 Civilian operator performed a U-turn in path of travel 




APPENDIX C: HFACS DRIVING SAMPLES 
Causal Factor HFACS Causal Category 
While waiting to turn onto the highway, a driver started 
to inch forward when he saw an oncoming truck in the 
right lane of traffic. He tried to stop the vehicle, but 
accidentally hit the gas instead forcing the truck to 
swerve to avoid a collision.  
Skill Based Error 
The driver failed to adjust his braking technique to 
accommodate for the icy road conditions and slid into the 
car in front of him at the stop sign. 
Skill Based Error 
Late one night a driver opted to take an unfamiliar 
shortcut to get home. He realized his mistake when the 
shortcut took him on a small, curvy road with no 
lighting. 
Decision Error 
At an intersection, a driver misjudged his distance from 
an approaching motorcycle. It was actually closer than 
the driver thought, but the motorcycle’s single headlight 
provided poor visual cues regarding its position.  
Perceptual Error 
The driver drove 10 to 15 mph over the posted speed 
limit on the highway. 
Violation 
With a school bus dropping kids off ahead, a driver opted 
to pass illegally instead of stopping the vehicle at least 10 
feet behind the bus. 
Violation 
There were patches of black ice on the road. Physical Environment 
One of the car’s headlights was burned out. Technical Environment 
On his way home, a driver became frustrated by 
everyone driving too slowly.  
Adverse Mental State 
The driver was physically impaired after going out for a 
few drinks. 
Adverse Physiological State 
The driver’s eyesight was so poor that he could not 
navigate his vehicle safely. 
Physical/Mental Limitation 
A driver went to an all-night party the night before a 
long-distance drive. 
Personal Readiness 
The driver received no indication that a truck was 
merging from an entrance lane on his right because the 
truck’s left blinker was not flashing. 
Communication/Coordination 
and Planning 
A driver departed for a long road trip over winter 
vacation without checking traffic or weather forecasts. 
Communication/Coordination 
and Planning 
A driving school instructor did not consistently provide 
adequate training. From time to time, he took personal 
calls while a student was driving. 
Inadequate Supervision 
The driving school instructor told his student to drive in Planned Inappropriate 
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Causal Factor HFACS Causal Category 
traffic on the highway during her first lesson. Operation 
Several accidents and near misses occurred at a particular 
intersection but local police had not yet put up a stop 
sign. 
Failed to Correct Known 
Problem 
Though considered an authority figure, an officer drove 
his police vehicle faster than the posted speed limit and 
did not signal before changing lanes.  
Supervisory Violation 
The state did not allocate adequate funding for road 
maintenance or sufficient highway patrol. 
Resource Management 
Police in county A were pressured to issue a specified 
weekly quota of tickets for particular violations (e.g. 
speeding or not wearing a seatbelt.) 
Organizational Climate 
Due to the lack of standardization in traffic laws, drivers 
who moved from one state to another were able to 






APPENDIX D: HFACS-MVC DRIVING SAMPLES 




While waiting to turn onto the 
highway, a driver started to inch 
forward when he saw an oncoming 
truck in the right lane of traffic. He 
tried to stop the vehicle, but 
accidentally hit the gas instead 
forcing the truck to swerve to avoid 
a collision.  
Skill Based Error ATT4 Inadvertent operation of 
wrong control 
The driver failed to adjust his 
braking technique to accommodate 
for the icy road conditions and slid 
into the car in front of him at the 
stop sign. 
Skill Based Error TQ2 Improper application of 
acceleration or brakes 
Late one night a driver opted to 
take an unfamiliar shortcut to get 
home. He realized his mistake 
when the shortcut took him on a 
small, curvy road with no lighting. 
Decision Error SA2 Failed to modify behavior 
to protect against potentially 
hazardous conditions 
At an intersection, a driver 
misjudged his distance from an 
approaching motorcycle. It was 
actually closer than the driver 
thought, but the motorcycle’s single 
headlight provided poor visual cues 
regarding its position.  
Perceptual Error PE1 Misjudged distance 
The driver drove 10 to 15 mph over 
the posted speed limit on the 
highway. 
Violation VPRO1 Speeding 10-19 mph 
over the speed limit 
With a school bus dropping kids off 
ahead, a driver opted to pass 
illegally instead of stopping the 
vehicle at least 10 feet behind the 
bus. 
Violation VPRO5 Illegal passing or lane 
changing behavior 




SC1 Slippery road surface 







On his way home, a driver became Adverse Mental A6 Frustration 
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frustrated by everyone driving too 
slowly.  
State 
The driver was physically impaired 




PC2 Impairment due to drugs 
or alcohol 
The driver’s eyesight was so poor 




PL3 Incompatible physical 
capabilities 
A driver went to an all-night party 




PR7 Lack of sleep 
The driver received no indication 
that a truck was merging from an 
entrance lane on his right because 





COM1 Inadequate or lack of 
communication between road 
users 
A driver departed for a long road 
trip over winter vacation without 





PLA2 Selected a poor or 
unfamiliar route for travel (e.g. 
selected a route that was 
shorter, faster, etc.) 
A driving school instructor did not 
consistently provide adequate 
training. From time to time, he took 





The driving school instructor told 
his student to drive in traffic on the 





Several accidents and near misses 
occurred at a particular intersection 
but local police had not yet put up a 
stop sign. 
Failed to Correct 
Known Problem 
FC 
Though considered an authority 
figure, an officer drove his police 
vehicle faster than the posted speed 
limit and did not signal before 




The state did not allocate adequate 
funding for road maintenance or 




Police in county A were pressured Organizational OC 
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to issue a specified weekly quota of 
tickets for particular violations (e.g. 
speeding or not wearing a seatbelt.) 
Climate 
Due to the lack of standardization 
in traffic laws, drivers who moved 
from one state to another were able 
to transfer licensure without 








APPENDIX E: MISHAP NARRATIVE SAMPLES 
Sample Narrative 
1 Summary: Vehicle crossed centerline, left highway and impacted tree. 
Narrative: [Servicemember] was traveling to residence and was involved in a 
single car accident. There were no witnesses to the accident so it is difficult to 
determine any specific cause. Currently awaiting police investigation report to 
help determine possible causes so that unit can try and prevent any further 
incidents of this nature. Upon receipt of the final police investigation report, an 
update will be made to this [sic] report with lessons learned and 
recommendations. 
2 Summary: SNM was in a motorcycle accident. 
Narrative: Be aware of your surroundings at all times. SNM suffers from a 
punctured lung, broken wrist, dislocated jaw and a fractured pelivc bone. SNM is 
still in the hospital release date to return to work is still unknown. 
3 Narrative: Servicemember lost control of his vehicle while negotiating a curve in 
the road.  The vehicle slid off of the road, collided with a tree and burst into 
flames. Driver and one of the passengers died of severe smoke inhalation and 
thermal burns. The other passenger died of cervical spine fracture and skull 
fracture. Although it is unknow how much sleep the driver had gotten prior to the 
accident, it is known that he was at a party with his passengers the night before 
the accident and that there was a percentage of blood alcohol in his system.  The 
driver was also apparently drinking underage. Alcohol and probably a lack of 
sleep contributed to this incident. Another servicemember is under investigation 
by civilian authorities for providing alcohol to a minor. The Commanding Officer 
personally conducted a brief with each of the five shift sections (both staff and 
student) which included the details of the police report to again reeemphasize the 
consequences of drinking and driving and the importance of operational risk 
management in their personal lives. 
4 Narrative: [Servicemember] was involved in a single vehicle mishap while on 
liberty. [Servicemember] was the only occupant of his vehicle.  The police report 
stated that [servicemember] drove at approximately 80 MPH over train tracks and 
through an intersection. The vehicle struck a ditch and rolled multiple times.  
Upon impact, [servicemember] was ejected from the vehicle. [Servicemember] 
was not wearing a seat belt at the time.  He was pronounced dead at the scene by 
local authorities. The coronoer cited massive brain herniation as the cause of 
death. Alcohol has not been determined, still waiting on toxicology report.  
[Servicemember] received safety briefs from four levels of his chain of 
command. His squad leader asked if any members of the unit planned to travel 
outside of the local area. [Servicemember] did not reveal his plans to travel out of 
the 300 mile liberty limits. He rented a vehicle that night and drove 515 miles 
straight to his girlfriend's residence in GA. Two days later, he began driving back 
to base. He was the only occupant of his rented vehicle. [Servicemember] 




citing officer stated he was traveling over 80 MPH. He was again stopped and 
cited for speeding at 0135 in SC. The citing officer stated he was traveling 20 
MPH over the speed limit. Each officer warned him to slow down and reduced 
the speeding violations to 9 MPH the speed limit. He continued to drive probably 
fatigued and at excessive speeds until the mishap occurred.  He ran over train 
tracks and continued through the stop required intersection.  The high speed 
crossing of the train tracks caused the vehicle to veer right and impact the right 
ditch on the far side. The vehicle continued to roll for 340 feet after the initial 
point of impact. He was not wearing his seat belt at the time of the mishap and 
was ejected. 
5 Summary: Operator 1 (O1) was traveling in PMV 1 (2001 Pontiac Grand Prix) 
northbound on [sic] Boulevard at a high rate of speed and under the influence of 
alcohol. Operator 2 (O2) was traveling in PMV 2 (2001 Chrysler Concord LXI) 
southbound. O1 lost control of PMV 1 and collided with PMV 2. 
Narrative: This mishap was [originally] reported as a class B and the report was 
released. [Subsequently], Operator 1 died from his injuries. [On the day of the 
mishap], O1 had spent an unknown amount of time at a local bar with classmates. 
At approximately 2333 hours, O1 left the bar and was traveling in PMV 1 
northbound in the 2800 block of [sic] Boulevard. O1 was traveling at a high rate 
of speed, attempted to pass a vehicle that was also heading northbound, crossed 
the centerline, and lost control of PMV 1, sliding sideways directly into the path 
of PMV 2. O2 was unable to react in time and PMV 2 collided with PMV 1 on 
the passenger side. O1 was initially transported to a local emergency room but 
was later flown by care flight to a [local] hospital due to a ruptured aorta and a 
ruptured bladder and will undergo surgery when able. O2 was the designated 
driver for PMV 2 and was transporting five friends to a local club. O2 suffered a 
bruised right wrist and was treated and released. Passenger 1 (P1) was sitting in 
the rear seat passenger side by the door and suffered a kidney injury that required 
removal of the kidney, head injuries, and a lacerated liver; P1 was placed on 
quarters after surgery. Passenger 2 (P2) was also in the rear seat sitting on the left 
side of P1. P2 was admitted to the hospital for exploratory surgery where they 
found a lacerated kidney; P2 was placed on quarters after surgery. PMV 2 was 
equipped for five persons; therefore, P1 and P2 were seat belted together with 
one seatbelt which contributed to the severity of their injuries. Passenger 3 (P3) 
was seated in the rear seat behind the driver and suffered a laceration to the 
forehead and received 16 stitches to close the wound. P3 also sustained a mild 
concussion and was kept in the hospital for one day for observation. Passenger 4 
(P4) was seated in the rear seat to the right of P3. P4 received nine stitches to the 
chin and was released. Passenger 5 (P5) was seated in the front passenger seat 
and suffered a laceration to the left side of the forehead from the airbag, was 
treated, and was released. Investigation and Analysis: O1's 72-hour history was 
found to be uneventful. O1 had a check ride flight on Wednesday which he 




enforced. O1 and roommate went home on Friday and O1 cooked dinner and had 
a undetermined amount of alcohol. O1 and roommate then went to a local bar 
where they had an undetermined amount of drinks and signed up for a local 
motorcycle rally. O1 and roommate proceeded to the final destination bar at 
approximately 2200 hours. O1 had a lot of interaction with people at the bar and 
gave no indication of internal distractions. O1 and classmates frequent this 
particular establishment. Roommate stated that the person that is usually their 
designated driver was not available on this weekend so their plan was to take a 
taxicab home. Witnesses in the bar stated that O1 was having drinks at several 
different tables, but were unable to state how many drinks O1 consumed. O1's 
roommate stated that O1 had said he was not having a good time but made no 
indication to him that he was leaving. A short time later, the roommate saw O1 
leaving the bar in PMV 1. The following factors were investigated and found not 
to be contributory to this mishap: road/weather conditions: the 2800 block of 
[sic] Boulevard is a two-lane asphalt road with no median and posted 35 mph 
zone. The road was in good condition. Residential areas border the east and west 
side of the roadway. The roadway is well marked with a yellow dashed center 
line. The weather was clear and the roadway was dry. Lighting in mishap area: 
although not contributory, the 2800 block of [sic] Boulevard has very poor 
lighting with only infrequent lamp post lighting. Personal protective equipment 
used: O1 was wearing a seat belt; PMV 1's airbag deployed. Vehicle condition: 
PMV 1 seemed to have been in good condition prior to the accident, with good 
tread life on the tires. O1 was cited for driving while intoxicated and toxicology 







APPENDIX F: CONTINGENCY TABLES BY MILITARY BRANCH 
Cell Contents:  Count 
   Expected Count 
 
ANALYSES FOR EACH CATEGORY: Found significant differences for 7 categories 
(SBE, VIO, PhyE, TechE, AMS, PML, CCP) 
 
 Skill Based Error 
0 1 












Pearson Chi-Square=9.743, DF=2, P-Value=0.008   Significant 
 
 Decision Error 
0 1 

































 Physical Environment 
0 1 












Pearson Chi-Square=8.852, DF=2, P-Value=0.012   Significant 
 
 Technological Environment 
0 1 












Pearson Chi-Square=17.716, DF=2, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
 
 Adverse Mental State 
0 1 












Pearson Chi-Square=100.399, DF=2, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 

















 Physical/Mental Limitation 
0 1 












Pearson Chi-Square=22.459, DF=2, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
 
 Communication, Coordination, and Planning 
0 1 












Pearson Chi-Square=18.713, DF=2, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
 
SUBSEQUENT ANALYSES FOR SIGNIFICANT CATEGORIES: SBE, VIO, PhyE, TechE, 
AMS, PML, and CCP 
 
 Skill Based Error 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=6.906, DF=1, P-Value=0.009   Significant 
     
          
         





 Skill Based Error 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.868, DF=1, P-Value=0.352   Insignificant 
 
 Skill Based Error 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=5.926, DF=1, P-Value=0.015   Significant 
     
          
         












Pearson Chi-Square=22.412, DF=1, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
     
         
         


























Pearson Chi-Square=20.487, DF=1, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
     
          
          
      
 
 Physical Environment 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=2.322, DF=1, P-Value=0.128   Insignificant 
 
 Physical Environment 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.304, DF=1, P-Value=0.581   Insignificant 
 
 Physical Environment 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=8.388, DF=1, P-Value=0.004   Significant 
     
         
         




 Technological Environment 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=10.188, DF=1, P-Value=0.001   Significant 
     
        
         
   
 
 Technological Environment 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=3.283, DF=1, P-Value=0.070   Insignificant 
 
 Technological Environment 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=9.404, DF=1, P-Value=0.002   Significant 
     
         
        
      
 
 Adverse Mental State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=30.473, DF=1, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
     
          
         




 Adverse Mental State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=1.100, DF=1, P-Value=0.294   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Mental State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=86.945, DF=1, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
     
          
         
      
 
 Physical/Mental Limitation 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=13.494, DF=1, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
     
         
        
      
 
 Physical/Mental Limitation 
0 1 












 Physical/Mental Limitation 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=13.681, DF=1, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
     
         
         
      
 
 Communication, Coordination, and Planning 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=3.090, DF=1, P-Value=0.079   Insignificant 
 
 Communication, Coordination, and Planning 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=2.107, DF=1, P-Value=0.287      
F     ’            : P-Value=0.527691     Insignificant 
 
 Communication, Coordination, and Planning 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=17.700, DF=1, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
     
         
        




APPENDIX G: CONTINGENCY TABLES BY VEHICLE TYPE 
Cell Contents:  Count 
   Expected Count 
 
ANALYSES FOR EACH CATEGORY: Found significant differences for 5 categories 
(PhyE, AMS, APS, PML, CCP) 
 
 Skill Based Error 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.642, DF=1, P-Value=0.423   Insignificant 
 
 Decision Error 
0 1 




















Pearson Chi-Square=0.490, DF=1, P-Value=0.484   Insignificant 
 
 Physical Environment 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=6.397, DF=1, P-Value=0.011   Significant 
      
          
         




 Technological Environment 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.675, DF=1, P-Value=0.411   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Mental State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=4.159, DF=1, P-Value=0.041   Significant 
      
          
         
      
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=57.639, DF=1, P-Value=0.000    Significant 
      
          
         
      
 
 Physical/Mental Limitation 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=90.376, DF=1, P-Value=0.000    Significant 
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 Communication, Coordination, and Planning 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=6.684, DF=1, P-Value=0.010    Significant 
      
         
        





APPENDIX H: CONTINGENCY TABLES BY PAYGRADE 
Cell Contents:  Count 
   Expected Count 
 
ANALYSES FOR EACH CATEGORY: Found significant difference for 1 category (VIO) 
 
 Skill Based Error 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=1.584, DF=1, P-Value=0.208   Insignificant 
 
 Decision Error 
0 1 




















Pearson Chi-Square=5.162, DF=1, P-Value=0.023   Significant 
     
         
         
      
 
 Physical Environment 
0 1 












 Technical Environment 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.072, DF=1, P-Value=0.789    
F     ’            : P-Value=1      Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Mental State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.753, DF=1, P-Value=0.386   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=1.361, DF=1, P-Value=0.243   Insignificant 
 
 Physical/Mental Limitation 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=1.467, DF=1, P-Value=0.226   Insignificant 
 
 Communication, Coordination, and Planning 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=1.093, DF=1, P-Value=0.296    
F     ’            : P-Value=0.299239     Insignificant 
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APPENDIX I: CONTINGENCY TABLES BY AGE GROUP 
Cell Contents:  Count 
   Expected Count 
 
ANALYSES FOR EACH CATEGORY: Found significant differences for 2 categories 
(VIO and APS) 
 
 Skill Based Error 
0 1 
























Pearson Chi-Square=4.286, DF=5, P-Value=0.509   Insignificant 
 
 Decision Error 
0 1 























































Pearson Chi-Square=20.453, DF=5, P-Value=0.001   Significant 
 
 Physical Environment 
0 1 





























 Technological Environment 
0 1 
























Pearson Chi-Square=3.395, DF=5, P-Value=0.639   Insignificant 
*NOTE* 3 cells with expected counts less than 5 
 
 Adverse Mental State 
0 1 





























 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 
























Pearson Chi-Square=14.162, DF=5, P-Value=0.015   Significant 
 
 Physical/Mental Limitation 
0 1 





























 Communication, Coordination, and Planning 
0 1 
























Pearson Chi-Square=10.432, DF=5, P-Value=0.064   Insignificant 
*NOTE* 3 cells with expected counts less than 5 
 












Pearson Chi-Square=6.139, DF=1, P-Value=0.013   Significant 
              
         
         



















































Pearson Chi-Square=5.857, DF=1, P-Value=0.016   Significant 
           
        
       












Pearson Chi-Square=5.964, DF=1, P-Value=0.015   Significant 
             =
         
         







































Pearson Chi-Square=15.495, DF=1, P-Value=0.000   Significant 
           
         
        






































Pearson Chi-Square=5.663 DF=1, P-Value=0.017   Significant 
            
        
       
























Pearson Chi-Square=7.040, DF=1, P-Value=0.008   Significant 
            
        
       












Pearson Chi-Square=4.390, DF=1, P-Value=0.036   Significant 
            
        
       







Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=4.880, DF=1, P-Value=0.027   Significant 
              
          
         
      
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.066, DF=1, P-Value=0.798   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.617, DF=1, P-Value=0.432   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=7.244, DF=1, P-Value=0.007   Significant 
              
         
        





 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.837, DF=1, P-Value=0.360   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=3.418, DF=1, P-Value=0.064   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.696, DF=1, P-Value=0.404   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=2.134, DF=1, P-Value=0.144   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=4.277, DF=1, P-Value=0.039   Significant 
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 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=0.316, DF=1, P-Value=0.574   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=6.116, DF=1, P-Value=0.013   Significant 
              
        
        
      
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=1.113, DF=1, P-Value=0.291   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=3.202, DF=1, P-Value=0.074   Insignificant 
 
 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 












 Adverse Physiological State 
0 1 








Pearson Chi-Square=7.092, DF=1, P-Value=0.008   Significant 
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